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Abstract 
From 1 April 2005, UK law was changed to allow children born through gamete donation to 
access identifying details of the donor. The decision to abolish donor anonymity was strongly 
influenced by a discourse that asserted the 'child's right-to-know' their genetic origins. Under 
the current regulation, if would-be parents want to receive treatment in the UK, they have no 
option but to use gametes/embryos from identifiable donors. For a majority, this also means 
that they will be on lengthy waiting lists due to the donor shortage. Interestingly, the voice of 
would-be parents - those who would be most affected by a contraction in donor supply and 
would carry the burden of informing children of their origins, should they so choose- were not 
heard during the donor anonymity debate or thereafter. 
Adopting a social constructionist approach, this thesis studies removal of donor anonymity as a 
social problem and examines why would-be parents remained silent during the public debate. 
There are two major steps taken: first, examining the donor anonymity debate in the public 
realm through media presentations, and secondly investigating would-be parents' reactions 
through ethnographic studies: a virtual ethnography study and interviews. 
The accounts of a sub-group of would-be parents reveal that having a donor-conceived child 
constitutes a permanent charge of deviance against the family. Many would-be parents were 
reluctant to raise their voices during the donor anonymity debate because they did not want to 
be exposed to publicity. Their reluctance to mobilise around pressing claims against the 
removal of donor anonymity reflects the variety of ways in which they can avoid the impact of 
this legislation. 
The thesis concludes by underlining the importance of having an informed public debate about 
the disclosure policy, and of developing mechanisms to protect both would-be parents' and 
donor offspring's interests. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
On 1 April 2005, with the implementation of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulations 2004, 
UK law was changed to allow children born through gamete donation to access 
identifying details of the donor. Once they reach the age of 18, children born 
from ova or semen donated after that date will have the right to obtain 
identifying information about the donors. Previously, they only had access to 
non-identifying information, including the opportunity to ascertain whether 
they might be biologically related to a prospective marriage partner. 
The removal of anonymity has generally had a negative impact on both the 
demand for, and the recruitment of, gamete donors (Cook and Golombok, 
1995a; Paul, Harbottle and Stewart, 2006; Robinson et al., 1991; Schover, 
Rothmann and Collins, 1992). It has been argued that the UK's policy of non-
anonymous and non-remunerated donation not only causes long waiting lists 
for donor conception (Dreaper, 2006; British Fertility Society, 2006), but also 
drives an increasing number of would-be parents abroad to seek treatment 
(Infertility Network UK, 2008). British would-be parents cite the shortage of 
gametes (particularly the shortage of eggs) in the UK as a major reason for 
receiving treatment abroad (British Fertility Society, 2006; Infertility Network 
UK, 2008). A further effect of the change in legislation has been that the cost 
of donor insemination (DI) has risen enormously in many centres; and the 
programme has effectively been removed from the NHS as standard practice in 
most areas (British Fertility Society, 2007). In other words, fewer people now 
have access to the treatment in the UK. 
A sub-group of would-be parents have been using online discussion forums to 
express their reactions to the law however their voices were not heard during 
the public donor anonymity debate or thereafter. This thesis focuses on their 
absent voices and attempts to understand why would-be parents remained silent 
during the donor anonymity debate, whilst advocates of the child's right-to-
know managed to get their claims recognised by the parliament and regulatory 
bodies. 
The research question 
Adopting a social constructionist approach, this study focuses on would-be 
parents' reactions to the law. The thesis is guided by an over-arching question: 
how may donor conception families' reactions to the disclosure policy in the 
UK better be understood? There are two major steps taken to answer this 
question: first, examining the donor anonymity debate in the public eye 
through media presentations, and secondly investigating a sub-group of would-
be parents' reactions and concerns through ethnographic studies. 
Background 
Prior to the 1980s, there was little awareness of donor conception in the UK 
(Snowden and Mitchell, 1983). Semen donation was perfonned without central 
record-keeping or regulation (Frith, 200 I). Children born by this means were 
technically illegitimate: the donor rather than the mother's husband was 
1 
.... 
considered the legal father (O'Donovan, 1989). In practice, though, the 
husband was usually recorded on the birth certificate as the legal father (Frith, 
2001). This deception, potentially a criminal offence, contributed to the desire 
to keep the child's history secret. In the absence of social and legal 
acceptability (Vercollone, Moss and Moss, 1997), concealing the method of 
conception from the offspring protected the adults involved - prospective 
parents, donors (Daniels and Taylor, 1993), and medical practitioners (Haimes, 
1993). 
The legal vacuum around assisted conception was challenged by the birth of 
Louise Brown, the world's first 'test-tube baby', in 1978. Although this 
resulted from in vitro fertilisation (lVF) rather than gamete donation, the 
technology clearly opened the way to new combinations of biological and 
social parentage that would need legal specification and recognition. In 1982, 
the UK government commissioned the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology, chaired by Baroness Warnock, a prominent 
philosopher, to report on the ethical and legal issues associated with assisted 
conception and related technologies. The Committee reported in the following 
year. Among its conclusions was a proposal that children born from donation 
should be defined as legitimate and that the donor should have no parental 
rights or duties (O'Donovan, 1988). This recommendation was enacted in the 
Family Law Reform Act 1987. The Committee also proposed that, in the case 
of gamete donation, the birth certificate should state 'by donation' entered by 
the father's or mother's name, as appropriate (Frith, 2001). The latter 
recommendation did not survive the House of Commons debate that led to the 
3 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFE Act) as it was thought 
that it would cause unnecessary embarrassment to the child (Lee and Morgan. 
2001). The Act's main effect was to create the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) to license and regulate clinics that carry out 
IVF, donor conception, and human embryo research. 
The Warnock Committee had endorsed the principle of anonymity in gamete 
donation to encourage donation and protect family privacy. By the early 1980s, 
however, some researchers were suggesting that it might be desirable to give 
offspring information about the donor's identity (e.g. Snowden and Mitchell, 
1983). Section 31 (3) of the HFE Act allowed offspring conceived through 
gamete donation the right to apply for information about the donor when 
reaching the age of 18. Although the Act did not specify the content of the 
information, the HFEA Code of Practice 6th Edition directed that donors should 
be told that 'the Act generally permits donors to preserve their anonymity' 
(HFEA, 1991: 4iii). In practice, donors were asked to provide some non-
identifying information, which could be passed to potential recipients. 
In January 2001 the Department of Health announced that the legislation 
governing access to information for those conceived through gamete donation 
would be reviewed. The government then launched a public consultation, 
which ended in January 2003. A significant majority of respondents endorsed 
the provision of non-identifying donor information to donor-conceived 
children, while a smaller portion of respondents proposed the complete 
removal of donor anonymity (Blyth and Frith, 2008). Nevertheless. the 
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government accepted 'a strong argument in principle for children conceived 
using donated sperm, eggs and embryos being able to find out the identity of 
their donor' (Hazel Blears, the minister of public health in Dyer, 2003). The 
government subsequently announced, in January 2004, that people who 
donated eggs, sperm, or embryos in the UK were to lose their right to 
anonymity from 1 April 2005. Anyone born using sperm, eggs, or embryos 
donated after that date may ask the HFEA for identifying information about 
their donors, when they reach the age of 18. Donors may only be told whether 
any children were born from their donation and some limited information about 
them -number, gender, and the year(s) in which they were born. 
The HFE Act 1990 was amended with effect from 5 July 2007 to bring the EU 
Tissues and Cells Directive (EUTCD) into UK law. Following the 
implementation of the EUTCD, the procurement, testing, processing or 
distribution of any embryo or sperm and eggs intended for human use must be 
licensed by the HFEA or be subject to an agreement with a licensed service 
(HFEA, 2008b). If patients are considering obtaining sperm, eggs or embryos 
from within the EU, a licensed UK clinic can organise for a transfer to be made 
from that country. However, the sperm, eggs or embryos transferred must meet 
UK requirements. All medical fertility and non-medical fertility services such 
as Internet sperm providers also have to abide by the UK standards, which 
include all donors being identifiable. There are other requirements: that the 
donors have consented to the transfer of their gametes/embryos to the UK; that 
they have been made aware of the legal position in the UK on identifying 
donors and implications for donors; and that they must have only receiyed 
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reasonable expenses or reimbursement of loss of earnings (no inconvenience 
payment should be made to a donor). Although would-be parents can exercise 
their rights to travel within the EU to receive gametes or embryos from a clinic 
that does not comply with UK standards, the gametes/embryos cannot travel if 
they do not meet UK requirements on screening. In short, if would-be parents 
want to receive treatment in the UK, they have no option but to use 
gametes/embryos from identifiable donors. For a majority, this also means that 
they will be on lengthy waiting lists due to the donor shortage. 
It has been argued that allowing fertility travel is "a fonn of tolerance that 
prevents the frontal clash between the majority who imposes its view and the 
minority who claim to have a moral right to some medical service" (Pennings, 
2002: 337). 1 On the one hand, fertility travel has been a safety valve for those 
who want to avoid the new law. On the other hand, would-be parents are being 
warned against seeking treatment abroad. In April 2006, Suzi Leather, the then 
chair of the HFEA, issued a public statement warning British citizens of the 
dangers of poorly regulated treatment provided abroad (HFEA, 2006). 
Under the current regulation, would-be parents are not compelled to tell their 
children about their donor origins. In spite of the greater encouragement in 
recent years for parents to disclose their children's donor origins, a recent study 
shows that less than eight per cent of egg donation parents, and less than five 
per cent of those who used donor insemination, disclosed to their children 
1 The movement of would-be parents to seek treatment in the international market is often 
referred to as 'reproductive tourism' or 'fertility tourism'. For the reasons I present in Chapter 
Eight, this term is perceived as offensive by the participants in this study, thcrefore throughout 
the thesis I will refer to 'reproducti\'c tourism' as 'fertility travel'. 
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(Golombok et aI., 2006). This shows that donor conception is often kept secret. 
As a matter of fact, any right to find out (identifying or non-identifying) 
information about the donor does not in itself eliminate secrecy surrounding 
the child's means of conception unless the use of donor gametes is registered 
on the child's birth certificate (Jackson, 2001). So far, none of the countries 
that have removed donor anonymity have formalised a system for informing 
the child. However, in the UK, in August 2007 the Joint Committee on the 
Draft Human Tissue and Embryo Bill considered whether the draft Bill should 
be amended to give donor-conceived people a 'legal' right-to-know and parents 
the 'legal' duty to tell, and also whether donor conception should be registered 
on the birth certificates of donor-conceived people. The government's 
response, published in October 2007, rejected the Committee's suggestion of 
putting 'by donor' on the birth certificates of donor offspring. It did however 
indicate that the matter would be kept under review. 
The process of project design 
This research started with a keen interest in the donor anonymity debate in the 
UK. By the time I started my PhD course, it had been almost four years since 
the Department of Health had announced that the legislation which maintained 
donor anonymity was under review. Even before the removal of donor 
anonymity, clinics in the UK had experienced difficulty in obtaining a 
sufficient supply of gametes (Murray and Golombok, 2000). Therefore, this 
announcement generated increased media interest in gamete supply and 
demand issues, particularly in relation to sperm. So, for example, in November 
2004, an article in The Times noted: 
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---------------_ ... 
TWELVE hundred years ago, the Danes spread their genes in Britain 
by rape and occupation. Now they are taking a less confrontational 
approach: a Danish sperm bank is stocking up large amounts of semen 
ready to flood the British market when sperm donation rules are 
changed next year (Browne, 2004). 
The article went on to explain that Cryos International, the world's largest 
sperm bank, based in Denmark, had recruited 40 donors -mostly blonde, blue-
eyed students over 6ft tall -who would meet British regulatory requirements. 
While the managing director and founder of Cryos interpreted the new 
regulations as a business opportunity, the media reported that clinicians in the 
UK were expressing concern about the said developments: the system in the 
UK would collapse if anonymity was lifted - donors wanted to remain 
anonymous. 
In the years that followed the removal of donor anonymity, fertility travel 
began to be featured in the media. The media reported that, donors had become 
scared and donations had dropped sharply; that there were now long waiting 
lists; and that some clinics would have to tum patients down. There was also a 
concern that those who receive donor conception treatment would prefer 
anonymous donors and that lifting anonymity would encourage people to buy 
unscreened sperm (which could be purchased through websites), or drive 
people abroad, as had happened in Sweden following the introduction of a 
similar law in 1985? 
~ ~ Since the removal of donor anonymity, many Swedish patients receive treatment in Denmark 
where anonymity is pennitted. 
------ ----_ ... _---_. 
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During the donor anonymity debate that preceded the new law, representatives 
of children's organisations, a number of academicians and donor-conceived 
adults pressed claims for the child's right-to-know, a movement that is 
described more fully in Chapter Three. Interestingly, the government did not 
face resistance from would-be parents - those who would be most affected by a 
contraction in donor supply and would carry the burden of informing children 
of their origins, should they so choose. My interest in the absence of would-be 
parents from these debates led to this study. 
This interest further developed in the course of reading the discussion forums 
of these online support groups. Support groups increasingly use an online 
environment to offer affirmation, consolation and understanding to individuals 
in distressed or vulnerable situations (Mann and Stewart, 2000). In the UK, 
many patients who undergo infertility treatment use discussion forums (hosted 
by patient support groups or clinics) to express and exchange their views 
anonymously. These discussion boards were snowed under with posts about 
clinics in countries such as Spain, Poland and Russia. The fact that the most 
popular countries for fertility travel were the ones that maintained donor 
anonymity indicated a 'resistance' to the new law that needed empirical 
investigation. Although I was keen to explore would-be parents' reactions to 
the new law, it was evident that reaching this population would be a challenge. 
As I have mentioned earlier, previous research in this area shows that the 
majority of couples who reproduce with the assistance of gamete donation do 
not intend to disclose this to the resulting child (Daniels and Taylor, 1 9 9 3 ~ ~
Klock, Jacob and Maier, 1994; Golombok et al., 2006). It is then questionable 
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whether would-be parents would be willing to lodge fonnal complaints which 
might make them and their donor conceived children known. One might 
assume that would-be parents are caught in a vicious circle: those who prefer 
anonymous donation are reluctant to press their claims because confidentiality 
matters to them. Given this reticence, their voice goes unheard by public 
bodies, like the HFEA, which can only deal with issues through fonnal and 
transparent modes of communication. 
But would-be parents have been expressing their discontent anonymously on 
online discussion boards. I envisioned that I would visit these websites in order 
to: (I) recruit participants for interviews; (2) collect data from discussion 
boards to understand the reactions of would-be parents to the new law; and (3) 
explore whether there was any collective activity perfonned by would-be 
parents in alternative modes of communication to challenge the law. 
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Structure of the thesis 
Chapter Two introduces the conceptual framework adopted in the thesis: social 
constructionist study of social problems. In this chapter, different traditions of 
studying social problems - functionalism and value-conflict theories - are 
briefly discussed. A social constructionist approach is shown to have 
advantages for this study, as it provides useful tools and concepts to understand 
how people define certain conditions as troublesome, lodge complaints, and 
change conditions they perceive as problematic. In Chapter Two, after 
presenting the ontological debate within social constructionism, I conclude that 
contextual constructionism, which locates claims within their broader social 
context, should be adopted in the thesis as this approach is more applicable and 
relevant to the public debate than strict constructionism. The chapter also 
introduces constructionism's vocabulary: claims; claims-making; and claims-
makers as well as natural history models, which will be used in the following 
chapters. 
Chapter Three examines how the donor anonymity problem was promoted in 
the UK. The chapter details the natural history of the child's right-to-know 
movement, and analyses the claims-making that succeeded in defining donor 
anonymity as a social problem, sufficient to change the law. The chapter deals 
with the ways in which claims were formed and presented during the debate by 
the stakeholders, identifies a number of important claims that were made by the 
proponents of the child's right-to-know, and explains how donor conceived 
children came to monopolise rights language. It presents the principal 
claimants, the specific claims lodged against the anonymous-donation system, 
1 1 
and the reasons why the counter claims-makers were overwhelmed. This 
chapter reveals the absence of would-be parents in the debate, the stakeholders 
who would be directly affected by the new arrangements regarding donor 
conception. 
Chapter Four presents the rationale and design of the study, and describes how 
the empirical research - the interviews and the virtual ethnography - was 
conducted. The chapter discusses the methodological challenges of conducting 
a study on hidden or hard-to-reach popUlations, such as donor conception 
families in the UK. It captures sampling, recruitment, access negotiations, and 
ethical issues, and reflects on how data analysis was undertaken. 
Chapters Five to Eight present the accounts of would-be parents and form the 
core empirical chapters of the thesis. These four chapters use the existing 
literature on donor conception families. Chapter Five presents the virtual 
ethnography study that I conducted on an online support group, Repromed, for 
infertility patients. Repromed was clearly one of the most active sites during 
the review of the law and represents an important source of data on voices that 
were not fully heard in the public debates over ending donor anonymity. The 
focus of this study is would-be parents' own communications and interactions 
in a setting where they discuss issues about gamete and embryo donation. The 
chapter analyses the posts, demonstrates that an interaction exists among the 
users, and gives examples of alternative claims-making activities. The findings 
indicate that the users of the website clearly associate the donor shortage with 
the change in the law to remove anonymity and criticise the HFEA for not 
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taking precautions in advance. The users also criticise the HFEA' s new donor 
selection and recruitment strategy. The findings suggest that their 
understandings of welfare and kinship are very different from those of the 
policy elites responsible for this legal reform. 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight draw on data collected by semi-structured and 
open-ended interviews. Goffman's Stigma (1963) theory provides the 
background to my data analysis in these chapters and I draw on sociology and 
anthropology of kinship. 
Chapter Six focuses on would-be parents' presentations of 'failing to 
reproduce'. Having failed to conceive, the participants experienced stigma as 
they departed from the social norm. In order to satisfy their desire for a child 
they agreed to have their gametes substituted, but they then bear a double 
stigma, because the means of conception and the resultant child are 
marginalised. 
Chapter Seven deals with information control. The stigma that donor 
conception creates can be easily concealed. If the child's origins are kept as 
secret, the family can 'pass' as normal. Given that the donor-conceived child is 
perceived as non-natural and manufactured, revealing the child's origins is 
perceived as potentially stigmatising both for the family unit as a whole, and 
the resultant child who does not need to know his/her deviance. By keeping 
donor conception secret the participants want to protect the family unit as a 
whole from stigma. 
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Chapter Eight focuses on would-be parents' reluctance to mobilise around 
pressing claims against the new law. In this chapter I examine the variety of 
ways in which they can avoid the impact of this legislation and discuss fertility 
travel as an avoidance strategy. 
The accounts of the would-be parents reflect social assumptions about 
biological and social parenthood, and the stigma that surrounds donor 
conception. It is evident that these assumptions play a role in how they assess 
themselves as potential parents, and the best interests of the resultant child. 
These assumptions also have an impact on disclosure, and how the would-be 
parents want to present themselves within and outside their families. This 
examination helps to explain their reticence during the donor anonymity 
debate. These parents feel that maintaining secrecy, or limiting information, 
about the child's conception is the safest way to protect the child, themselves, 
and the extended family. Fertility travel acts as a safety valve for would-be 
parents that allow them to avoid the legal imposition of disclosure in the UK. 
In the final chapter, I retrace the steps that I have taken in the thesis. This 
concluding chapter brings together all the elements to answer the research 
question, and explains how the would-be parents react to the new law that 
forces them to display their differences. To close, I discuss the implications of 
the work as whole. 
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Limitations of the study 
This study does not claim to be a definitive account of would-be parents' 
reactions to the removal of donor anonymity or to include a representative 
sample of people seeking donor conception in the UK. Firstly, men, single 
women, and couples in same sex relationship are, though not entirely absent, 
only a minority of the sample. Secondly, being a 'would-be parent' is an 
inherently transient status; their views about the law or donor conception may 
change as they move into the status of a 'parent', or some may accept their 
status as non-parents and give up trying. Thirdly, as I used Internet as a 
recruitment channel, a majority of the accounts presented belong to those who 
have Internet access, or those who favour expressing their views in cyberspace. 
Finally, the difficulty of capturing the views of those who choose to remain 
more 'silent' than the would-be parents in this study is self-evident. Some 
voices will always remain silent. 
15 
CHAPTER TWO: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST 
STUDIES OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
In this thesis, adopting a social constructionist approach, I study the removal of 
donor anonymity as a social problem. Before I examine what makes donor 
anonymity a social problem in the UK, I will provide a review of social 
problems literature and introduce the conceptual framework, contextual 
constructionism, adopted in the thesis. 
There are different sociological perspectives on the definition of social 
problems and how to study them. Between the 1920s and 1970s, studies of 
social problems were heavily influenced by a functionalist approach. Some 
scholars sought to create a different kind of sociology of social problems: the 
'value conflict' approach was the result. However, a theoretically integrated 
and empirically viable research tradition did not develop until the emergence of 
'social constructionist' theory (Blumer, 1971; Spector and Kitsuse, 1977; 
Schneider, 1985). The radical proposition of social constructionism is that 
social problems result from the definitional activities of people around 
conditions: thus the analyst should focus on monitoring the activities of the 
people who are trying to alter these putatively 'undesirable' conditions. 
Although a detailed discussion of the different traditions of social problems 
analysis is not within the scope of this thesis, it will be helpful to locate and 
justify my approach through a brief consideration of the history of these ideas. 
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Following this, a reVIew of Spector and Kitsuse' s approach to social 
constructionist studies of social problems is provided. Spector and Kitsuse' s 
work is subject to both 'strong and weak interpretations' (Best, 1993: Holstein 
and Miller, 2006). A strong reading of constructionism urges the analysts to 
avoid discussing social conditions. A weak reading, on the other hand, locates 
claims within their broader social context. An ontological debate on these 
different interpretations resulted in the emergence of two different perspectives 
on the study of social problems: strict constructionism and contextual 
constructionism. Both approaches focus on the claims-making processes, 
however the latter proposes that understanding social problems claims often 
depends upon understanding their context, because claims-makers have 
particular reasons for choosing particular rhetoric to address particular 
problems. After explaining my rationale for taking a contextual constructionist 
epistemological approach to study the donor anonymity problem, I will briefly 
discuss the empirical model suggested by social problems theorists: natural 
history. The natural history model was first introduced by value conflict 
theorists and further developed by Spector and Kitsuse (1977). This model will 
then be applied to the donor anonymity debate in Chapter Three to identify the 
claims that defined the donor anonymity as a social problem. 
The functional approach to social problems 
The functional approach dominated writings on social problems for almost 50 
years. In functionalism, society is perceived as an orderly system where a 
majority of the members share common beliefs, values and norms. Society 
develops institutions (e.g., family, religion) and patterns in order to maintain 
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itself and keep it running efficiently. Societies can be treated as systems whose 
parts should be examined in terms of their interrelationships and their 
contribution to the society in general (Cotterre11, 1992). If anything adverse 
happens to one of these parts, the system cannot function properly. Therefore, 
the core of the functional etiological approach was identifying conditions and 
behaviours that impeded the fulfilment of a society's goals, throwing that 
society into disequilibrium (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977). To the functionalist, 
all elements in a social system may contribute to stability or change. 
Despite the fact that some functionalists, such as Durkheim, suggested that 
crime should be regarded as not only an inevitable but also a normal and even 
healthy social phenomenon (Cotterrell, 1992), the objective condition which 
created a social problem was generally seen as having an intrinsically harmful 
or malignant nature standing in opposition to a normal society (Blumer, 1971): 
it was a state of dysfunction, pathology, disorganisation or deviance. 
Accordingly, functionalism centred on the concepts of 'social pathology' in the 
1920s, 'social disorganisation' in the 1930s, and 'social dysfunction' by the 
1950s. 
Functionalists attempted to rationalise the changes in society in systemic terms 
rather than seeking to explain why pressures for change arise with reference to 
human actions. In consequence, they have been accused of leaving human 
beings out of the sociological picture (Cotterrell, 1992). They also claimed that 
there were invariant social laws that could explain social phenomena across 
societies, and social problems could be defined in terms of particular social 
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conditions. The objective knowledge of social conditions was obtainable 
through scientific methods, and such scientific study would demonstrate that 
some social conditions were truly social problems. By proposing that social 
conditions existed separately from people's interpretation of them, functionalist 
theory paid little attention to individual agency. 3 
Challenges to functionalism 
Value conflict theorists recognised the limitations and inadequacies of the 
functionalist model. Waller (1936) argued that attempts to treat social problems 
in a scientific matter had proved useless due to the emphasis given to the 
objective side of the problems, and the lack of attention to the value 
judgements constituting them as problems. Likewise, (Becker, 1966) suggested 
that no social problem was solely a matter of objective conditions but rather a 
product of a process of definitions. 
Another critique of functionalism was that it gave the sociologist a privileged 
status in identifying a social problem, like a medical practitioner who was 
3 The work of Merton (1971), however, demonstrates how values were included in the 
functional approach to social problems. Merton divides social problems into two categories: 
deviant behaviour and social disorganisation. Deviant behaviour is the violation of 
institutionalised fonus. Accordingly, this definition requires assumptions about the social 
norms and some notion of value consensus. Still, the approach does not require a "full-blown 
functional theory of social systems" (Spector & Kitsuse, 1977). In contrast, the second concept, 
social disorganisation, explains social problems with an elaborate set of assumptions and 
assertions. Merton notes: "Social disorganization refers to inadequacies or failures in a social 
system of interrelated statuses and roles, such that the collective purposes and individual 
objectives of its members are less fully realized than they could be in an alternative workable 
system ... " (p. 820). As Merton himself acknowledges, this is not an easy task. The designation 
of a condition as social disorganisation requires that we assume our basic unit of analysis to be 
a 'system' and that we identify the 'collective purposes' and 'individual objccti\cs'. In other 
words, the sociologist is required to make technical judgcments about the workings of a social 
system. 
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diagnosing an illness. Lemert (1951 a) argued that sociologists put their ethical 
tags of 'good' and 'bad' on various conditions and behaviours according to 
their (or what they believed to be commonly shared) value judgements. 
Likewise, Blumer (1971) pointed out that a sociologist may note what he 
believed to be a malignant condition in a society, but the society may 
completely ignore its presence, or could perceive and approach it differently. 
According to Rose (1971), functionalists gave great weight to the 'functional 
prerequisites' of any social system - 'necessities of nature' - and to the 
limitations of social action in modifying these functional prerequisites. 
According to this approach, a problem caused by a functional prerequisite 
could never be avoided. Therefore, sociological research could only show why 
the problem must exist. 
Waller (1936) noted that concepts such as social disorganisation were 
necessary for purposes of logical presentation but never adequate in explaining 
social problems. Blumer (1971) argued that there was no clear definition of the 
concepts of 'deviance', 'dysfunction' , and 'structural strain' , and more 
importantly, there was no explanation of when deviance became a social 
problem. Even if these concepts were clearly defined, there was no universal 
guide for diagnosis, assessment and treatment of the subject matter. 
More recently, Miller and Holstein (1997) suggested that treating social 
problems as signs of social disorganisation and pathology was related to 
Western ideas of guaranteeing justice, equality and respect to e v e r y o n e ~ ~ hence, 
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those definitions were circumstances that departed from cultural ideals rather 
than interpretations of reality. 
Value conflict theory 
The functionalist theorists sought to explain how society functioned when a 
social problem emerged, whereas the value conflict theorists analysed how 
members of society came to see a condition as problematic. Waller (1936) and 
Fuller and Myers (1941) were early proponents of the value conflict approach. 
Their attempts to add 'subjectivity' (without totally discarding objective 
conditions) to the functionalist formulations of social problems inspired other 
value conflict theorists such as Lemert (1951a; , 1951 b) and Becker (1966). 
In functionalism, social problems are seen as an effect of objective conditions. 
That leads the sociologist to explain social problems with a focus on objective 
conditions rather than subjective definitions (e.g., people's interpretations of 
the social problems). According to value conflict theorists, however, the 
objective condition is not sufficient to constitute a social problem itself. Waller 
(1936) notes that it is value judgements that define conditions as social 
problems: 
Various attempts to treat social problems in a scientific manner have 
proved useless because they have dealt only with the objective side of 
social problems and have failed to include the attitude which 
constituted them problems (1936: 922). 
To Waller, 'the attitude' - the value judgement - is the subjective side of social 
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problems. Underlining the tension between culture - the realm of beliefs , 
values and norms - and social organisation, Waller believes that social 
problems are moral problems originating from the conflict of humanitarian and 
organisational mores. Organisational mores are the basic mores upon which 
social order is founded (e.g., private property, individualism, monogamous 
family). Humanitarian mores are mores aimed at making the world better or to 
remedy the misfortunes of others. Conditions that we see as social problems 
emanate from the organisational mores; therefore they can only be solved by 
changing the organisational mores from which they arise. 
Waller claims that social problems did not exist when every primary group 
cared for its own helpless and unfortunate. Accordingly, social problems are a 
phenomenon of secondary group society, in which the primary group is no 
longer willing and able to take care of its members. He argues that this 
breakdown brought 'humanitarianism' into existence; feeling sympathy for 
those whom we had never seen. 
Waller notes that if one attempts to treat a social problem scientifically, one 
should try to understand why it is considered as a problem. Thus, the 
sociologist must investigate the growth and functioning of the humanitarian 
mores, study the cultural and psychological background of reformers, and the 
processes of social change. 
By introducing the conflict between organisational and humanitarian mores, 
Waller opened a new door to social problems studies. He did not abandon the 
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concept of objective conditions in his social problems formulation. However, 
he did argue that without value judgements a condition could not constitute a 
social problem. In social problems literature, Waller's approach was radical, if 
not revolutionary: 
Weare all, as Galsworthy remarked, under sentence of death, but death is not a 
social problem; death becomes a social problem only when men die, as we 
think, unnecessarily, as in war or by accident or preventable disease. Not all the 
miseries of mankind are social problems (1936: 924 ).Like Waller, the work of 
Fuller and Myers (1941) also contributed to the study of social problems by 
adding sUbjectivity to the functionalist conceptualisation: 
[I]f conditions are not defined as social problems by the people 
involved in them, they are not problems to those people, although they 
may be problems to outsiders or to scientists (1941: 320). 
Fuller and Myers defined a social problem as "a condition, which is defined by 
a considerable number of persons as a deviation from some norm, which they 
cherish" (1941: 320) . According to the authors, every social problem consisted 
of an objective condition and a subjective definition. This objective condition 
was a verifiable situation (such as trends in the birth rate) and could be checked 
by trained observers. The second component of the definition involved 
subjectivity: the awareness of certain individuals that the condition was a threat 
to certain cherished values. 
Similarly to Waller, Fuller and Myers noted that cultural values play an 
important role in the definition of a social problem. They suggested that value 
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judgements cause people to define the same condition and solutions differently. 
According to Fuller and Myers, social problems involved a dual conflict of 
values. First, with regard to some conditions, people disagreed as to whether 
the conditions were a threat to fundamental values. Secondly, even if they 
agreed on that, they would disagree over programmes of refonn due to lack of 
other values relative to means or policy. The authors argued that social 
problems arose and were sustained since people did not share the same 
common values and objectives (Waller also had noted that social problems 
existed because people did not want to solve them). Finally, not only Waller 
but also Fuller and Myers suggested the same solution: sociologists must not 
only study the objective condition phase of a social problem but also the value 
judgements of the people involved in it. 
Blumer (1971) drew attention to 'collective definitions'. He argued that "social 
problems are fundamentally products of a process of collective definition 
instead of existing independently as a set of objective social arrangements with 
an intrinsic make up" (1971: 298). According to him objective conditions could 
not constitute a social problem. Rather, it was the process of collective 
definitions that detennined the career and fate of the social problem. Other 
value conflict theorists introduced similar definitions. For example Rubington 
and Weinberg (1971) defined a social problem as: "an alleged situation that is 
incompatible with the values of a significant number of people who agree that 
action is needed to alter the situation" (1971: 6). Yet another definition reads: 
A social problem is a condition affecting a significant number of people in 
ways considered undesirable, about which it is felt something can be done 
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through collective social action" (Horton and Leslie, 1981: 4). 
Critics questioned these elements of subjectivity introduced by proponents of 
the value conflict approach (e.g. humanitarian mores, value judgements, or 
collective definitions). Some argued that the value conflict definition of social 
problems was largely dictated by the given society: "if' significant groups' are 
relied upon to define what the social problems are, it is most likely that these 
are also the powerful groups who sit in central positions of the status quo" 
(Westhues, 1973: 425). To them, value conflict theory remained class-biased: it 
accepted the judgements of the powerful social classes in defining what 
conditions were social problems (Westhues, 1973). 
Another criticism was raised by Spector and Kitsuse (1977). Despite having 
argued for basic changes in the functionalist approach, the value conflict 
theorists neither abandoned the concept of objective conditions in their social 
problems definition, nor did they suggest a simple empirical model to study 
social problems. Spector and Kitsuse argued that the objective condition in the 
formulation should be abandoned altogether, and all emphasis should be put on 
subjective definitions. 
The rise of social constructionism 
The opening line of Constructing Social Problems (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977) 
is: "there is no adequate definition of social problems within sociology, and 
there is not and never has been a sociology of social problems" (1977: 1). By 
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rejecting the dominant conventional social problems definitions that are 
suggested by functionalists and value conflict theorists, Spector and Kitsuse 
suggested a radical change in social problems theory. 
According to the authors, although value conflict theorists acknowledged that 
objective conditions were not in themselves sufficient to constitute a social 
problem, they did not discard them in their formulation. For example, Fuller 
and Myers (1941) had argued: "the subjective definition is the awareness of 
certain individuals that the condition is a threat to certain cherished values" 
(1941: 45). According to Spector and Kitsuse this formulation is ambiguous 
because the 'awareness' of that condition as a 'threat' is not clear: it is 
unknown whether the condition is in fact a 'threat'. If the subjective definition 
is based on a 'belief that the condition is a threat, the sociologist does not need 
to verify the existence of the imputed condition. In other words, Spector and 
Kitsuse reject the dualism of putting both objective conditions and SUbjective 
definitions into the formulation. They define social problems as "the activities 
of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with 
respect to some putative conditions" (1977: 75). With this definition, they 
replace the concept of 'objective conditions' by 'putative conditions'. 
The proponents of the value conflict approach, Fuller and Myers (1941), also 
claimed that an objective condition was a verifiable situation, the existence of 
which could be confirmed or discarded by impartial and trained observers. To 
Spector and Kitsuse, a problematic condition does not exist until it is defined as 
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such, thus there are no existing conditions waiting to be discovered by experts. 4 
The authors further note that there is not necessarily a relationship between any 
objective indicators of social problem conditions and what people worry about. 
There can be objective conditions that create harm without subjective worry, or 
people can start to worry about a condition when objective indicators seem to 
show that the condition is not new or growing. Spector and Kitsuse therefore 
suggest that social problems are constructed through social claims and 
explanations about how these problems should be understood (Spector and 
Kitsuse, 1977). These definitional activities are defined as 'claims-making 
activities'. Claims-making activity has nothing to do with social problem 
conditions; all attention is on the activity of people who try to persuade the 
audience to evaluate a condition as a problem. 
The social constructionist definition of social problems was subject to 
criticism. One of these was that it still involved objectivism, despite its 
rejection of this aspect of more conventional forms of social problems research. 
In response to this, Ibarra and Kitsuse suggested that 'claims-making 
constitutes social problems' (1993: 34). A social problem "points to that class 
of social interactions consisting of members' analytically paraphrasable means 
for formulating, describing, interpreting, and evaluating a symbolically 
4 In functionalism, the sociologist is positioned as an expert who diagnoses a problem. With 
regards to the sociologist's stand, Spector and Kitsuse argue that the significance of objective 
conditions are the assertions made about them, and not the validity of those assertions as 
judged from some independent standpoint, as for example, that of a social scientist. Spect.or 
and Kitsuse also oppose the value conflict theorists' interest in values and mores. Accordmg to 
them, there is no sense in discussing how society defines values; rather than speaking of 
society in the abstract, it is sensible to examine some concrete instances where definitions are 
constructed. According to the authors, the sociologist should not be the participant in the 
problem. If a sociologist acts as an expert in treating a social problem, then he/she will be a 
participant rather than an analyst. Paradoxically, in social constructionism, by pointing out a 
claims-making activity, the sociologist herself becomes a claimant. 
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constructed and morally charged inter-subjective existence" (1993: 48). The 
main modification in this formulation is a linguistic tum: a redefinition of the 
focus of inquiry from the claims-making activities to the discursive strategies. 
As opposed to this approach which limits social problems work to the 
examination of rhetorics, others have argued that the inclusion of socio-cultural 
context is an important feature of claims-making (Best, 1993). According to 
these latter theorists, evaluation of social problems claims is an important part 
of studying social problems: In fact, it is what makes it relevant to public 
debate. The epistemological debate that resulted in the emergence of two 
different perspectives will be detailed in the following section. 
Theoretical controversy: challenges to constructionist theory 
Contrary to the realist stance of functionalism which proposes that an external 
world exists independently of our representations of it, Spector and Kitsuse 
posited a relativist approach that was based on the doctrine that, since any such 
external world was inaccessible to us in both principle and practice, it did not 
need to be postulated or considered (Cromby and Nightingale, 1999). The 
authors also rejected the value conflict school's approach that objective 
conditions might help to explain the subjective elements of social problems. To 
them, social constructionists study how a condition is defined as a social 
problem, not the social condition itself. 
By bracketing attention to objective conditions, constructionist theory opened 
its doors to critics. However, critics have tended to come from within 
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constructionism rather than outside. The principal controversy has been the 
attack on 'ontological gerrymandering'. Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) argued 
that Spector and Kitsuse adopted a theoretically inconsistent stance by 
bootlegging assumptions about social conditions into their analyses. According 
to the authors, constructionism frequently involves the selective application of 
scepticism, allowing or denying the existence of phenomena according to the 
analyst's attitude towards them: 
The successful [constructionist] social problems explanation depends 
on making problematic the truth status of certain states of affairs 
selected for the analysis and explanation, while backgrounding or 
minimizing the possibility that the same problems apply to assumptions 
upon which the analysis depends (1985: 216) 
A first reaction to this critique was to call for analysts to avoid all assumptions 
about social conditions. In response to this criticism, some social 
constructionists have acknowledged their epistemological shortcomings. 
Nevertheless, they argued that claims-making should be examined within its 
context and inclusion of the socio-cultural context is an important feature of 
claims-making (Best, 1993). As a result, two main streams emerged: strict 
constructionism and contextual constructionism. 
Strict constructionists avoid making (even implicit) assumptions about 
objective reality. To them, the actual social conditions are irrelevant - all that 
matters is the perspectives of claims-makers. Some critics argue that strict 
constructionism has little to say about the everyday practices of social 
construction. For example, as Loseke (2003) notes, a question might be 
whether such an understanding of social constructionism diverts attention from 
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more important questions about social problems. Questions associated with 
subjective definitions might not seem as real or immediate as those associated 
with objective conditions. Another criticism of strict constructionism is raised 
by Best (1993) . He argues that all sociological analysis requires stepping back 
from the subjects of research, calling at least a portion of the taken-for-granted 
social world into question. Strict constructionists however advocate stepping 
back even further. By distancing themselves from the research subject, they are 
assuming less and calling more into question. Best claims that this is an 
unattainable goal because analysts use a language, and a culture's assumptions 
are built into its language. As a result, no matter how far analysts distance 
themselves from their subject matter, ontological gerrymandering is inevitable. 
Most importantly, Spector and Kitsuse dismiss interests as antecedents to 
claims-making and they suggest that the analyst cannot interpret interests as 
"anything other than imputations made by participants" (1977: 91). For that 
reason Spector and Kitsuse run the risk of creating a theory of claims-making 
"devoid of meanings, intentionality, and motives" (Bockman, 1991: 453). 
Strict constructionism comes at a cost; it constrains the analysis (Best, 1993). 
Contextual constructionism 
While the debate over strict constructionism occupied the attention of a few 
theorists seeking to locate claims-making within its context, some sociologists 
developed a more pragmatic approach, namely contextual constructionism. 
Best (1995) was one of the pioneers: 
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Claims emerge at particular historical moments in particular societies: 
they are made by particular claimsmakers, who address particular 
audiences. Claimsmakers have particular reasons for choosing 
particular rhetoric to address particular problems. Such specific 
elements from claimsmaking's context, and contextual constructionists 
argue that understanding social problems claims often depends upon 
understanding their context (1995: 345). 
Similar to value conflict theorists, contextual constructionists reconcile 
objectivism and realism, thus performing ontological gerrymandering; a form 
of epistemological deconstruction. They focus on the construction of meaning, 
yet they acknowledge making some assumptions about objective conditions. 
Some critics argue that although contextual constructionism is more applicable 
than strict constructionism, it is not flawless; it re-raises questions that social 
constructionism was designed to overcome in the first place. It is claimed to be 
incoherent, inconsistent, and confused (Loseke, 2003). But, assumption-free 
sociology is a rather unattainable goal. As Cromby and Nightingale (1999) 
argue: 
The history of critical thought shows that both realism and relativism 
are typically deployed strategically. Writers ground their critiques in 
aspects of the world which they wish to make or remain real and, from 
this grounding, relativise aspects of that they want to question or deny. 
Which aspects of the world are to be relativised and which 'real-ised' is 
a choice typically shaped by moral, political or pragmatical precepts, 
not epistemology or ontology (1999: 8). 
Best (1993) argues that ontological gerrymandering is inevitable but not a 
weakness. It is neither necessary nor possible for analysts to avoid all 
assumptions or ignore the context of claims. Besides. even the strict 
constructionist cannot escape objectivism entirely (Woolgar and Pawluch, 
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1985). On the other hand, Best (1993) notes that contextual constructionism 
will " ... not to be sure, meet the strict constructionists' tests for epistemological 
consistency, but it just might help us understand how social problems emerge 
and develop" (1993: 144). He argues: 
Just as quantitative researchers continually risk sacrificing sociological 
substance for more elaborate research designs and more sophisticated 
statistics, qualitative researchers must balance substance against the 
demands of theoretical consistency. Analytic purity can come at a 
terrible cost. The sociology of social problems began with the 
assumption that sociological knowledge might help people understand 
and improve the world; strict constructionism sells that birthright for a 
mess of epistemology (1993: 143). 
Best (1993) suggests that researchers tum away from the attractions of 
postmodern ethnography, and instead develop "grounded theories through 
analytic induction" (1993: 144). This is the main approach adopted in this 
thesis. 
'Silenced' Claims-Making 
As I will show in Chapter Three, donor anonymity problem was owned by the 
advocates of the child's right-to-know in the UK. During the public debate the 
potential impact of the disclosure policy on would-be parents could have been 
raised as a social problem. However, the government did not face resistance 
from would-be parents - those who would be most affected by a contraction in 
donor supply and would carry the burden of informing children of their origins, 
should they so choose. As I mentioned in Chapter One, my interest in the 
absence of would-be parents from these debates led to this study. 
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From strict constructionist perspective, one might assume that silence of the 
would-be parents in the donor anonymity debate indicates that there is no 
problem for them to be postulated. On the other hand, there are many 
indications of discontent among would-be parents which lead me to challenge 
the basic assumptions of strict constructionism and study the removal of donor 
anonymity as a social problem which cannot be expressed by would-be parents 
in formal modes of communication. 
Although this thesis adopts a social constructionist position on social problems 
-concentrating on explaining the subjective elements of social problems - it 
avoids a strict relativist stand. There are two main reasons for this. First, a 
strong reading of Spector and Kitsuse' s social problems definition (1977) has 
focussed attention on successful claims-making activities that gain public 
awareness. As a result, social problems research has paid little attention to 
'silenced' claims-making. Spector and Kitsuse (1977) note that social 
problems activity commences with collective attempts to remedy a condition 
that some group perceive as offensive: "social problems arise from statements 
by groups that certain conditions are intolerable and must be changed" (1977: 
148). According to Spector and Kitsuse, there will be preparatory stages of 
claims-making activities. However, not all such preparations will lead to social 
problems, "some may be abandoned, some groups may disband before they 
ever get to the stage of making a claim.[ ... J In many instances no social 
problem will develop, but in others, claims-making may emerge" (1977: 129). 
According to this statement, the validity of a social problem depends on the 
success of claims-making. If the claims-making activity fails, the problem that 
33 
generated the activity will not be considered as a social problem. This 
assumption rules out the possibility that some stakeholders can perceive a 
condition as a problem but repress their claims. For example, like would-be 
parents in the donor anonymity debate, those who have confidentiality 
concerns might not be able to identify themselves publicly. As I show in 
Chapter Seven and Eight, they might also be reluctant to lodge complaints in 
formal ways. The rigid ontological stand of strict constructionism does not 
leave room for the analyst to explore a potential problem which could not be 
articulated, because no social problem exists unless it is defined as such. Strict 
constructionism also encourages the analyst to leave all her assumptions about 
a troublesome condition aside. But, following this suggestion, the social 
problems which did not reach the analyst's attention will not be studied 
because the analyst cannot theoretically justify the reasons that led her to 
consider a condition as potentially problematic. This is to say that, the study of 
absent voices is a challenge to the conventional view of social problems. In 
analysing an important source of data on voices that were not fully heard in the 
public debates over ending donor anonymity, - one aim of this thesis is to 
suggest a more inclusive approach to 'claims-making' definition in social 
constructionist theories of social problems. 
Secondly, linked to the problem above, the social constructionist approach 
proposed by Spector and Kitsuse says little about studying definitional 
activities which are made in alternative ways, rather than the formal modes of 
pressing claims. For example, the social constructionist approach to social 
problems raises a few practical problems if one is to examine the claims-
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making activities of marginalised, hidden or hard-to-reach populations. 
Individuals, particularly ones who have confidentiality concerns, can 
participate in claims-making activities through a variety of ways other than 
public gatherings or protests about the definitions of troublesome conditions. In 
Chapters Six and Seven, I draw on Goffman' s Stigma (1963) theory to 
understand the reticence of the interview participants in voicing their concerns: 
a majority of them consider donor conception as deviance, and a potentially 
stigmatising condition. Therefore, they employ information control strategies 
to conceal using donor gametes/embryos to conceive. As they do not want to 
be exposed to publicity, they engage in claims-making activities in alternative 
modes of communication (e.g. using online discussion boards to express their 
reactions or giving anonymous interviews) rather than formal ways. Given this 
reticence, their voice is unheard by public bodies which can only deal with 
issues through formal and transparent modes of communication. As a result, 
they can come to be colonised by the views of those who are less constrained. 
Natural history models 
Early work on social problems followed a natural history model. It was argued 
that every social problem had a history, and social problems developed through 
a series of stages. Natural history models are useful tools for the development 
of empirical research for studying social problems. In Chapter Three, I will 
apply a natural history model to the donor anonymity debate; therefore, it will 
be helpful to provide a brief review of these models. 
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The natural history model was first introduced by Fuller and Myers (1941) who 
posited that social problem recognition followed an orderly, linear trajectory. 
Following Fuller and Myers, some other value conflict theorists (Becker, 1966; 
Blumer, 1971) and social constructionists (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977) also 
suggested a heuristic natural history model. 
In Fuller and Myers' natural history of social problems, first, groups come to 
see that important values are being threatened by a given situation. In the 
second stage, sides are chosen since people who propose solutions soon find 
that these solutions are not acceptable to others. Consequently, ends and means 
are discussed and proposals for action offered. The final stage is the 
institutionalised phase of the social problem, in which some groups 
successfully influence the course of action on behalf of their value definition of 
the situation. Moreover, administrative units get engaged in putting policy into 
action. 
This kind of categorisation however is open to criticism. Fuller and Myers note 
that these three stages in natural history are not mutually exclusive, and that 
they tend to overlap; however, for conceptual purposes, the three general 
phases may be set off from each other. 
As a case study, Fuller and Myers presented a study of a trailer-camp problem 
in Detroit. The authors claimed that the residence-trailer problem was a 
situation which could be observed on a local and emergent basis in specific 
neighbourhoods and cOlnmunities. They argued, '"the factors of localism and 
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emergence offer the investigator a delimited area and a timeliness of 
observation which permit a current, intimate focus on the items of awareness , 
policy determination, and reform" (1941: 327). However, Lemert (1951 b) 
claimed that these stages could not be completely observed that way. 
Following Fuller and Myers' work, Lemert investigated the newspapers in 
several cities in California to study the articulation of the value conflicts over 
trailer camps. The results did not indicate that a public interest and concern 
with trailer camps was a critical focus in the newspapers. Lemert did not claim 
that there was no public awareness of trailer camps as problems: however he 
argued that neighbourhood awareness of trailer camps as problems manifested 
itself only in "sporadic and attenuated" form (1951 b: 218). According to 
Lemert, policy formation towards trailer camps in other California cities was 
largely unilateral on the part of administrative offices. The trailer camps 
developed in different ways in Detroit than in Southern California. Finally, he 
concluded that Fuller and Myers' formulation of social problems was 
inapplicable to the rise and regulation of Californian cities: " .. .it appears to be 
an insufficient conceptualization of the interplay of public opinion in culture 
conflicts in modem society" (1951 b: 221). In other words, Lemert thought that 
the concept of natural history was inadequate to explain the life-cycle of a 
social problem. 
Another theorist, Becker, pointed out that little research had been done on the 
stages of development of natural history; therefore it was not possible to 
present a commonly accepted scheme of analysis. According to him, one had to 
consider the various definitions proposed by interested parties to start an 
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analysis. He suggested that every social problem has a history and develops 
through a series of stages, each stage reflecting a change in who defines the 
problem, the kind of definition it is given, and the resulting actions taken to 
solve the problem (1966). Becker went on to propose a natural history model of 
five stages: the emergence of a social problem; the legitimation of the problem; 
the mobilisation of action; the formation of an official plan; and the implication 
of the official plan. 
Spector and Kitsuse also proposed a natural history model to monitor the 
emergence and life cycle of a social problem. Their formulation shares the 
characteristic features that are presented above, but it is more flexible and 
provides guidance for monitoring claims-making activities that can be 
observed in each developmental stage of social problems. The authors divide 
the natural history of the problem into several periods, each characterised by its 
own distinctive kind of activities, participants and dilemmas. This is the 
natural history model that I will apply to the donor anonymity debate, and it 
will be detailed in Chapter Three. 
Conclusion 
My analysis entails several theoretical assumptions. First, I assume that in 
some cases, claims-making may be repressed by an opposing group, or may not 
emerge due to lack of public support or institutional power. My second 
assumption is that in order to study such a problem, the analyst might consider 
a particular objective condition as an indicator of a social problem as it is 
neither necessary nor possible for analysts to avoid all assumptions (Best, 
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1993). Third, I argue that strict constructionist studies of social problems 
constrain the analysis of the problems which are not or cannot be articulated in 
transparent modes of communication; empirical research may require focusing 
attention on what people cannot do, rather than what people do. Finally, I 
suggest that analysis of such social problems may necessitate looking into 
alternative definitional activities where performing a collective activity is not 
possible or preferable by the stakeholders of the problem. 
Arguably, in the UK, the child's right-to-know movement succeeded in the 
absence of any public articulation of the rights of would-be parents. In Chapter 
Three, where I present the natural history of the donor anonymity problem, I 
will also discuss the claims-making activities of the interest groups, and 
analyse the nature of their claims. Studying the accomplishment of successful 
claims-making enables the analyst to understand what kind of elements these 
claims adopt from the socio-cultural context and, hence, what kind of discourse 
is perceived as legitimate. Such analysis can also help us to understand why 
some stakeholders cannot press claims due to the perceived illegitimacy of 
their claims. On the other hand, the accounts from would-be parents that I 
analyse in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight will illustrate the reactions of 
would-be parents to this dominating discourse and the new law. I believe that 
studying suppressed claims as much as successful claims will give a broader 
perspective to understanding social problems, with a potential to inform policy-
making - not least because suppressed claims are likely to generate new 
problems as stakeholders may find a way to cope with their problem in 
alternative, potentially less legitimate ways. 
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CHAPTER THREE: NATURAL HISTORY OF 
DONOR ANONYMITY DEBATE 
Social constructionist theories of social problems help us understand how 
people come to define certain conditions as problematic. Spector and Kitsuse 
(1977) suggest that social problems should be understood as demanding and 
responding activities rather than as essential features of a condition, so analysts 
should focus on claims-making that promotes a particular definition of a 
problem. In this social constructionist view, a claim is a demand that one party 
makes upon another (e.g. demanding services, lodging complaints, supporting 
and opposing some governmental practice or policy). Claims-makers are the 
people who make claims, and audiences are the people who judge and evaluate 
the importance of these claims (Loseke and Best, 2003). 
Social problems are not static conditions or instantaneous events but a 
sequence of activities that may move through different stages (Loseke and 
Best, 2003). For example, the activities of claims-makers in defining a problem 
are different from the activities they perform once the problem is recognised. 
As Becker (1966) suggests: "every social problem has a history and develops 
through a series of stages, each stage reflecting a change in who defines the 
problem, the kind of definition it is given, and the resulting actions taken to 
solve the problem" (1966: 13). Natural history models enable analysts to 
identify these stages. In this chapter, I apply the natural history model proposed 
by Spector and Kitsuse to the donor anonymity problem in the UK to identify 
40 
these stages and illustrate the way in which certain interests, assumptions and 
claims led to a change in the law. It must be said, while applying the natural 
history model, I am more interested in the discourse of claims, and less 
interested in presenting the sequence of activities in a chronological order. 
There are two reasons for this. First, the construction and legitimation of the 
problem is too complicated to be explained by a simplistic model that offers a 
rigid structure of development stages. This is a critique of all natural history 
models.
5 
Secondly, my research interest required understanding the nature of 
claims rather than providing a historical account of the donor anonymity 
debate. 
While presenting the natural history of the donor anonymity problem and the 
claims-making activities performed in each stage, I will draw on newspaper 
reports, web-based material, consultation documents, responses from interest 
organisations to these consultations, and speeches from parliamentary debates. 
Monitoring social problems requires analysts to be observant of the images and 
the information available in the public sphere. Conrad (1997) suggests that 
these presentations can be called 'public eye'. He argues that we can see the 
public eye as containing the lenses through which people come to understand 
particular problems. The public eye includes news, television, documentaries, 
periodicals, fiction and the Internet. Conrad notes that the public eye also 
"incorporates opinion polls that tell us what we or others believe, government 
reports or statistics that place an official imprimatur on information, political 
speeches that frame issues in particular fashions, social movements that bring 
5 Spector and Kitsuse (1977) argue that in the life-cycle of a problem some stages can be 
skipped: "if a Stage can be skipped, it isn't a Stage" (1977: 154-158). 
41 
problems to public attention and professionals and organizations (like us) who 
ruminate about problems" (1997: 140). Similarly, in the career of a social 
problem it is claims-makers who select the lenses through which the public will 
come to understand the problem. How these lenses are chosen is central to the 
promotion of a social problem. In this chapter what is revealed is the way that 
claims-makers in the donor anonymity debate in the UK shaped these lenses by 
using distinct kinds of claims about abolishing anonymity. 
Claims-making activities in Stage 1: constructing the problem 
Towards the end of the 1990s, there was an alarming decrease in the numbers 
of people coming forward as sperm donors in the UK. For example, 437 sperm 
donors were recruited in 1994-1995, but only 271 were recruited in 1998-
Due to the shortage, it was claimed that some would-be parents 
became so desperate that they placed advertisements in papers. The problem 
was perceived to be so severe that there were efforts to establish a new 
independent organisation to promote egg and sperm donation to infertile 
couples (BBC News, 1998).7 There can be objective conditions that create 
harm without subjective worry, or people can start to worry about a condition 
when objective indicators seem to show that the condition is not new (Loseke, 
2003). Interestingly, as we shall see, it was not the donor shortage which was 
6 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) registers (HFEA, 2008d). 
7 The organisation was the brainchild of Fertility Nurses Forum, a sub-group of the Royal 
College of Nursing. It was claimed that those who wanted to find donors had started placing 
advertisements in the newspapers. The new organisation aimed to raise awareness and 
encourage people to come forward as donors. 
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defined as a social problem, but donor anonymity. Donor anonymity was not a 
new condition in the UK, but, it emerged as a social problem at the end of 
1990s. 
Despite the fact that social problems are not characterised by a profound sense 
of historicity, identifying by whom and when the problem was first articulated 
in the public sphere may give clues about its emergence as a social problem. 
My analysis shows that the Children's Society (a national charity involved in 
campaigning and social policy work to support children) was the first 
organisation that attempted to transform the anonymity of donors into a public 
concern. 
The Children's Society's call 
In Stage 1 of the natural history model, groups attempt to assert the existence 
of some condition, define it as offensive or undesirable, publicise their 
assertions and tum the issue into a public or political matter. The complaining 
group mayor may not be the victim of the said condition: for example, the 
complaint may be made by an organisation of social workers or another 
humanitarian group. 
In November 1998, the Children's Society called for a change in the law so 
that people who were born by sperm or egg donation could access the same 
information about their donors that adopted children could access about their 
natural parents: 
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There are a generation of children growing up today who do not know 
who they are. We have learned from people who have been adopted 
how important it is to have access to medical information so they can 
make informed decisions about themselves. These children's rights have 
been overlooked and we are sitting on a timebomb (Julia Feast, 
Project manager of the Children's Society in Simpson, 1998 [emphasis 
added]) 
There are a number of claims in this statement: that donor conceived children 
do not know who they are; and that access to medical information is important 
to make informed decisions about one's self; that children's rights have been 
overlooked; that it is only a matter of time before donor conceived children 
will protest against the status quo. According to the statement, donor 
anonymity creates identity problems for donor-conceived children who have 
similar needs to adopted children, and denying access to their identity infringes 
their rights. As we shall see later, the donor anonymity debate was 
characterised by this definition in the public sphere. 
Activist groups such as the Children's Society make effective owners of social 
problems because they have resources (leaders, members, budgets, etc.), 
ideologies and persistence (Best, 1999). The Society's characterisation of the 
problem was significant and influential as they drew strategically on trends in 
adoption law, and the search movement. Its call for legal change brought a 
response from government agencies. In 1999 the Department of Health 
confirmed that it was looking at the issue and would publish a consultation 
paper, although, as we shall see, it took two more years to start a consultation, 
the Children's Society had successfully initiated a controversy. The first 
reaction to the child's right-to-know clainls came from the medical community: 
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It [removal of donor anonymity] will effectively deny a lot of infertile 
couples the chance of being parents. A sperm or egg donor does not 
create a human being, that needs a womb to give it life. There is a 
major difference between adoption and egg and sperm donation (Dr 
Sam Abdallah of the Lister Fertility Clinic in Simpson, 1998). 
The National Fertility Association stressed that the government's intention to 
review the law was bad news for donors: 
This may be a victory for children, but it certainly is not for the donors. 
Their rights have to be protected too. People already give for altruistic 
reasons and now they are going to be hammered for it (Tim Hedgeley 
of the National Fertility Association in BBC News, 1999). 
A study on donor conceived adults 
Experts may also play a key role In definitional activities because their 
expertise supports particular interpretations (Best, 1999). They benefit from 
new opportunities for publications, funding, press coverage, etc. In the donor 
anonymity debate, the timely findings of a psychological study supported the 
claims of the Children's Society about the identity problems of donor 
offspring. The study on donor conceived adults was conducted by Turner and 
Coyle (2000). Sixteen participants (13 male, three female, age range 26-55 
years) recruited through donor insemination support networks in the UK, USA, 
Canada and Australia were sent semi-structured questionnaires bye-mail and 
post. The data were qualitatively analysed usmg interpretative 
phenomenological analysis. The participants consistently reported mistrust 
within the family, negative distinctiveness, lack of genetic continuity, 
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frustration in being thwarted in the search for their 'biological fathers· 8 and a 
need to talk to a significant other. Turner and Coyle argued that these 
experiences could be seen as being indicative of a struggle to assimilate, 
accommodate and evaluate information about their new identities as donor 
offspring. The authors claimed that non-disclosure of D I can cause 
'psychological damage' and that, for these participants, it undermined the 
socially valued principles of honesty and trust. The authors suggested that this 
lack of trust was observed in one participant's behaviour during the study: 
It could be postulated therefore that this lack of trust might be 
replicated in the donor offspring's other relationships. Indeed, the 
investigators found that it was often difficult for participants to trust 
them and one donor offspring did not take part because she was 
doubtful about our intentions (2000: 2049). 
The findings of Turner and Coyle's study created controversy in academia. For 
example, Schilling and Conrad (2001) sent a letter to the journal which 
published the study in which they criticised the study for having considerable 
methodological problems. They suggested that its findings were 
unsubstantiated: 
Regarding the interpretative phenomenological analysis of data, the 
problem may arise that the researchers will only find in the data the 
facts they have been looking for ( ... ) Although the authors themselves 
discuss essential differences between adopted children and donor 
insemination (DI) children, the applied questionnaires are based on 
findings from research on adoption ( ... ) To our mind it is of vital 
importance to differentiate between these two groups. In particular. the 
conclusion that non-disclosure of donor insemination can cause 
psychological damage seems to be unsubstantiated (2001: 2244-2245). 
t! While referring to donors, I avoid using biological 'mother', 'father' or 'parent' as these 
expressions are linked to certain moral assumptions in the donor anonymity debate. 
46 
Social problems that reach Stage I may disappear or remain at this stage 
indefinitely, but sometimes government (politicians and bureaucrats) may 
support institutionalising the problem because it gains them additional support, 
resources and/or press coverage (Best, 1999). During the donor anonymity 
debate, it was not only a call by an interest organisation or expert opinion that 
made the UK Government act , but also a successful application for judicial 
review by two donor-conceived individuals. 
Rose and Another v. Secretary of State for Health ([2002) EWHC 1593 
(Admin)) 
In December 2000, the Department of Health confirmed that there would be a 
consultation exercise on the rules governing access to information for those 
conceived through gamete donation. One month later, in January 2001, the 
Secretary of State for Health received a letter from Joanna Rose, and the family 
of a child, EM, seeking access to information regarding their anonymous 
donors.9 The Secretary of State's decision on these requests was communicated 
in a letter of June 2001: he refused access, emphasising that "there was to be a 
consultation exercise, that the consultation document would be published 
shortly and that the various points would be considered by ministers following 
completion of the consultation exercise". 10 
Joanna Rose and EM sought judicial review of this decision. Rose, an adult 
woman, had been conceived in the UK using donor insemination prior to the 
9 Joanna Rose wanted access to non-identifYing infonnation, and where possible identifYing 
infonnation, in respect of the anonymous donor. They also wanted directions or regulations to 
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HFE Act. She had not been able to discover any infonnation about the spenn 
donor. The other claimant, EM, a six-year old, had been conceived using donor 
insemination after the coming into force of the Act. II As noted above, these 
claimants had sought access to infonnation about their anonymous spenn 
donors and the establishment of a contact register, but the Secretary of State 
had rejected their requests on the grounds that a consultation exercise on the 
issue of anonymity was underway. 
In the course of the application for judicial review, Rose explained why genetic 
connections were "very important" to her, "socially, emotionally, medically, 
and even spiritually": 
[NJon-identifying infonnation will assist me in fonning a fuller sense of 
self or identity and answer questions that I have been asking for a long 
time ... With the revelation of my donor conception I am now unable to 
complete medical history fonns .. .1 do not know about half of my 
ethnicity or racial identity ... Without this infonnation these feelings of 
distress and inequality will not go away. The need to discover this 
infonnation has become a central feature of my life, along with the 
need for recognition for this. I need to find out more about my medical, 
genealogical and social heritage. 
She also emphasised to the Court that: 
[ 0 Jther people who come from families, where they have known both of 
their natural parents are able to discover this through the process of 
time. This includes infonnation about their background and religion, 
where certain of their talents and skills may come from (e.g. parents or 
relations with musical or artistic skills), why they look the way they do 
etc. I have a strong need to discover what most people take for granted. 
While I was conceived to heal the pain of others (i.e. my parents' 
be made concerning matters identified in the letter. EM's family was seeking non-identifying 
information about the donor and the establishment of a contact register. 
10 [2002] EWHC 1593 (Admin) at [l-l]. 
II In the case EM's mother acted as her litigation friend. 
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inability to conceive children naturally), I do not feel that these are 
sufficient attempts to heal my pain. 12 
EM's need for access to information about her donor was explained to the 
Court by her mother as something that was important to the whole family: for 
them, secrecy posed a risk for the family not just for EM herself. EM's mother 
also explained that "[i]f in the future our daughter wanted to make contact with 
the donor then we would completely support her and help her in this".13 
In support of their application, the claimants relied on Articles 8 and 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Article 8 provides for a right 
to respect for private and family life,14 and the European Court of Human 
Rights has held that this right incorporates the concept of personal identity, 
including the right to obtain information about a biological parent. 15 The 
claimants also invoked Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, arguing that 
there should not be discrimination between donor offspring and adoptees or 
between donor offspring (like Rose) born before the coming into force of the 
1990 Act and those (like EM) born thereafter. 
12 [2002] EWHC 1593 (Admin) at [7]. 
IJ [2002] EWHC 1593 (Admin) at [12]. 
14 Article 8 provides" 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life. his 
home and his correspondence; and 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with 
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others." 
I:' See e.g. M i k l l l h ~ ~ \' Croatia Application no 53176/99. 
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The judge, Scott Baker J, outlined a series of principles based on which he 
concluded that "Article 8 is engaged both with regard to identifying and non-
identifying infonnation".16 The principles were as follows: 
• Private and family life is a flexible and elastic concept incapable of 
precise definition. 
• Respect for private and family life can involve positive obligations on 
the state as well as protecting the individual against arbitrary 
interference by a public authority. 
• Respect for private and family life requires that everyone should be 
able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings. 
This includes their origins and the opportunity to understand them. It 
also embraces their physical and social identity and psychological 
integrity. 
• Respect for private and family life comprises to a certain degree the 
right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings. 
• The fact that there is no existing relationship beyond an unidentified 
biological connection does not prevent Article 8 from biting.
17 
The judge said that he found it "entirely understandable that A.I.D. children 
should wish to know about their origins and in particular to learn what they can 
about their biological father or, in the case of egg donation, their biological 
mother". He emphasised that "[ a] human being is a human being whatever the 
circumstances of his conception and an A.I.D. child is entitled to establish a 
16 [2002] EWHC 1593 (Admin) at [46]. 
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picture of his identity as much as anyone else". It was in his view quite clear 
that Article 8 ECHR and the existing jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights supported the idea that "everyone should be able to establish 
details of his identity as a human being", and that this clearly included the 
"right to obtain information about a biological parent who will inevitably have 
contributed to the identity of his child". 18 
Scott Baker 1's judgment says nothing however about whether there had been a 
breach of Article 8 in this case: it focuses only on the fact that Article 8 is 
engaged. The reason for this is that, at a case management conference prior to 
the hearing, the judge had decided that the issue of breach should be "stood 
over": 
Once the consultation exercise was under way, and it was clear that the 
government was giving serious consideration to how to tackle this 
extremely difficult problem, it was obviously sensible that many of the 
issues in this litigation should be stood over pending ministerial 
decisions on what if any government action was appropriate. 19 
Furthermore, Scott Baker 1's judgment in Rose is very clear that "the fact that 
Article 8 is engaged is far from saying there is a breach of it. .. Whether or not 
there is breach of it is ... an entirely different matter ... ".20 Ultimately, although 
Rose and EM's application for judicial review was successful at the first stage, 
the later hearing to determine whether there had in fact been a breach of Article 
8 was delayed and, as we know, regulations passed in 2004 abolished donor 
anonymity. 
17 [2002] EWHC 1593 (Admin) at [45]. 
18 [2002] EWHC 1593 (Admin)at [47]-[48]. 
19 [2002] EWHC 1593 (Admin)at [16]. 
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Culmination of Stage 1 
A feature of Stage 1 in the promotion of social problems is that not only are 
claims formed and presented but strategies are also developed to press these 
claims and gain support; through the creation of public controversy. Spector 
and Kitsuse note that such controversy is the culmination of Stage 1. Claims 
may provoke reactions from other groups that prefer existing arrangements or 
who would lose something if they were altered. The claims-making process is 
characterized by claims-competitions "claims-makers operate within a social 
problems market place, bidding for public awareness, official recognition, 
program funding, and other scarce resources" (Best, 1997: 74). Accordingly, 
while there are many groups competing for social problem status, only a few 
succeed in convincing the audience (Loseke, 2003). Such conflicts may 
facilitate the creation of public awareness of the imputed condition. I identified 
three major claims in Stage 1: that donor-conceived children should have the 
same rights as adopted children; that donor-conceived adults have personal 
identity problems because of the missing information about their origins and; 
that it is donor conceived children's right-to-know find about their origins. In 
the absence of a significant opposition to right-to-identity claims (except for 
concerns about donor shortage) the government started a consultation process. 
Under the natural history model, one might argue that the problem was 
transformed to Stage 2. 
~ ( ) ) [2002] EWHC 1593 (Admin)at [61]. 
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Claims-making activities in Stage 2: recognition of the problem 
In Stage 2, the legitimacy of the claims is recognised by some official 
organisations. This may lead to proposals for reform, an official investigation 
or the establishment of an agency to respond to those claims. 
The Donor Information Consultation, a MORI poll and the HFEA's 
survey 
In February 2002, following the announcement that the legislation governing 
access to information for those conceived through gamete donation would be 
reviewed, the Department of Health published a consultation paper, Donor 
Information Consultation, (2001) asking what information should be available 
to people born as a result of gamete or embryo donation. The paper proposed 
three main alternatives: non-identifying information on existing donors should 
be provided on request; more comprehensive non-identifying information 
should be collected on future donors and made available on request; or 
identifying information should be collected and provided. The consultation 
paper did not address the question of whether donor offspring should be told by 
their families about the means of their conception, which was considered to be 
"a matter for the parents themselves to decide" (para. 1.10). The Department of 
Health was cautious in its reference to adoption (paras 2.8-2.12) as a helpful 
model in considering how the law can protect the best interests of donor 
offspring: paragraph 2.10 noted that "the parallel with adoption is inexact".Of 
the 237 responses to the public consultation, 132 favoured making identifiable 
information available, 70 were opposed and 23 were undecided. There was 
widespread agreement (211 responses) that more 'non-identifying' information 
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about donors should be made available to people conceived as a result of 
gamete donation (Department of Health, 2003). 
Spector and Kitsuse (1977) note that when governmental agencies respond to 
the complaints of a particular group, the social problems activity undergoes a 
considerable transformation. They argue that "even the simplest response to the 
claims may bring about a transformation in the protest groups or create new 
organizational crises for it" (1977: 149). Recognition of its claim can mean that 
a group gets involved in official proceedings on the problem. In the donor 
anonymity problem it was the Children's Society that took part in starting 
official proceedings. In March 2002, a MORl poll was commissioned by the 
Society to explore public opinion on whether children born using donated 
sperm or eggs should have a right to know their genetic history at the age of 
eighteen. The poll found that the public was in favour of allowing people 
conceived from donor gametes to gain more information about their genetic 
parents. These results were welcomed by the Society: 
[t ]he results from this poll are too powerful for the government to 
ignore. Children have been living under the shadow of legislation that 
has denied them the right to the most basic information about 
themselves for too long (Julia Feast in BioNews, 2002). 
The Children's Society's efforts were supported by Baroness Warnock, one of 
the architects of the 1990 legislation. She noted that children conceived with 
donor insemination should have access to information about their biological 
father, including genetic details which could be crucial to their health. Her 
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view received wide coverage in the media. She argued that it was "morally 
wrong to deceive children and deprive them of knowledge about who they are, 
especially when now, we all understand so much more about the importance of 
genetic inheritance". She also stressed that her opinion about the matter had 
changed in the last two decades: 
It's absolutely deplorable for a child not to know what other children 
know. .. I am speaking out now because I wanted to make sure that 
nobody used our 1984 report which is almost 20 years old as an 
argument (BBC News, 2002a). 
During the debate one of the most influential counterclaims-making groups 
was the British Fertility Society (BFS).21 Other major professional groups 
(e.g., Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and British Medical 
Association) were also opposed to the disclosure policy on the grounds that this 
would have an adverse impact on donor supply. After the consultation was 
closed, BFS published their response to the consultation paper. The BFS 
recommended that the regulations allow only for non-identifying information. 
It claimed that it was not the right time for a radical change to remove 
anonymity because the majority of donors and recipients were not ready for 
this. It also suggested a new framework under which donors could choose to be 
either anonymous or identifiable (British Fertility Society, 2002). Dr John 
Mills, Chairman of the BFS said: 
The BFS welcomes the Donor Information Consultation and timely 
debate on this complex, sensitive and very important matter. The 
Society has a multidisciplinary membership of doctors, nurses, 
21 The BFS was founded in 1972, with the encouragement of IVF pioneer Patrick Steptoe. It is 
a multidisciplinary professional non-profit organisation whose membership includes clinicians. 
counsellors, nurses, embryologists, andrologists, and research scientists. working in the field of 
infertility and assisted reproduction. The main purpose of the Society is to increase knowledge 
and understanding in this field. 
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scientists and counsellors and while there are areas of general 
consensus there is also some disagreement particularly over the 
question of donor anonymity. The BFS view is to avoid a position that 
is resistant to change and to adopt a progressive and informed approach 
(British Fertility Society, 2002). 
Media coverage showed that the medical community was worried about losing 
potential donors: 
The vast majority of donors we have would not be prepared to donate if 
they thought there was a real possibility they would be identified to 
their donor offspring (Dr Gillian Lockwood, medical director of 
Midlands Fertility Services in Dyer, 2002). 
Contrary to what Lady Warnock said, I think there would be a 
significant drop. I know of one or two clinics that are close to packing 
up already. There will still be people who want to donate, but I think 
the numbers will drop significantly (Dr George N dukwe, clinical 
director at the CARE clinic at Park Hospital, Nottingham in Dyer, 
2002). 
The proposed changes in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA) review (HFEA, 2005a) and the EU directive on 
standards relating to the handling and use of human tissues and cells 
may also lead to further reductions in donor treatment activity. On the 
other hand, the demand for donor sperm is likely to increase because of 
a possible decline in the semen quality in the general UK population 
(Dr Jane Stewart, honorary lecturer at the University of Newcastle-
upon-Tyne and consultant gynaecologist and specialist in reproductive 
medicine at the Newcastle Fertility Centre at LIFE, in Willson, 2005). 
The numbers of donors in this country are actually reducing, and 
particularly in terms of egg donation. If donors feel someone's going to 
knock on their door in 18 years' time, they'll think twice about donating 
(Glen Atkinson, medical director of the fertility clinic CARE, in BBC 
News, 2002b). 
There is a danger that if we cannot recruit donors we may find that 
many infertile couples will be unable to receive treatment. We are 
concerned that if this happens, some couples may seek treatment 
overseas (Dr Allan Pacey of the British Fertility Society in BBC News, 
2004). 
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The only interest group that represented would-be parents, INUK (Infertility 
Network UK) expressed similar concerns: 
We worry that the removal of donor anonymity will only further the 
d i m i n . i ~ h i n g g number of egg and sperm donors (Sheena Young of the 
InfertIlIty Network UK-patient support group in BBC News, 2004). 
Following the Department of Health's consultation, the health minister Hazel 
Blears told the House of Commons that any decision on waiving anonymity 
would be put off for at least six months to allow more discussion with clinics 
and donors: 
We agree that there is a strong argument in principle for children 
conceived using donated sperm, eggs or embryos being able to find out 
the identity of their donor ... However, we believe that this sensitive area 
needs further consideration and debate - very few fertility clinics 
responded to our consultation exercise (Arthur, 2003). 
The media reported that Ministers feared that donors would be put off by the 
possibility of being identified in the future against their wishes, and that this 
would lead to a drop in sperm or eggs made available for infertility treatments 
(Arthur, 2003). The media also reported that various charities supported the 
consultation exercise: 
The whole business of [anonymous] sperm donation, where children are 
reduced to commodities, is wrong, and the fact that resulting children 
never know their biological fathers compounds this. Children have a 
right to know their biological background for medical and emotional 
reasons. Protecting sperm donors' anonymity encourages the view that 
fatherhood is to be undertaken lightly (Nuala Scarisbrick, of the charity 
Life, in Arthur, 2003). 
However, some charities were worried that, following the medical 
community's veto, the government would backtrack. For example, Rupert 
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Rushbrooke, director of Bloodlines, a pressure group campalgnmg for the 
rights of children created by sperm donation, said Ms Blears had "backtracked" 
from ministers' earlier proposals to remove anonymity for future conceptions. 
He claimed: 
The Government was clearly ready to remove the secrecy in donor 
conception, but their decision has very obviously been vetoed by the 
medical profession (Arthur, 2003). 
The HFEA was also concerned that the government would not move towards 
an open donation system as fast as the Authority hoped. One might argue that it 
is rather unusual for a regulatory body to make its moral stance explicit. The 
following extract demonstrates HFEA's position in the debate: 
Clearly we are disappointed that the Government feel we can't move to 
an open system now but today's proposals are a step in the right 
direction. What is now needed is a change in the climate of thinking 
about infertility. A move towards open donation is a move towards a 
genuine acceptance of donor insemination. A detailed register of donors 
is kept, yet people still cannot find out who their parents are. It is 
essentially a matter of principle (Suzi Leather, chairwoman of the 
HFEA in Arthur, 2003). 
The Department of Health sought further information from clinics and donors. 
Responses were received from 140 donors and 42 clinics. "Most but not all" 
clinics said they were opposed to the removal of anonymity. Some respondents 
were concerned that fewer donors would come forward at a time when there 
were already not enough of them. In addition, it was pointed out that removing 
anonymity would have no effect on secrecy since many parents chose never to 
tell their children that a donor was involved in the conception. Twelve donor 
offspring wanted non-identifying information and 11 identifying information. 
Fifty-eight donor insemination (DI) parents advocated the availability of non-
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identifying information and 38 the availability of identifying information. 
Twenty-two of the donors agreed with the provision of non-identifying 
information but only eight agreed with the provision of identifying information 
(Lawford-Davies and Forsyth, 2004). 
During the spring of 2004, the HFEA conducted a survey of clinics to develop 
a detailed understanding of the current demand for, and provision of, treatment 
using donated gametes or embryos, as well as to identify relevant trends 
(HFEA, 2005b). Sixty-two of the 99 surveyed clinics responded. The removal 
of donor anonymity was the most frequently cited factor anticipated negatively 
to affect sperm and egg donation. These findings indicated that many 
practitioners expected the removal of donor anonymity to have a negative 
impact on the provision of treatment services with donor gametes. The clinics 
were already suffering from a donor shortage. 22 
R e m o v a l o f d o n o r a n o n y m i ~ ~
The UK government subsequently announced, in January 2004, that people 
who donated eggs, sperm or embryos in the UK were to lose their right to 
anonymity from 1 April 2005. Anyone born using sperm, eggs or embryos 
donated after that date may ask the HFEA for identifying information ~ b o u t t
their donors, when they reach the age of 18. Donors may only be told whether 
22 The total number of donors for general use was estimated to be 1,024. This number is subject 
to a number of caveats. First, it may include donors who have donated at more than one donor 
recruitment centre, in which case the number would be an overestimate (the HFEA Code of 
Practice i h Edition (HFEA, 2008f) currently imposes a limit of 10 live birth events per donor). 
Secondly, it may capture some donors with sperm held in, s t ~ r ~ g e e at more than ,one clinic. If 
this were the case, it would further reduce the number of mdIvIdual donors avaIlable, ThIrdly, 
for many clinics the donor sperm in storage originates from donors recruited at other UK 
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any children were born from their donation and some limited information about 
them - number, gender and the year(s) in which they were born. With regards 
to non-identifying information, a donor-conceived person aged 18 or older can 
obtain a list of non-identifying information about their donor from the HFEA if 
they ask for that information and if that information is on the HFEA's register. 
The then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health, Melanie Johnson, 
indicated that the government's decision to remove donor anonymity was based 
on the public consultation; a programme of work with clinics and donors; 
consideration of the position in other countries; and a comparison with the 
information available to adopted people: 
I firmly believe donor-conceived people have a right to information 
about their genetic origins that is currently denied them, including the 
identity of their donor ( ... )We live in an age where, as technology 
continues to develop, our genetic background will become increasingly 
important. I have listened to the views of donor-conceived people and 
they would like more information about their genetic origins - perhaps 
for themselves, perhaps for their children, perhaps because they feel the 
information belongs to them. That it is rightly theirs. ( ... )There is a 
growing body of opinion, which I agree with, that donor-conceived 
people should not be treated so differently from adopted people. 
Today's new regulations will align their positions, removing the major 
discrepancy that exists between the rights of donor-conceived people 
and those of adopted people (He Deb (2003-04) 416 col. 60WS.). 
The government's announcement provoked reactions from different groups. A 
number, including the HFEA, supported the decision: 
centres and may be stored for specific use at clinics. Therefore, 1,024 may not reflect the actual 
number of donors available to every centre. 
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We have been asking for this for a long time. I can understand why 
people want to know who their genetic parents are (Suzi Leather, 
chairman of the HFEA, in BBC News, 2004). 
It's like adoption. It helps some people who are adopted to know who 
their parent is (Laura Spoelstra, chairman of the National Gamete 
Donation Trust, which raises awareness of the need for egg and sperm 
donors, in BBC News, 2004). 
This announcement has the potential to lift the stigma of secrecy from 
the field of donor conception (Marilyn Crawshaw, a spokeswoman for 
UK DonorLink - a voluntary contact register for donors and their 
children, in BBC News, 2004). 
Debates in parliament 
Following the government's announcement, on 18 May 2004, Melanie Johnson 
opened the first standing committee on delegated legislation, draft HFEA 
Regulations 2004 (Disclosure of Donor Information). During her speech she 
stated that the position of donor-conceived people should be more closely 
aligned with that of adopted people; the regulations therefore provided for 
donor-conceived people to have access to information about their genetic 
origins. She pointed out that the draft regulations were strongly supported by 
the Donor Conception Network, the British Association for Adoption and 
Fostering, other children's organisations and the HFEA itself (Stg Co Deb, 
2003-04). 
Following the debate held in the House of Commons, on 9 June, 2004 the 
House of Lords discussed the issue. In her opening speech, Baroness Andrews 
explained the reasons that made this provision seem so necessary (HL Deb, 
2003-04a: col. 344-349). Some of the issues that she raised were: that the 
secrecy and even stigma surrounding assisted conception had faded (col. 345); 
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that public attitudes towards information and rights to infonnation have 
changed dramatically (referring to the Rose case, col. 345)23; and that such 
openness had worked successfully in recent years in relation to adoption (col. 
348). Baroness Andrews also addressed a few concerns raised by the opponents 
of the new law: 
Although we recognise that there is likely to be a dip in donor numbers 
- certainly in the short term - evidence from other countries suggests 
that donor levels will rise again (HL Deb, 2003-04a: col. 346) 
One of the fears that has been raised is that parents might be deterred 
from telling their children that they are donor-conceived, but I 
understand that research soon to be published by Susan Golombok, 
Director of the Family and Child Research Centre at City University, 
indicates that more parents are planning to tell their child about donor 
conception - about 50 per cent intend to do so (HL Deb, 2003-04a: col. 
347). 
During the debate, some peers stated their concerns about the potential 
shortage of eggs and sperm. However the government said that it was planning 
a campaign, which would cost £200.000. The campaign would be conducted 
with the support of three organisations: National Gamete Donation Trust24, the 
British Fertility Society25, and the Donor Conception Network. 26 Baroness 
Andrews noted that the aim of the initiative was "to accompany the transition 
23 She argued: "Information now is much more readily accessible than it was in 1991 ... In a 
century where access to information is regarded as a personal and political right, this does not 
seem any longer to be appropriate. It has already proved to be a bone of contention-the 
Government are very likely to be challenged about the provision of information to donor-
conceived people, as the Department of Health has already been in an application brought by 
Liberty. That application related to the provision of non-identifying information." 
24 The National Gamete Donation Trust was set up in 1998 as a national government-funded 
charity, to raise awareness of, and seek ways to alleviate the national shortage of sperm, egg 
and embryo donors. 
25 BFS's response to the Call for Evidence of the House of Commons Select Committee about 
anonymity was: "The loss of anonymity for donors remains an area of concern with regard to 
its impact on donor recruitment. A review should allow for reconsideration of a twin track 
approach." . 
c6 The Donor Conception Network is a group started in 1993 by parents who had deCIded to tell 
their children about their origins and who came together to support each other. 
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to donor identifiability with a positive, proactive campaIgn for public 
awareness of the value of donation, so that the government can help clinics to 
recruit identifiable donors" (HL Deb, 2003-04a: col. 347). 
Claims-making activities in Stage 3: re-emergence of claims and 
controversy 
Spector and Kitsuse's description of Stage 3 is different from its counterparts; 
whereas past natural history models end with legitimation and implementation, 
theirs is open-ended since official acceptance is seen as a possible ground for a 
'new generation' of definitional activities (Schneider, 1985). Spector and 
Kitsuse (1977) argue that Stage 3 is the re-emergence of claims and demands 
by the original groupe s) or by others, expressing dissatisfaction with the 
established procedures. These activities are not concerned directly with the 
conditions imputed in Stage I, but with the organisational procedures of 
dealing with the complaints. If claims-makers are not satisfied with the official 
response in Stage 2, for example, Stage 3 may begin. 
In the UK, neither the claims-makers who proposed the removal of donor 
anonymity, nor their opponents were satisfied by the policy change. Lifting 
anonymity was perceived as a positive step towards openness by the children's 
organisations, but it was not their ideal solution. As Wallbank (2004) argues, 
the government's reluctance to compel disclosure sent a half-hearted message 
to parents, although it offered no practical reassurance to prospective donors. 
63 
In fact, none of the countries that have removed donor anonymity has 
formalised a system for informing the child (Frith, 2001): all leave the decision 
to the parents. The issue is perceived as one of family privacy. Where the child 
does not suspect his or her circumstances of conception, no question of tracing 
their genetic origins exists (Liu, 1991: 85). As Thevoz (1997) points out, 
openness and truthfulness in family relationships and respect for the child's 
autonomy are ethical demands, which are almost impossible to convert into 
legal obligations. Similarly, Waldman (2007) argues: 
Parental disclosure patterns in an era of evolving social norms are 
resistant to change .... Changes in social norms may help parents feel 
more comfortable with the complex relationships ART creates, but 
existing data reveals that the changes are slow and legislative initiatives 
exert a less powerful gravitational pull than we might expect 
(Waldman, 2006: 549). 
Spector and Kitsuse have an interesting observation for explaining similar 
policies. They argue that the official response or established procedures may, 
in fact, tum out to be a public relations solution in which the imputed 
conditions are ignored on the view that the social problems activities can be 
"cooled out". Nevertheless, as we shall see in the following section, these 
public relations solutions can be challenged by the claims-makers. 
Claims against the new law from the child's right - to - know camp 
The child's right-to-know camp was not convinced that lifting anonymity 
would encourage openness and claims on the right-to-know soon re-emerged as 
an issue. In their response to a consultation27 on the HFE Act in 2005 the 
n The Department of Health undertook a public consultation e x e r ~ i s e e over. the summer and 
autumn of 2005 on possible changes to update the law and regulation relatmg to human 
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British Association for Adoption and Fostering (BAAF) demanded that donor 
conception should be registered on a child's birth records. They expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the new law as follows: 
We have a responsibility not to collude with the parents who have 
chosen not to be truthful with their child about his and her genetic 
origins. Prospective adoptive parents would not be approved as 
adoptive parents if it was thought that they would not tell their child 
that s/he was adopted. ( ... ) this is why it should be a statutory 
requirement for prospective parents of a donor conceived child to 
undergo an assessment and preparation period, where such matters can 
be addressed. One way of encouraging parental disclosure would be to 
annotate birth records in a way analogous to adoption and parental 
order registration. The birth record should not endorse a biological 
untruth and if parents know that the information is recorded somewhere 
in official documentation it may prevent deceit and secrecy. The 
"short" birth certificate, which can be used for most purposes, would 
not indicate the individual's status as donor-conceived (British 
Association for Adoption & Fostering, 2005: para 45). 
This proposal was not accepted (Department of Health, 2006). However, in its 
initial proposals for revising the HFE Act 1990, the government did indicate 
that it would recognise in law some reciprocal rights of donors, and widen 
access in relation to consanguinity: 
F or the first time, the law will make clear the right of donors to access 
limited nonidentifying information about children conceived as a result 
of their donation. Also, the law will, in some circumstances, allow 
donors to be informed when their identifying details have been 
requested by those children. In addition, donor-conceived children will 
be able to find out if they have donor-conceived siblings, as part of the 
information accessible to them at age 18 (Department of Health, 2006: 
para 2.58). 
Nevertheless, during the review of the Human Tissue and Embryos Draft Bill, 
'legal' right-to-know claims re-emerged. In August 2007, the Joint Committee 
on the Bill considered the right to know and the need to be told. Some of the 
reproducti\'c technologies. This was part of a review intended to ensure that the law 
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witnesses suggested that the draft Bill should be amended to gIve donor 
conceived people a 'legal' right to know and the parents the legal duty to tell. It 
was argued that, as the state was involved in assisted conception, it should not 
be actively involved in deception (Department of Health, 2007: Ev 44). 
Related to the arguments about a legal right to know, the Joint Committee 
considered whether donor conception should be registered on the birth 
certificates of donor-conceived people. A donor-conceived person argued that a 
man or woman whose gametes are not used to create a child should be referred 
to not as a parent but as an "adoptive parent" or a "step parent" (Joint 
Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, 2007: Ev 16, para. 
16). The provisions that he would like to see in the draft Bill included that 
Parliament should bring donor-conceived people on a par with adoptees by 
applying 'donor' identification legislation retrospectively: if a person is donor-
conceived this must be indicated on the birth certificate; and that gamete 
recipients must pass the same stringent checks passed by adopting adults. 
This witness's view that donor conception "must be required to be indicated on 
the birth certificate because a person must know they are donor conceived" was 
supported by several other witnesses. The Joint Committee's decision on the 
issue was "[t]his is a complicated area involving the important issue of privacy, 
as well as issues of human rights and data protection. We therefore recommend 
that, as a matter of urgency, the Government should give this matter further 
consideration" (Department of Health, 2007: Recommendation 28, para. 276). 
remained fit for purpose in the early 21 st century. 
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One witness pointed out that the right to know should be protected through 
law, because "the right to information at the age of eighteen is largely illusory 
in the case of donor-conceived children unless they know they are donor-
conceived". He also claimed that there was a "very strong trend" in English 
domestic law to get at the truth of biological origins (Department of Health, 
2007: Ev 14, paras. 5-9). The BAAF also wanted to see an urgent review of 
how children born as a result of donor-assisted conception have their status 
reflected in official records (2007: Ev 37). These proposals were designed to 
make sure that parents tell their children about their donor-conceived 
beginnings. Would-be parents expressed their anger and anxiety at these 
proposals on online discussion boards. The Donor Conception Network, an 
NGO which advocates for the child's need to be told about the donor 
conception, stated that it did not support the proposal. The organisation sent a 
briefing to Members of Parliament on this matter (and others within the Bill) 
and also invited would-be parents to take action to protest against the proposal. 
On the discussion forum of an online patient support group, 
fertilityfriends.co.uk, some would-be parents asked whether the proposal 
included those who received treatment abroad. A representative from the 
Donor Conception Network commented that, based on their interpretation of 
the policy, if it was agreed by Parliament that a symbol or wording should 
appear on the birth certificate indicating that a child had been conceived by 
donor conception, all parents would be expected to tell the Registrar of Births 
about a donor conception, no matter where the conception took place. 
When the Joint Committee reviewed the draft Bill, it was not only the BAAF 
but also the British Medical Association who hoped that the government would 
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change the law. The BMA was one of the organisations that had opposed the 
removal of donor anonymity. It was disappointed that the government had not 
taken the opportunity of this Bill to review that decision. It reported that the 
removal of donor anonymity was having a detrimental impact upon the 
availability of treatment with donor gametes and, despite reports from the 
HFEA that the number of men registering as sperm donors had increased, the 
number of women registering as egg donors continued to fall. The BMA also 
stressed that the number of people registering as donors may not give an 
accurate picture of the number of donor conception treatments taking place and 
the length of time that prospective patients had to wait for treatment: 
The BMA would like to see increased openness between parents and 
their donor-conceived children. We are concerned that the removal of 
donor anonymity may have made such openness less likely. Parents 
who are unwilling for their child to make contact with the donor when 
they reach 18 may be less likely to tell their child they were donor 
conceived (British Medical Association, 2008). 
Eventually, although the Joint Committee believed that it was in the best 
interests of the child to know of their donor conception, the Committee did not 
endorse of the view of those who called for a statutory duty on parents to tell 
their child of his or her donor conception. The government agreed that it was 
preferable that parents were educated about the benefits of disclosure rather 
than forcing the issue through the annotation of birth certificates. The 
government's response published in October 2007 rejected the Committee's 
suggestion of putting 'by donor' on birth certificates of donor offspring, but 
decided to keep the matter under review. The government's response to this 
recommendation was that it is preferable that parents are educated about the 
68 
._- .... -_ .. -_._._...... -
___ ... __ ............•. __ ............................ __ 0···· 
benefits of disclosure rather than forcing the issue through the annotation of 
birth certificates. However, the government considered this as a sensitive area 
that should be kept under review: "We believe that the issues need to be 
considered carefully, including constructive dialogue with stakeholders, and we 
will keep the matter under review" (Department of Health, 2007: paras. 69-
70). 
Claims against the law from opponents of the open donation system 
It was not only the advocates of the child's right-to-know who expressed 
discontent about the 2004 law, but also opponents of the open donation system 
for whom the steady decline in the number of sperm donors was a senous 
concern. 
Acute donor shortages and long waiting lists for would-be parents were 
regularly reported in the media. According to a BBC investigation in 2006, 50 
of the 74 clinics in the UK reported that they had insufficient sperm or none at 
all. The BBC found only 169 registered donors in the UK, with none in 
Northern Ireland, one in Scotland, and six in Wales (Dreaper, 2006). A BBC 
Scotland survey of Scotland's five IVF clinics found a crisis in supply that had 
completely halted treatment in two clinics and brought long waiting lists in 
others (BBC News, 2006a).28 Dr Evan Harris MP, a former GP and member of 
the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, blamed the new 
law: 
28 The survey revealed that two of Scotland's four NHS clinics have suspended services 
because of a lack of donors. In one clinic, the waiting time for egg donation treatment has more 
than doubled since the law was introduced, from 2 years to at least 5 years. Another clinic had 
no new donations since the law was introduced and there had been between 30 and 40 patients 
that the clinic was unable to treat. One clinic reported that for the first time they had to start a 
waiting list for treatment using donor sperm at the end of last year and they were no longer able 
to offer any treatment until supplies became available. 
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The decision to abandon donor anonymity was stupid and misguided 
(Woolf,2006a). 
The Government should reopen this issue. It's urgent because people 
are waiting. They will either go abroad, to unregulated sperm producers 
or go childless. What the Government is effectively saying is, it is 
better for children never to be born than not to be able to contact their 
parent (Woolf, 2006b). 
Clare Brown, chief executive of Infertility Network UK, called for an urgent 
recruitment drive by the Department of Health to persuade men to come 
forward and replenish the country's sperm banks: 
There is not just a shortage of donor sperm in the UK - we are actually facing a 
crisis. The number of donors started to decline when the removal of anonymity 
of donors was first broached - even before it became law. But since the 
removal the situation has worsened and something has to be done to help the 
many, many couples who will never have a family unless we do something. 
Many couples face a childless future just because of a lack of sperm (Woolf, 
2006b). The situation facing infertile couples was so acute that the HFEA called 
on spenn banks to consider using stocks of sperm reserved for couples who 
may want a second child (Woolf, 2006b). Nevertheless, the HFEA did not 
consider removal of donor anonymity as a reason behind the sperm shortage. 
The Authority accused some clinics of 'hoarding' their supplies of sperm and 
refusing to release it to other clinics. These clinics responded that they were 
forced to stop supplying other fertility centres because the sperm shortage 
meant that they could not meet the needs of women on their own books 
(Woolf, 2006b). 
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The BFA claimed that short term effect of the change in legislation had been 
that the cost of DI had risen enormously in many centres, and the programme 
had effectively been removed from the NHS as standard practice in most areas 
(British Fertility Society, 2007). According to the National Gamete Donation 
Trust, over 500 sperm donors are needed annually in the UK. The HFEA 
registers show that in 2000, there were 325 men registered as donors. The latest 
figures from the Authority show that this figure dropped to 259 in 2005, and 
reached 307 in 2006. There is a sharp decrease in egg donor numbers. In 2000 
there were 1242 egg donors, in 2006 this figure dropped to 812. As a subset of 
total egg donors, there were 500 egg sharers in 2004. This figure dropped to 
323 in 2006. The National Gamete Donation Trust notes on its website that 
there is an acute shortage of egg donors and many couples wait for several 
years to benefit from donated eggs. 
Egg share donors 
Sperm (subset of total egg 
Year donors Egg donors donors) 
2000 325 1242 
2001 328 1315 
2002 278 1179 
2003 255 1056 
2004 247 1064 500 
2005 259 956 409 
2006 307 812 323 
Table: Donor registration at centres per year29 (HFEA, 2008d) 
29 It st be noted that the figures that HFEA currently publishes may include duplicates 
mu l' . 
where an individual donor has registered again at a different c mlC. 
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The HFEA has referred to the drop in sperm donor numbers as a 'myth' 
(HFEA, 2007a). It must be said that the donor shortage issue has been 
controversial, as the figures can be read differently. Although the HFEA 
acknowledges that there is a donor recruitment problem in the UK, it does not 
consider this to be a consequence of the change in the law. The Authority 
interprets any recovery in donor numbers as evidence that the new law did not 
affect recruitment. The HFEA blames the shortage on clinics' poor recruitment 
strategies: 
Our figures show that it's a myth that the change in the law has caused 
a sudden fall in sperm donors. What we see is a patchy provision across 
the country (HFEA spokesman John Paul May tum in BBC News, 
2006b). 
Many commentators continue to claim that the change in the law to 
remove anonymity for sperm and egg donors would lead to an 
immediate and steep fall in the number of donors. These new figures 
show that the predicted drop in sperm donor numbers is a myth. The 
HFEA's role in the donor system is to keep a register of every person 
who becomes a donor and to provide guidelines for the donation 
system. We have no role in encouraging donors to come forward. 
However we do think it is important to inform the work of those people 
working in the donor system by providing information about trends in 
donor recruitment. Professionals working in the sector say that there are 
a complex set of reasons which led to a fall in donor numbers from 
1997 onwards. The British Fertility Society, the National Gamete 
Donation Trust and other organisations have been looking at ways to 
improve the numbers of sperm donors recruited in the UK. It is 
acknowledged that egg donations have fallen during this period but the 
procedures for and issues involved in egg donation are much more 
complex, as are the reasons why women mayor may not choose to 
donate (Shirley Harrison, chair of the HFEA, in HFEA, 2007a). 
In its response to the HFEA' s press release, INUK draws attention to the fact 
that the number of donors in the UK has been declining since the possible 
removal of anonymity was first raised back in 1997, and that due to donor 
shortage patients have no choice but to go abroad for treatment: 
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Weare pleased to see the slight increase in the number of sperm donors 
in the UK in 2006 compared to 2005 figures. However, the number of 
both sperm and egg donors in the country falls far short of the numbers 
needed to allow patients to access donor treatment. The shortage of 
donors means that some clinics are no longer even accepting patients on 
a waiting list. The number of donors in the UK has been declining since 
the possible removal of anonymity was first raised back in 1997/98 and 
what is needed now is an ongoing national campaign to recruit donors 
in local areas, backed up with the infrastructure to support them and 
give patients the opportunity to have their treatment without waiting 
years or being forced to consider going abroad for treatment (Clare 
Brown, Chief Executive of Infertility Network UK, in Medical News 
Today, 2007). 
The groups that the HFEA mentioned in its briefing such as the BFS and the 
National Gamete Trust also raised the problem of the donor shortage: 
The BFS notes with interest the HFEA's report of a slight increase in 
the number of sperm donors registering in the UK in 2006. The BFS 
remains concerned that availability of sperm donation services remains 
patchy at best throughout the country. The Society is aware of several 
centres which have now withdrawn donor insemination services to 
patients, and for those who may be fortunate to be able to access 
treatment, costs and waiting times have greatly increased (Mark 
Hamilton, chairman of the British Fertility Society, in Henderson, 
2007). 
The National Gamete Donation Trust addressed the shortage as follows: 
It is crucial to remember that we haven't reached the required 500 
sperm donors per year and we are nowhere near solving the problem of 
the shortage of egg donors. Most of the increase in numbers is down to 
the sustained work of a small number of committed clinics (Laura 
Witjens, chairwoman of the National Gamete Donation Trust, in 
Henderson, 2007) 
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Campaigns were launched throughout the country to promote sperm donation 
and the BFS established a working party to examine sperm donation in the UK. 
Its report was launched at a HFEA meeting in February 2008. The report made 
a number of recommendations about how the existing pool of donors could be 
used to more effect: "the report gives a helpful impression of the current state 
of sperm donation services in the UK, showing an undeniable mismatch 
between supply and demand". The HFEA's response in July 2008 was that the 
Authority's remit did not extend to the recruitment of donors; this was a matter 
for the sector and should be addressed as a matter of urgency (HFEA, 2008a). 
It was not until later in 2008 that the HFEA expressed 'great concern': 
[T]he number of donor insemination cycles and births continues to fall. 
While more couples are able to take advantage of techniques such as 
ICSI, for those patients whose treatment requires donor sperm, this is of 
great concern. The HFEA is supportive of clinics that are actively 
recruiting donors and we welcome the BFS Working Party proposals to 
introduce a national system for donor recruitment (Lisa Jardin, chair of 
HFEA, in HFEA, 2008e). 
Not only in Stage 3, but in all stages of natural history of the problem, 
opponents of the open donation system based their claims on the donor 
shortage. The law was also criticised for several other reasons. In a letter to The 
Times (21 September 2006) Professor Sir Colin Campbell, founding chair of 
the HFEA (1990-1994), called for the restoration of anonymity for sperm 
donors. In his view, the putative interests of a person not yet conceived should 
not take precedence over the legitimate interests of would-be parents: "the 
policy is causing anguish to couples who are unable to conceive without 
assistance, and putting serious impediments in the way of those otherwise 
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willing to assist with donations. The policy must be changed" (Campbell, 
2006). He was supported by his successor as chair, Baroness Deech (1994-
2002): 
The lobby for the removal of anonymity asserted a misleading parallel 
with adoption, but adoption has a history and a relinquishment that call 
for explanation. The argument that one needs to know one's father in 
order to ascertain health issues is also false. Medical predictions can be 
made just as accurately from one's own body (Deech, 2006). 
Professor Lord Winston from Imperial College, London, also contributed to the 
discussion by drawing attention to two other adverse effects of the regulations 
abolishing anonymity. First, more couples undergoing these treatments were 
stating a firm intention to conceal the method of conception from any child. 
Second, a woman donating eggs to another infertile woman during her own 
treatment, but whose own treatment fails, may be distressed to learn that she 
has a genetic child of whose existence she was not aware (Winston, 2006). 
Advocates of the child's right-to-know joined this debate. Eric Blyth, Professor 
of Social Work at the University of Huddersfield asserted: "Sir Colin Campbell 
(letter, Sept 21) allows expediency to trump a significant human rights issue: 
the interests of donor-conceived people to learn about their genetic history" 
(Blyth, 2006). A number of letters were contributed by donor offspring. Their 
main theme was that awareness of one's parents was a norm in society and 
withholding such information was discriminatory. It was argued that donor 
offspring had a "terrible fate" and "suffered harm". In response to these letters, 
Dr Andrew Lawson, from the Medical Ethics Unit at Imperial College, noted 
that all treatments and therapies have the potential to harm and that, if doing no 
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harm was the prime code of medicine, then practitioners were bound to do 
nothing (Lawson, 2006). 
Silent resistance of would-be parents 
Would-be parents remained silent during the debate. They had the possibility 
of accessing to anonymous treatment in other medically advanced countries. 
Fertility travel and purchase of sperm online increasingly featured in the media 
after the new law came into effect. The titles of many news reports presented 
dramatic pictures of fertility travel: "ED faces fertility tourism threat" (BBC, 
30 June 2004); "Plea for egg and sperm donors" (BBC, 30 December 2004); 
"Fertility tourism 'is inevitable'" (BBC, 20 June 2005); "We went to 
Hollywood for IVF" (BBC, 14 December 2006); "Donor Crisis 'fuels IVF 
tourism' " (BBC, 14 December 2006); "Personal story: IVF in Barbados" 
(BBC, 15 December 2006); "IVF Tourism: an ethical dilemma?" (BBC, 19 
December 2006); "Personal story: IVF in Istanbul" (BBC, 19 December 2006); 
"Warning over 'fertility tourism' (BBC, 28 April 2006); "Call for ED-wide 
fertility rules" (BBC, 2 July 2007); India's surrogate mother industry (BBC, 12 
October 2008); "Baby chase" (The Guardian, 26 June 2004); "Loss of 
anonymity could halve number of sperm and egg donors"( The Guardian, 19 
October 2005); "British couples desperate for children travel to India in search 
of surrogates" (The Guardian, 20 March 2006);"Cruel cost of the human egg 
trade" (The Guardian, 30 April 2006); "The fertility tourists" (The Guardian, 
30 July 2008). 
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The discussion boards of online support were snowed under with posts about 
clinics abroad. These alternative counter claims-making activities will be 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
The HFEA warned patients about the consequences of seeking treatment 
abroad: 
We know that a relatively small number of people choose to travel 
abroad to undergo fertility treatment and that sometimes the treatment 
is packaged as a "holiday" where the patient can convalesce in the sun. 
However, we are concerned about people who choose to have their 
treatment abroad should know about the potential risks. We have heard 
of some clinics which offer treatment to patients that is so dangerous 
that it has been banned in the UK. For example implanting five 
embryos which significantly raises the chance of multiple pregnancy, 
the biggest risk of IVF for both mothers and babies. It is very sad when 
we receive complaints from patients about their treatment abroad and 
we are not able to help or reassure them. We would urge patients to 
think twice and consider the risks and implications before going abroad 
for treatment (Suzi Leather, chair of the HFEA, in HFEA, 2006). 
Similar warnings were published on the website of the Donor Conception 
Network, a self-help network for donor conception families. 
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DC Network is increasingly being approached by people seeking 
information about clinics outside the UK that provide donor conception, 
usually egg donation ( ... ) Anyone planning any sort of medical 
treatment abroad may have to face the prospect of travelling to what 
may be an unfamiliar country with different laws, language difficulties 
and potentially different clinical standards. However those seeking 
donor treatment in overseas clinics face a number of additional issues. 
There have been reports that women in some countries have been 
recruited as egg donors in circumstances that suggest a degree of 
exploitation. The Tissues and Cells Directive says that ED donors 
should not be paid for donating but can be compensated for 
inconvenience. There seem to be very wide discrepancies in how this is 
interpreted. It is often difficult to get meaningful assurances about the 
circumstances in which donors have been recruited (Donor Conception 
Network, 2007). 
There were also warnings against buying sperm online. In July 2007 the HFE 
Act was amended to prohibit any attempt to "procure, test, process or 
distribute" any gametes (sperm and eggs) intended for human application 
without a licence from the HFE Authority. One year later, in response to a 
news report about women purchasing sperm through Internet, the chair of the 
HFEA, Professor Lisa Jardine noted: 
Your article about the growing number of single women seeking to 
have children without a relationship with a man (G2, September 17) 
raises many issues which it is important to air and discuss. Since July 
2007 it has been a criminal offence to "procure, test, process or 
distribute" any gametes (sperm and eggs) intended for human 
application without a licence from the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority. Prospective patients seeking donated gametes 
should only use licensed centres. That way, they can be assured that the 
gametes have been subject to screening checks and that the centre 
complies with the standards set out in the HFEA code of practice. A 
further difficulty with using unlicensed centres is that the HFEA is 
unable to hold, in its statutory registers, information relating to donors 
or children conceived from gametes obtained from such centres. 
Responsibility for prosecuting criminal offences rests with the police, 
and it is the practice of the HFEA to refer concerns about internet 
procurement to them. We strongly advise any person who becomes 
aware that a person or organisation may be procuring, testing, 
processing or distributing gametes without a licence to contact the 
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police. The women whose stories you tell are entitled to make such 
fundamental choices about their personal lives within a safe, clinically 
sound framework. It is the HFEA's responsibility to provide that 
framework, and to be vigilant for the safety of those who undergo 
fertility treatment. The internet sperm providers referred to in one of 
your examples are not licensed by the HFEA. The service they offer is 
unlawful and unsafe (Jardine, 2008). 
These concerns about fertility travel and online sperm providers suggest that 
demand for gametes may be leading many would-be parents to cope with the 
donor shortage problem in alternative ways. Despite their reticence in voicing 
their reactions in the public realm, many patients have been using online 
discussion forums to express and exchange their views anonymously about the 
new law and fertility travel. In Chapter Five I explore these alternative claims-
making activities that escaped from the public eye. 
Claims-making in Stage 4 
Spector and Kitsuse (1977) argue that Stage 4 occurs with claimants' 
"contention that it is no longer possible to 'work within' the system" (1977: 
153). This last stage involves rejection by the complainant group(s) of the 
agency's response and the development of activities to create alternative 
responses to the established procedures. The donor anonymity problem had not 
reached this stage at the time this study was conducted. 
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How did children's rights come to monopolise rights claims? 
One of the HFEA's core principles is "the right of people seeking assisted 
reproductive treatment to proper consideration of their request" (HFEA, 2003: 
9). Another is "a concern for the welfare of children, which cannot always be 
adequately protected by concern for the interests of the adults involved". These 
two principles do not necessarily conflict. Nevertheless, the natural history of 
the donor anonymity problem in the UK indicates that would-be parents' right 
to seek treatment has been compromised for the perceived needs of unborn 
children who will come to life as a result of donor conception. The donor-
conceived children's right-to-know their origins is based on an adoption 
analogy, and would-be parents who deny this right are condemned. 
T h e a d o p t i o n a n a ~ g y y
Studies of adopted children have found that a child's knowledge of his or her 
background is crucial to the formation of positive self-identity (McWhinnie, 
200 I; Triseliotis, 1973). On this basis, it is argued that the disclosure of such 
information is in the best interests of the child and that these should override 
any preference for secrecy on the part of the parents, whether natural or 
adoptive (Maclean and Maclean, 1996). Accordingly, the Adoption and 
Children Act 2002 gives the child the right to access any available information 
unless the High Court orders otherwise. 3o During the debate on the 
30 An adoption is registered in the Adopted Children Register in a similar way to registration of 
donated gamete children in the HFEA register. On reaching the age of 18, people who are 
adopted (between 12 November 1975 and 30 December 2005 and live in England or Wales) 
'have the right to receive any information which would enable him to obtain a certified copy of 
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government's plans to abolish donor anonymity, Melanie Johnson explained 
that "Our conclusion is that the interests of the child are paramount, and that 
the position of donor-conceived people should be aligned more closely with 
that of adopted people, with access to identifying information about their donor 
when they reach age 18" (HC Deb, 2003-04 416 col. 6IWS). Johnson also 
noted "Today's new regulations will align their positions, removing the major 
discrepancy that exists between the rights of donor-conceived people and those 
of adopted people" (Johnson, 2004). 
By lifting anonymity for gamete donors, the government would be according 
similar rights to children born by this means. In Melanie Johnson's words, the 
government decided that "donor-conceived people should not be treated so 
differently from adopted people". 
During the donor anonymity debate the needs of donor-conceived children 
were "typified" by the claims-makers. In this typification the adoption analogy 
was used. On 26 June 2002, The Observer published a commentary by Julia 
Feast of the Children's Society. This commentary perfectly exemplifies how 
the adoption analogy was employed: 
This Sunday, millions of families throughout Britain will celebrate 
Fathers' Day - a day to celebrate and honour the importance of family 
values. Yet the 1500 children born each year through donor-assisted 
the record of his birth, unless the High Court orders otherwise' (Adoption and Children Act 
2002, Chapter 38, 60(a) 13). Donor-conceived children who were born after the 1 April 2005 
can, on reaching the age of 18, obtain identifying infonnation including their donor's name (and 
their name at birth, if different), date and place of birth, and last known address from the HFEA 
register. Unlike adoptees, donor gamete children's access is not subject to potential restrictions 
by the High Court. 
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conception are denied the rights to even know who their biological 
parents are (Feast, 2002). 
By referring to Father's Day, the importance of family values is emphasised, 
and then donors are conceptualised as "biological parents". 
The experience of allowing adopted children to know about their past 
strongly supports the case for change. Since 1975, adopted children 
have been entitled to information about their biological history - a copy 
of their original birth certificate, showing their original name and place 
of birth and the names and addresses of their birth parents. Many 
adopted children have benefited tremendously as a result, gaining a 
fuller sense of their own identity (Feast, 2002). 
Having mentioned how adopted children benefited from accessing information 
on their birth parents, Feast portrays donor-conceived children as victims of a 
policy which denies them rights that adopted children enjoy. 
It's time for the government to acknowledge that openness and honesty 
should now become the accepted practice, so that all of tomorrow's 
children grow up with dignity and a right to their identity (Feast, 2002). 
In the statement above Feast addresses humanitarian mores such as 'openness', 
'honesty' and 'dignity', and draws attention to the conflict between these 
humanitarian mores and government policy. She further notes that by denying 
them access to donor identity, the government infringes the donor-conceived 
children's human rights: 
It is a basic human right, as laid down in the European Convention on 
the Rights of a Child [sic], which says children have the right to 
develop and retain a sense of their own identity (Feast, 2002). 
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Feast also claims that the right to information about identity is also "central to 
mental health": 
And this is an issue about child rights - the right to information about 
identity is central to mental health. Evasiveness and mistrust are a 
dangerous environment in which to bring up a child. Many people who 
were born through donor assisted conception will confirm these 
feelings (Feast, 2002). 
Typification is a common strategy that is adopted by activists. Typifying is the 
backbone of claims-making activity. It occurs "when claimsmakers 
characterise a problem's nature" (Best, 1995: 8). Typification can take many 
forms; to give an orientation toward a problem and arguing that a problem is 
best understood from a particular perspective is one form. When a new 
problem is constructed as a different instance of an already existing problem, 
the audience will be more likely to understand the problem: successful claims-
making changes the old in novel ways (Loseke, 2003). The adoption analogy is 
an excellent example. The rights of donor-conceived children is a complex 
issue, but when the public is convinced that there are similarities between 
adoption and donor conception the problem will be more comprehensible and 
people will know how to think about it. Typification of adopted people as 
'others' has also been a strategy adopted by search movement activists in 
America. Wegar (1997) argues: 
The agenda of search movement draws upon society's view of adoptees 
as simultaneously familiar, to the extend that the public can identify 
with their quest for identity, and different, to the extend that they are 
perceived as standing outside the order of nature, as Others (1997: 13). 
A significant part of claims-making is associated with 'new social movements' 
or 'identity movements' (Loseke and Best, 2003). These social movements 
focus on changing public perception by increasing the social regard accorded 
to types of people, particularly socially discredited people. As opposed to old 
social movements which coalesced around shared grievances and perceptions 
of injustice, new social movements articulate grievances that are not based on 
economic and class interests (Johnston, Larafia and Gusfield, 1994). These 
movements are based on elements such as identity, status, humanism and 
spirituality. The values represented by new social movements reflect the ethos 
of individual freedom, choice and self-fulfilment (Wegar, 1997); they often 
involve "new or formerly weak dimensions of identity"; they attempt to 
"reclaim a self-robbed of its identity", and aspire to "empower members to 
'name themselves'" (Johnston, Larafia and Gusfield, 1994: 7-10, quoted in; 
Wegar, 1997). 
They (the new social movements) are associated with a set of beliefs, 
symbols, values and meanings related to sentiments of belonging to a 
differentiated social group; with the members' image of themselves; 
and with new, socially constructed attributions about the meaning of 
everyday life (Johnston, Larafia and Gusfield, 1994: 7). 
The Women's movement, gay rights and the adopted children's search 
movement exemplify this trend. The child's right-to-know claims seem to 
adopt ideas from new social movements, particularly from the 'search 
movement' for adopted people. This is not to say that the donor anonymity 
problem can be subsumed by the social movements by which it was inspired; 
we might better argue that claims about social problems are embedded in a 
broader cultural context which provides cultural resources from which claims 
draw (Best, 1999). 
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Violation of moral standards 
There are strategies of constructing a social problem so as to conVInce 
audiences that "a condition is prevalent and troublesome enough to violate 
morality, that it contains victims who deserve sympathy" (Loseke, 2003: 82). 
Claims-makers construct an image of a condition, the victims who are harmed 
by it and the villains who cause it. Based on the adoption analogy, advocates of 
an open donation system portrayed donor conceived children not only as 
victims of a policy which infringed their right to identity, but also as victims of 
their parents who deny this information to them. Some commentators criticised 
parents of donor-conceived children who kept donor conception as a secret for 
committing an immoral act. For example, Baroness Warnock argued: 
It's perfectly possible for parents of a child born by artificial 
insemination by donor to allow him to be brought up under a 
misapprehension that the father he calls father is in fact his genetic 
father. I think that is actually morally wrong (Rhodes, 2002, emphasis 
added). 
Claim-makers who adopt a moral orientation typically advocate giving people 
guidance to discourage immorality (Best, 1995). The following extract from 
Baroness Warnock's speech offers such guidance: parents should acknowledge 
the donor origins of their children: 
There can be no moral justification whatever in deceiving a child about 
the circumstances of his birth. It is a very awkward doctrine to 
enunciate, considering the number of children born by adulterous 
relationships. Nevertheless, it is deeply morally wrong to pretend 
that a child is the son or daughter of a father or mother who is not 
his or her real biological parent. To insist on pretending shows self-
interest on the part of the parents-that they are interested in their own 
status, not that of the child. It may be deeply traumatic for the child, 
because children nearly always guess that there is something a bit 
funny about their birth if it has taken place by donation or they were 
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adopted. To treat a child as though it were a toy or a pet-to suggest 
that it does not particularly matter where it came from because it is your 
child-is genuinely immoral (HL Deb, 2003-04b: 662 col. 356 
emphasis added). 
The extracts quoted above indicate that it is "genuinely immoral" to "pretend" 
that a child is the son or daughter of a father or mother who is not his or her 
real biological parent. The would-be parents' inclination toward secrecy is 
portrayed as a potential threat to the resultant child's welfare, and parents who 
intend not to disclose are accused of deception and violation of moral 
standards. 
F east, from the Children's Society and BAAF, also approached the openness in 
child-parent relationship as a matter of balance of rights. She expressed 
concern that the rights of infertile parents had historically been put before those 
of unborn children: 
The current legislation [the HFE Act 1990] puts the right of a parent to 
have a child before the needs of a child. This imbalance must change 
(Feast, 2002). 
The following extract from Baroness Warnock's speech also exemplifies the 
discourse that the unborn child's rights should be protected against the parents' 
passionate desire to bring them to life at any cost: 
I think they [the would-be parents] have been treated as though this 
passionate desire they have to have a child must override all other 
considerations and I don't think that's right (Rhodes, 2002). 
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Conclusion 
Earlier in this chapter, I noted that any social condition is a potential subject for 
claims-making (Best, 1995), and it is claims-makers who shape the public's 
sense of what the problem is, and what must be done to solve it. The natural 
history of the donor anonymity problem in the UK shows that the problem was 
owned by the advocates of the child's right-to-know in the UK. 
In the UK, a large number of infertile couples seek donor conception; 
according to the HFEA registers in 2006 1124 children were born using 
donated eggs and sperm (HFEA, 2008d). During the donor anonymity debate 
the potential impact of the disclosure policy on would-be parents could have 
been raised as a social problem. Nevertheless, without any significant objection 
from would-be parents, abolishing anonymity was framed as an action which 
would have effects on only two interest groups: the resultant offspring and the 
donors. A number of assumptions prevailed: (1) potential offspring had as 
much right to find out about their genetic origins as adopted people did; (2) the 
secrecy and stigma surrounding assisted conception had faded; (3) by 
abolishing anonymity, donation culture would change and future donors would 
be altruistic people who wanted to help infertile couples; and (4) more parents 
were planning to tell their child about donor conception. In response to the 
medical community's concerns about a potential donor shortage, the 
government claimed that any shortage would be a short-term problem and 
would be solved through promotions and recruitment campaigns. 
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Donor shortage was not ignored by the mass media; on the contrary, during the 
debate the media focused on the decreasing donor numbers. According to Best, 
the media play an important role in promoting social problems. It is not, 
however, enough to institutionalise the social problems; other cultural 
entrepreneurs, such as activists, government and experts also play an important 
part. Social movement activists are among the strongest competitors (Loseke 
and Best, 2003). These activists were present in the donor anonymity debate, 
and indeed were influential in raising awareness of the child's right-to-know 
based on an adoption analogy. On the other hand, their lack of interest in 
representing would-be parents' rights was evident. 
In the absence of an explicit reaction or opposition from would-be parents, 
counter-claims activities were performed by the medical community and the 
patient support group, INUK. These counter-claims making activities focused 
on the donor shortage and drew attention to detrimental effects of the new law: 
donors are reluctant to donate; UK clinics cannot meet the demand for 
gametes; long waiting lists for patients who wish to get treatment; and 
increasing numbers of patients travelling abroad to avoid the law. A few 
claims-makers also addressed the argument that the new law might discourage 
parents from being open with their donor-conceived child. 
The nature of these claims was significantly different from that of their 
opponents. Whereas the child's right-to-know claims addressed humanitarian 
mores, these counter-claims focused on the supply-demand problems in the 
gamete market. The fact that would-be parents would suffer due to the donor 
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shortage could only find little sympathy when weighed against the child's 
welfare arguments raised by the child's right-to-know camp. 
It is evident that reticence of would-be parents in voicing their concerns did not 
help their case. Especially in new social movements, individuals also play an 
important role in pressing claims. The impact of Rose's case on the donor 
anonymity debate exemplifies this. Johnston et al. (1994) argue "many 
contemporary movements are 'acted out' in individual actions rather than 
through or among mobilised groups" (1994: 7). Presumably, involvement of 
would-be parents in the debate could have changed the problem's trajectory if 
these parents had attempted to create a public or political issue by talking about 
their experiences, their rights, or their understanding of the welfare of their 
unborn children. The political significance of self-narratives and life stories can 
be seen in many social movements (Wegar, 1997). Indeed, for members of 
marginalised social groups, self narratives and autobiographies are "often the 
only means of making their voices heard or of formulating experiences 
independently of dominant cultural and institutional frameworks" (We gar, 
1997: 74). 
Loseke and Best (2003) note that "claims-makers often greatly expand their 
grounds and diagnostic frames by constructing full-blown typifications of the 
types of people harmed by social problems and the types of people causing 
these problems" (2003: 110). During claims-making activities, advocates of a 
child's right-to-know portrayed donor-conceived children as potential victims 
of their parents. Arguably, the socio-political climate was not ideal for would-
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be parents, or their representatives, to defeat the charges against them. Given 
the ways in which they were framed during the debate, their reticence should 
come as no surprise. 
The natural history of the donor anonymity problem reveals that, in the UK, the 
child's right-to-know movement succeeded in the absence of any public 
articulation of the rights of would-be parents. Since the removal of donor 
anonymity, and despite the absence of any public articulation of the rights of 
would-be parents, it is evident that there is a severe donor shortage in the UK 
and that growing numbers of people are seeking treatment abroad. The 
movement of would-be parents to jurisdictions where anonymity is still 
permitted indicates that some people choose to cope with the problem by 
avoiding the law, rather than making official claims to challenge the policy-
makers. This 'silent resistance' to the new law deserves to be subject to 
empirical investigation. This issue will be investigated in later chapters through 
would-be parent's own accounts. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
PROCESS 
Constructing Social Problems by Spector and Kitsuse (1977) issued a call for 
more qualitative empirical work in the field of social problems. In order to 
illustrate how social problems research could be undertaken, one chapter 
provided a detailed empirical example of claims-making activities: a 
controversy that developed out of efforts to pUblicise the use of psychiatry to 
control political dissidents in the Soviet Union. Spector and Kitsuse argue that 
the public discourse of claims-making can be examined in the myriad 
circumstances in which the construction of social problems takes place 
(Holstein and Miller, 2003). These circumstances include "demanding services, 
filing out forms, lodging complaints, filing lawsuits, calling press conferences, 
writing letters to protest, passing resolutions, publishing exposes, placing ads 
in newspapers, supporting or opposing governmental practice or policy, setting 
up picket lines or boycotts" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977: 79). 
Although their case study focused on institutional or organisational claims-
making activities, the authors suggested that social problems research should 
not be limited to such contexts. Since the book was published, the 
constructionist perspective has produced an impressive collection of empirical 
studies. I read Constructing Social Problems with the UK's donor anonymity 
debate on my mind. I found its theoretical approach useful to understand and 
monitor social problems; however I did not find an answer to the question as to 
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how one can study a social problem which has not gained public awareness, 
which is not documented, or which is not articulated in formal modes of 
communication. In short, if I were to study the claims-making activities of the 
would-be parents in the donor anonymity paradigm, there was an obvious 
obstacle: collecting material of the kind specified by Spector and Kitsuse as 
data for this approach would prove difficult, if not impossible. 
My theoretical interest in alternative forms of claims-making led me to 
consider employing two different methods for collecting data: interviews and a 
virtual ethnography. Although observation remains at the heart of ethnography, 
interviews are recognised as one of the most important methods that 
researchers use to gather data to explore the meaning of concepts, categories 
and events for their informants and they are especially important in 
ethnographic work. Although interviews are widely used in social problems 
research to examine formal modes of communication (e.g., interviewing the 
representatives of NGOs or governmental agencies), cyberspace provides 
excellent opportunities to monitor claims-making activities performed by 
hidden populations, who are not willing to engage in political action. Lately, in 
constructionist approaches to social problems, ethnographic studies have been 
seen as having a central place in developing theoretical understanding. It has 
been argued that any form of communication has the potential to be read as a 
claim (Lynxwiler and DeCorte, 1995). Hence, I believe that the virtual 
ethnography study that is presented here has the potential to contribute to social 
problems research. 
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In what follows, I will first outline the rationale of my study. I will then reflect 
on the methodological challenges of conducting a study on hidden or hard-to-
reach populations, such as donor conception families in the UK, and how I 
solved this problem by using the Internet as a recruitment channel and a data 
collection source. I will then go on to describe how the interviews and virtual 
ethnography were conducted, including the ethical issues. Finally, I will 
discuss how data analysis was undertaken and reflect on the potential impact of 
this study on problem definition. 
Rationale of the study undertaken 
Before embarking on a description of the work undertaken, I will consider the 
rationale for undertaking an empirical study on would-be parents. As I 
explained in Chapter One, this research started out with an interest III 
understanding the reactions of would-be parents to the disclosure policy. In 
Chapter Two, I justified my adoption of a contextual constructionist approach 
to study the donor anonymity debate as a social problem. In Chapter Three, I 
presented the natural history of the donor anonymity debate to reveal the ways 
in which right-to-know claims became successful and led to the 2004 
regulations. This examination helped me to understand the nature of claims 
opposing the use of anonymous gametes for conception. It also gave me insight 
into the way in which donor-conceived children and their parents were 
portrayed in the public sphere. Fertility travel, Internet sperm providers and the 
grey market in gametes are phenomena addressed as 'unsafe', 'illegal', 
unethical', respectively, by policy makers, and would-be parents are warned 
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against the consequences of considering any solution to their infertility, other 
than treatment in a licensed UK clinic. On the other hand, neither the reasons 
behind the development of these coping or avoidance strategies, nor the 
potential solutions to the problem that lead would-be parents to use 
'illegitimate' ways of obtaining gametes are articulated as often as the horrors 
of the unlicensed gamete market, or the ignorance of would-be parents who 
cannot see the merits of using gametes from identifiable donors. 
Remarkably, despite their reticence during the donor anonymity debate, would-
be parents continue to protest anonymously against the new law, and the 
warnings against fertility travel, on the discussion forums of online support 
groups for those who receive infertility treatment. During and after the donor 
anonymity debate, many patients who are undergoing infertility treatment have 
been using these discussion forums to express and exchange their views 
anonymously about the many issues surrounding infertility treatment. While 
exploring the counter claims-making activities of would-be parents, I visited a 
number of these websites (jertilityfriends. co. uk; infertilitynetworkuk; 
repromed; acebabies; and ivfconnections) to familiarise myself with the 
concepts, issues, community culture and abbreviations that the members use in 
their posts. These posts include inquiries as to where one can receive treatment 
abroad by using gametes from anonymous donors, stories about fertility travel, 
complaints about the long waiting lists and the donor shortage in the UK, and 
criticism of the new regulations. These postings show that the removal of 
anonymity has had identifiable detrimental effects: first, donors are reluctant to 
donate, UK clinics cannot meet the demand for gametes and there are long 
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waiting lists for patients who wish to get treatment. Second, being citizens of 
an EU member state, UK patients can exercise their right to get treatment 
abroad elsewhere in the EU. However, when it comes to donor conception, 
they are urged to think twice by the regulatory body, the HFEA. Third, in the 
public sphere there is an intimidating discourse of openness and transparency. 
These claims demonstrate that the silence of would-be parents in the public 
realm does not mean that they do not view the removal of donor anonymity as 
a social problem. Therefore, their reticence in voicing their concerns deserves 
to be subject to empirical investigation. I consider that hearing would-be 
parents' voices on this matter can have a potential influence in identifying 
policy failures and impact on future policy-making. 
The research questions 
Studying the natural history of the donor anonymity debate has helped me to 
understand what kind of elements successful claims adopt from the socio-
cultural context, and hence what kind of discourses are perceived as legitimate. 
Chapter Three presented the assumptions behind the new law and the discourse 
that dominated the donor anonymity debate in chapter three. The assumption 
behind the ethnographic work described in this chapter is that the analysis of 
accounts gathered through interviews and excerpted from online discussion 
forums can help me to identify and analyse cultural assumptions about donor 
conception through the perspectives of would-be parents. 
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Such analysis can also help us to understand why some stakeholders cannot 
press claims due to the perceived illegitimacy of their claims. The subsequent 
chapters also reflect an interest in what my informants said about, for example, 
the meaning of having a donor-conceived child, receiving donor gametes to 
conceive, and how to control this information about their family life. The main 
questions that I aim to answer by the empirical work undertaken are as follows: 
(1) What do would-be parents have to say about the moral and legal 
expectations about their parenting? 
(2) What is their response to the legislative and other measures taken by the 
government to encourage them in being open with the resultant child? 
(3) How do they deal with the tension between socially acceptable 
parenting, which advocates openness with the child, and parental 
autonomy? What are their coping/avoidance strategies? 
(4) Why did they remain silent during the debate? 
Why perform another study on donor conception families? 
Donor conception has been intensively studied by sociologists and 
psychologists in recent years. Whilst public understanding of the practice has 
been a focus of recent sociological studies, psychological studies have dealt 
with the emotional experiences of those who have received donor gametes, 
family functioning in families conceived with gamete donation, and parents' 
decision-making in relation to telling their children about their donor origins. 
For example, one study by Golombok et al. (2004a) based on interviews with 
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donor conception families (which was quoted during the donor anonymity 
debate by the advocates of open donation) indicated that an increasing number 
of parents reported that they intended to disclose. There authors note that, in 
contrast to the findings of earlier investigations, both donor insemination and 
egg donation parents appeared to becoming more open toward disclosing the 
mode of conception to the child. The earlier studies had found that not one set 
of donor insemination parents and only one set of egg donation parents in 
samples of four to eight year old children born in the 1980s had told their child 
(Golomb ok et al., 1995; Golombok et aI., 1996; Golombok et aI., 1999). 
Golombok et aI. therefore conclude that: 
[r ]egarding the issue of disclosure of the donor conception to the 
child, there appears to have been a marked change in attitude in 
recent years (2004b: 451). 
Interestingly, two years later, a follow-up study on the same families showed 
that that a majority of parents had not told although they had reported that they 
would: 
Although it was expected from their reported intentions when 
their child was aged 1 that more of the gamete donation parents 
would have begun to discuss with their children the 
circumstances of their birth, it seems that these intentions had 
not been acted upon by the time the child turned 3 years old 
(Golombok et aI., 2006: 1923). 
The follow-up study shows that in spite of the greater encouragement in recent 
years for parents to disclose their children's donor origins, less than eight per 
cent of egg donation parents and less than five per cent of donor insemination 
parents had begun to do so by the time their child had reached age three. This 
98 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ -
contrasts sharply with the finding that 56 per cent of these same oocyte 
donation parents and 46 percent of these donor insemination parents reported 
when their child was one year old that they planned to tell their child about the 
donor conception. My reading of these findings is that, regarding the issue of 
disclosure of the donor conception to the child, there appears to have been a 
marked change in parents' discourse in the recent years, but not necessarily in 
their actual behaviour and practice. It must be noted that these families' 
decisions about disclosure may change over time, and these parents may tell 
their children about their donor origins. On the other hand, what people say 
during an interview might be different from what they really think or do. More 
importantly, given the current public discourse encouraging openness, the 
parents might have felt compelled to give responses that they perceived as 
acceptable. 
Interview respondents may frequently answer according to what they believe is 
expected of them, so-called "social desirability" (Silverman, 2001). During the 
interview the respondent is concerned with presenting him/herself with his/her 
competence as a member of whatever community is invoked by the interview 
topic: 
The data produced by interviews are social constructs, created 
by the self-presentation of the respondent and whatever 
interactional cues have been given off by the interviewer about 
the acceptability or otherwise of the accounts being presented 
(Dingwall, 1997: 59). 
The interviewer'S reactions about the acceptability of the respondent's account 
affect the whole interview process. In short, an interview is a social situation in 
which the facts and identities are created through the interaction of the people 
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involved. Interview data therefore cannot offer literal descriptions of a 
respondent's reality (Murphy and Dingwall, 2003). This is not a particular 
critique of the study discussed above, but a critique of all interviews. 
Why interviews? 
If interviews cannot offer the respondent's reality, why did I consider 
conducting interviews with would-be parents? One reason was, as I mentioned 
earlier, to evaluate the accounts of the respondents in the socio-cultural context 
which was described in Chapter Three. I thought it would be possible to 
contribute to the literature by evaluating the accounts of donor conception 
families in a broader, socio-Iegal context which asserted openness. 
Furthermore, although interview data are a joint product of the interviewer and 
the respondent, this does not mean that no use can be made of them. When I 
put together the accounts in my study, despite each respondent's different view 
about openness to the child, there was a story being told by all informants in a 
consistent and repetitive fashion. 
The constructionist approach assumes that there are multiple realities: how the 
researcher views reality shapes the data generated, and the findings of the 
study. However, to facilitate the policy relevance of this research, I avoided 
the strict constructionist approach where interviews are treated as constructed 
narratives which cannot give access to experiences. I treated the data gathered 
by ethnographic studies as a vehicle to access meaning located outside the 
interview encounter; but I was also aware that these meanings were socially 
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situated by the respondents and by me, therefore they could be interpreted and 
understood in many ways. As Murphy and Dingwall argue, "data are never 
merely accounts or versions, such that any reading is as good as any other" 
(2003: 60). 
Departing from extant studies conducted on donor conception families, the 
empirical study that I have undertaken focuses on would-be parents' accounts 
and claims regarding the socio-Iegal context. In constructing social problems, it 
is important that the problem contains "victims who deserve sympathy" 
(Loseke, 2003: 82). Accordingly, the assumptions of the stakeholders about the 
acceptability of their demands have an impact on whether they will press 
claims. If the actors believe that their demands are not publicly acceptable, they 
will be less likely to press claims. For example, would-be parents are not likely 
to say that they do not agree with a policy that makes the interests of the child 
the paramount concern. The ascent of children's rights as a matter of public 
concern means that such an argument would be less likely to fit in any popular 
frame and gain public acceptance. 
Why virtual ethnography? 
Ethnographic studies conducted in digital space deal with social action and 
social organisation in online communities. Unlike interviews, during which the 
respondent presents herself to the interviewer, the members of discussion 
forums present themselves to their peers and to visitors to the forums. Virtual 
ethnography can therefore provide an insight into the discourses that are in use 
in collective definitional activities. 
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As I discussed earlier, the accounts of would-be parents and their claims draw 
our attention to the ways that they would like to present themselves: these 
presentations could explain why would-be parents did not challenge the new 
law in formal modes of communication. The same assumption led me to 
perform a virtual ethnography, but this time my intention was to observe the 
interaction of the would-be parents among their peers. By employing two data 
collection methods - interview and a virtual ethnography - I also hoped to 
achieve a more comprehensive understanding of how would-be parents present 
the facts that they construct. Posts on the discussion forums have different 
characteristics to data gathered by interviews. This means that digital space has 
the potential to contribute to observing how social problems are defined. 
Discussion threads may for example provide the chronological natural history 
of collective definitional activities. 
The virtual ethnography study I conducted enabled me to access what was 
already there, instead of constructing the data with the interviewee. Unlike 
interviews, in which the agenda is set by the interviewer, naturally-occurring 
settings like the discussion boards of online support groups enable users to 
determine the topics they would like to discuss, without the intervention of the 
researcher. Virtual ethnography is, in many respects, similar to observational 
data, as it escapes transformation. Murphy and Dingwall (2003) argue that, in 
comparison to observational data, interview data involve at least two or 
sometimes three transformations. The interviewer who chooses the questions to 
ask performs the first transformation. The second transformation is that of the 
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respondent who restructures their original experience to reply to the question. 
The authors note that, in some cases, there may be a third transformation if the 
researcher proposes what the possible answers might be (2003: 54). The 
researcher will try to minimise this "chain of transformation" therefore the , 
data derived from observational methods carry more credibility than those 
derived from interviews (2003: 54). 
During data collection, the users of the website and I were able to escape from 
the "chain of transformation" to a certain extent, as the study I conducted was a 
form of participant observation. This is not to say that the data collected by this 
means were more reliable than the interview data as it minimised the one-to-
one interaction. Every kind of human interaction, including the digital form, 
involves re-creating aspects of the self, and the facts. 
Finally, postings on the discussion forums enabled me to build up a picture of 
the kinds of practical problems with which donor conception families had to 
deal. Many of these were irrelevant to my research question: however this 
exercise enabled me to identify several issues that I failed to envisage while 
designing the interviews, such as the difficulties in finding a donor with 
matching characteristics due to the donor shortage, and the problems 
experienced with the clinics. I then updated my interview questions 
accordingly. 
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Of course, collecting data from the Internet cannot escape criticism. I will 
discuss this issue in detail later in the chapter when I describe the study 
undertaken. 
Sampling, access and recruitment 
There was on major foreseen problem with this research: how to find people 
who had become or were attempting to become parents as a result of gamete 
donations? The potential participants in this study constituted a hard-to-reach 
population given the lack of contact information or databases to inform 
sampling. Using magazines and newspapers to advertise research can be highly 
effective with hard-to-reach populations, such as rape victims or sex workers 
(Benoit et al., 2005), however it can be quite expensive. In the absence of a 
formal setting where people could articulate their concerns while maintaining 
their anonymity, my recruitment strategy necessitated looking at alternative 
settings that brought them together. In this respect, the potential of the Internet 
to recruit participants was obvious. I envisioned that I would visit these online 
support groups for individuals receiving fertility treatment in order to: (1) 
recruit participants for interviews; (2) collect data from discussion boards to 
understand the reactions of would-be parents to the new law; and (3) explore 
whether there was any collective activity performed by would-be parents to 
challenge the law. 
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Recruiting participants for the interviews 
At the outset of the project I thought that it would be interesting to conduct an 
ethnographic study that included observation and interviews in a fertility clinic. 
However, I was not confident that negotiations to gain access to a clinic, or the 
ethical approval process for NHS settings, would be successful and these 
considerations discouraged me from attempting to negotiate access. 
Furthennore, I was not convinced that the UK clinics could help me with 
reaching my target population; for example, the clinics would not necessarily 
have access to patients who had, or considering having, treatment abroad. 
An obvious way to reach out to potential participants was through advertising 
on online support groups where I observed the claims-making activities during 
this preliminary research. Infertility clinics are mainly marketed through the 
Internet. Accordingly, I assumed that my potential infonnants would be 
visiting cyberspace. These websites have the potential to attract any would-be 
parents interested in infertility services: patients share their experiences, 
exchange views, and find out practical infonnation about clinics operating 
abroad. For example, the largest online community of UK infertility patients, 
fertilityfriends.co.uk, has over 26,000 members who had posted 2,316,170 
posts as of 14 November 2008. Some of these support groups (lNUK; 
fertilityfriends. co. uk; and acebabies) are also listed on the HFEA' s useful links 
page for patients. 
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I sent interview information to targeted organisations (the five largest online 
support groups: acebabies; infertilitynetworkuk (INUK); fertilityfriends.co.uk; 
Repromed; and IVF Connections) and used forums and online notice boards to 
announce the research. Initially, the research population was set as "those who 
received! or considered receiving donor insemination abroad". However, my 
observations on the online support groups made me realise that those who 
received egg or embryo donation should also be included in my sampling. 
Although the donor anonymity debate has focused on the recruitment of sperm 
donors, egg shortage is even more severe, and I did not want to exclude 
embryo recipients either, as the problems that they were faced with were 
similar. 
Access negotiations to the online support groups: Locating an 
informant 
Fontana and Frey (1998) argue that "the researcher must find an insider, a 
member of the group studied, willing to be an informant and to act as a guide 
to and translator of cultural mores and, at times, jargon or language" (1998: 
59). I had such gatekeepers on each website. For example,fertilityfriends.co.uk 
requires researchers to contact the administrator to get an approval before 
sending a post. Having contacted the moderator, my post was placed on one of 
the message boards. 
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Studies show that recruitment of donors is a problem especially in the countries where donor 
anonymity has been removed: waiting lists get too long and some couples prefer anonymous 
donors. 
I am a second year PhD student at the University of Nottingham at the Institute for Studies of 
Genetics, Biorisk and Society. I am exploring the consequences of removal of donor 
anonymity for would-be parents who are willing to obtain donor insemination. It is hard to 
recruit participants in this area, so I would be grateful if you can help me. 
I would like to interview 20 people considering donor insemination as a family building 
alternative. The average duration of the interviews will be one hour. Interviews will be tape-
recorded and transcribed, and all names will be changed. No information will be passed to the 
third parties. References from my supervisors will be provided upon request. 
If you like to give interviews please contact me at ilke.ozdemir(cv,gmail.com or from this web 
site. I'd really appreciate your help! 
I look forward to hearing from you! 
Best wishes 
I also posted this advert on Repromed, the setting where I conducted the virtual 
ethnography study. The fact that my ad was approved on the 
fertilityfriends. co. uk website was noticed by one of the moderators at 
Repromed. Although I did not need an approval at Repromed to post an ad, the 
moderator put a notice on my announcement (in capital letters) saying "FOR 
EVERYONES INFORMATION THIS IS A GENUINE REQUEST AS IT 
WAS ALSO ON FERTILITY FRIENDS WEBSITE AND ALL REQUESTS 
ON THERE HAVE TO BE APPROVED BY THE ADMIN TEAM BEFORE 
THEY ARE ALLOWED TO POST". 
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My other contact was the media officer of infertilitynetworkUK. She posted an 
ad on the message board of the website about the research: 
"have a request from a PhD Student to interview people on the subject of donor anonymity and 
explore why people consider going abroad to receive treatment, perhaps due to the anonymity 
Issues. 
If you are interested please email me directly and I will send you all the details. The interviews 
can be conducted anonymously if preferred" 
I was also able to post my ad on Acebabies and IVFconnections.net. Neither 
website has a procedure for screening research requests, but I e-mailed the 
administrators of the related discussion boards to inform them about my 
research ad. Printed ads were also handed out during National Infertility Day 
(NID) 2006, following permission obtained from the heads of the organising 
committee, Clare Brown, Chief Executive of the INUK, and Sheena Young, 
Head of Business Development. Unfortunately, I was only able to interview 
one person whom I met during the NID. Two participants (one donor, one 
would-be parent) contacted me through fertility friends. Another donor was 
found by word of mouth. Two people contacted me through INUK, three from 
Repromed and three from ivfconnections (including the only couple I 
interviewed). And lastly, as I describe below, I asked those who participated to 
send the information to other people they knew who might like to participate. 
Although more than 20 people were contacted, the interviews were eventually 
conducted with 11 parents and two donors. 
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Problems with recruitment and snowballing 
My plan to recruit participants ran into difficulties because those who were in 
favour of anonymous donation were reluctant to give interviews as 
confidentiality was of high importance to them. For example, on Repromed, 
despite the support of the moderator (she was also one of the most regular and 
well-known users who had over 2,500 posts), the instant response rate was low. 
(The message boards enable visitors to see how many times the post has been 
viewed. My post was viewed 260 times but the responses were in single 
figures.) Hine (2000) had the same experience with her posts on news groups. 
She says that this lack of response is fairly typical in her experience and that of 
others for generalised requests for research assistance from newsgroups. A 
similar point is made by Baym (1995) who speculates that people feel no 
obligation and have no incentive to respond. It is however important to 
consider the fact that online patient support groups may be slightly different to 
newsgroups. If I had intended to conduct covert research pretending to be a 
patient who wanted to learn about others' opinions about the removal of 
anonymity, I believe that the topic would have created a long thread. 
The extract below from an online support group paints a picture of what it is 
like to be an informant in the donor anonymity debate and how the researcher 
is perceived. It is from Elaine, my first contact and the first interviewee. 
I think the HFEA are the worst possible thing that could have 
happened to fertility treatment within the UK. I myself have 
given numerous, anonymous, interviews to people who are 
trying to fight our comer, but it's difficult when you don't want 
the world and his uncle to know your business - and that is, of 
course, why they keep winning! (Elaine). 
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Elaine has tried to make her voice heard by giving 'anonymous' interviews to 
journalists and researchers. Nevertheless, she does not want to reveal her 
identity and, hence, cannot make claims in more formal ways, as she and her 
partner are not planning to disclose to their prospective children how they were 
conceived. 
Giving interviews might compromise one's confidentiality: by agreeing to give 
an interview, informants agree to sign an informant consent form,31 have their 
voice recorded, provide some personal details including demographic 
information, and more importantly talk to a stranger about the unique story of 
their treatment (sometimes so unique that it makes their identity traceable).This 
may be particularly problematic for those who have received donor conception. 
For example, one pregnant woman I interviewed pointed out that although she 
was planning to disclose to her twins that they were donor-conceived, she did 
not want any strangers to know about their means of origins before the twins 
do. This seems to be a legitimate concern, not only for the potential 
participants who may not trust a PhD student in protecting their confidentiality 
but who might also feel that it is unfair to the unborn child who has given no 
consent. The resultant child, for example, might prefer to keep her means of 
conception as a secret; but if her parents have already made this public before 
she had a say on the matter, she will have no control over such information. In 
a way, although disclosure to the child may give the child autonomy, disclosure 
to 'others' may put it at risk. This is a dilemma that some would-be parents 
31 If the infonnant was reluctant to sign, s/he was given the option to agree with the tenns 
verbally. 
.. _ .... __ ._-----_._--
---- ---------------
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have in mind, as will be highlighted by several of the accounts in Chapters Five 
and Seven. Moreover, being contacted might have made them realise that they 
had a particular life experience that made them a research interest - that they 
might have something controversial or confidential. Furthermore, if they did 
not spend much time thinking about the disclosure, coming across the ad or 
being contacted might have brought up a subject which had been avoided. The 
fact that potential research subjects were in the middle of a treatment or 
expecting a baby made the interview arrangements even more difficult. 
Researchers studying 'hidden' populations may find that standard probability 
sampling methods are inapplicable because their potential informants lack a 
sampling frame, have privacy concerns, and constitute a small part of the 
general population (Heckathorn, 2002). Members of hidden populations may 
be involved in activities that are considered deviant, or they may be vulnerable, 
making them reluctant to take part in more formalised studies using traditional 
research methods (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). Snowball sampling, where one 
participant gives the researcher the name of another potential participant, 
enables access to such populations. Ultimately, I opted for this method. 
However, when I e-mailed potential informants, whose contact details had been 
forwarded by the key informant, this method proved problematic. Many 
respondents refused to participate because they thought their confidentiality 
had been violated by the referral. Two out of nine informants refused 
interviews immediately. Their responses documented their anxiety, fear and 
anger about being contacted. They asked me to delete their contact addresses 
and not to contact them again under any circumstances. I apologised, and 
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assured them that I would delete all of our correspondence and their contact 
details, which I did. Three of the respondents did not reply to my e-mail. Four 
respondents were interested in giving interviews (the number includes the 
partner of one of the respondents) but reported that they were not impressed by 
the fact that my referral intruded upon their privacy. I had a long e-mail 
correspondence with these potential participants. They all agreed to talk to me 
only if I could visit them. Although they provided me with details of their 
infertility experience and the circumstances that led them to consider donor 
conception, I cannot quote them in this study as I assured them that our e-mail 
correspondence was not to be used in my thesis. Carrying out phone interviews 
was not an option; in fact, one informant said that it was unthinkable for her to 
talk to a stranger over the phone about her very intimate problems. This came 
as a surprise, as most of the parents I interviewed earlier preferred phone 
interviews. I agreed to conduct face-to-face interviews (and having learnt from 
this experience I did not mention phone interviews to any of the other potential 
participants). Having discussed where we would meet and when, all three 
changed their minds. One said that she would be very busy because she was 
pregnant. Another explained that her husband was not happy with her giving an 
interview. The third informant cut the contact without providing any 
explanation. After I concluded the interviews, a potential participant contacted 
my supervisor about his commentary in a newspaper on donor anonymity. 
Initially she agreed to give an interview but then she wanted to wait for a while 
as she realised she was pregnant. She informed me that she was expecting 
twins and was not in great physical shape. I did try to contact her after a while 
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but she did not respond to my e-mails. Overall, at this stage I had got quite 
used to participants changing their mind after getting pregnant. 
What kind of interviews? 
Some writers urge researchers to be reflexive not only about what the interview 
accomplishes, but also about how the interview is accomplished (Silverman, 
2001). Accordingly, in this section I will reflect on how the interviews in this 
study were accomplished. 
At the outset of the project I hoped to conduct joint interviews. Unfortunately, 
this goal was not achieved. Joint interviewing, when the researcher interviews 
two people together, is commonly used in the context of inquiries involving 
people in marital relationships or living as couples. Although in my adverts I 
made it clear that I would like to talk to couples as well as individuals, men did 
not approach me or told their female partners that they would rather not 
participate in the interviews. Earlier studies had reported that women are more 
open about talking about infertility (Miall, 1986). Interestingly, during joint 
interviews, according to the evidence, it tends to be men more than women 
who are the' scene-stealers' (Arksey, 1996; Shakespeare, 1993); men are more 
likely to be overbearing, to interrupt or speak on behalf of the other (Arksey, 
1996; Jordan et al., 1992). 
The interviews were conducted with eleven would-be parents (further details 
on the interview sample are presented in Appendix-I. It was not possible to 
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provide information in a great detail about the users of Repromed, however 
some demographic information about the sample is provided in Chapter Five). 
and two donors between 8 February and 29 August 2006, except for one. This 
last interview was conducted on 14 May 2008. Overall, two written, one e-
mail, two face-to-face and eight phone interviews were conducted. All phone 
interviews and face-to-face interviews were tape-recorded. I told the 
participants that I could stop recording whenever they wished, but none of 
them asked me to stop recording at any stage of the interview. After each 
interview, I made brief written summaries comprised of medical histories, the 
treatment received, demographic measures, a summary of the highlights from 
the interview space, time, feeling, and the main issues raised. The interviews, 
on average, took an hour. I took notes, especially during the phone interviews. 
Note-taking was useful in directing my attention to the interview guide because 
during phone interviews it is possible to get distracted. All these records were 
used when it came to coding. 
My initial opInIon that face-to-face interviews are preferable to phone 
interviews has changed for several reasons. First, all interviews took 
approximately one hour, regardless of whether they were carried out by phone 
or not. This indicates that phone interviews can be as deep as face-to-face 
interviews. Secondly, I did not have problems with rapport building and did not 
feel that the face-to-face interviews were more comfortable than the phone 
ones. As I discussed earlier, some participants clearly preferred face-to-face 
interviews, whereas others insisted on speaking on the phone. In my experience 
it was clear that rather than what the researcher feels, it is important to conduct 
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the interview in a way that suits the participant most. Perhaps this is 
particularly an Issue when the interview topic is related to one's personal 
expenences. 
Before conducting the interviews I reviewed a large amount of literature on 
donor conception families, and this contributed to the development of themes 
that would be brought up during the interviews. Although I had a list of 
questions and notes with me, I refrained from raising specific questions, unless 
it was necessary. The interviews were designed as semi-structured. Semi-
structured interviews were adopted in preference to more structured methods 
for very deliberate reasons. First, research can itself generate theoretical 
frameworks (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). For example, as we shall see in the 
data analysis chapters, the would-be parents' accounts indicate that the 
perceived stigma of infertility and having one's gametes substituted have a 
significant impact on disclosure patterns. Although I had read Goffman' s 
stigma theory (1963), I did not design the interview questions to explore the 
stigma that the would-be parents might be experiencing. Nevertheless, the 
accounts generated the theme of stigma. Secondly, semi-structured qualitative 
interviews provide flexibility for the interviewees and the interviewer. The aim 
was to give the interviewees sufficient space in order that they could discuss 
their views on donor conception in their own terms. 
The interviews assessed three areas of donor conception expenence: the 
decision making process; disclosure; and claims-making (for and against policy 
change). I was primarily concerned with getting a sense of, and insight into, the 
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perspectives of the would-be parents. I therefore refrained from asking precise 
questions, as they might exclude areas of discussion which I had not thought 
of. However, I used an interview guide which was altered several times in the 
course of the study as I refined areas of interest or ways of asking. At the 
beginning of each interview, I explained to the respondent what the research 
was about, and briefly talked about the themes I was exploring. The opening 
question of the interviews was usually, "Could you tell me about your 
experiences which led you to consider donor conception?" As I had provided a 
brief background of my research at the beginning of the conversation, after 
narrating their treatment history, the respondents usually ended up talking 
about disclosure and the disclosure policy themselves without any interruption. 
When there was a silence, I encouraged the interviewee to make comments 
about the issues, which according to my notes, they had not covered. 
According to the traditional techniques, the interviewer should avoid getting in 
a 'real' conversation in which she answers questions asked by the respondent 
or providing her personal opinion. This was not my approach to the interviews. 
I engaged in a 'real' conversation with empathic understanding rather than 
distancing myself. This is not to say I took an empathetic approach to 
interviewing. Empathetic approaches take an ethical stance in favour of the 
individual or group being studied, hoping to be able to use the results to 
advocate social policies (Fontana and Frey, 1998). Presumably this approach 
makes the interview more honest and morally sound, overall, however, I agree 
with Atkinson and Silverman's (1997) view on the matter: researchers should 
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not privilege any ways of looking at the world but should instead continue to 
question. 
Ethical issues 
Traditional ethical concerns focus on three issues: informed consent; the right 
to privacy; and protection from harm. All these issues were carefully 
considered before and after the interviews. 
Informed consent 
All participants were given information about the aims of the study and how 
the interviews would be conducted. The participant consent form presented 
below was either signed by the participant before the interview or verbal 
consent (phone interviews) was taken and tape recorded. In a number of cases, 
where I conducted the interview by mail or e-mail, the consent form was 
postedle-mailed. In each case I sent the form before the potential participant 
agreed to give an interview to make sure that they understood the research 
purposes and the content of the interview. After the first few interviews 
however, I told the participants that as long as they gave me verbal consent 
(which was tape-recorded) they did not have to sign the form. I took the view 
that if the participants had confidentiality concerns, signing any kind of form 
with their names on would be off-putting. 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION and CONSENT FORM 
This project is examining the consequences of the removal of donor anonymity for access to 
donor gamete donation by would-be parents and the practical impact of the growing policy 
preference for disclosure of donor conception (DC) status to children . . The empirical data H'ill 
be collected from twenty semi-structured open-ended interviews of would-be parents (who ha\'e 
obtained DC or are considering it as an option). Interviews will be tape-recorded and 
transcribed. Everything you say will be treated as confidential to the researcher and her 
supervisors, and nothing will be published in any way that will allow you to be recognized, and 
all names will be changed. The average duration of the interviews will be approximately one 
hour. The interviews will cover three areas of DC experience: your decision to seek DC, your 
current thinking about disclosing the use of DC to any children that you may conceive through 
this procedure, and your general view of present UK policy on the regulation of DC 
Project title Legislation of Donor Gamete Donation in the UK: The Consequences of Removal 
of Donor Anonymity for Would-Be Parents 
F or more information: http://www.nottingham.ac . uk! iss/research/Current -Research-
Projects/Student projects/Ozdemir Donor.php 
Researcher: Ilke Ozdemir. ...................................................................... . 
Supervisors: Prof Robert Dingwall and Prof Therese Murphy 
• I have read the Participant Consent Form and the nature and purpose of the research 
project has been explained to me. I understand and agree to take part. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
I understand the purpose of the research project and my involvement in it. 
I understand that I may withdraw from the research project at any stage and that this 
will not affect my status now or in the future. 
I understand that while information gained during the study may be published, I will not 
be identified and my personal results will remain confidential. 
I understand that I will be audiotaped 
I understand that data will be stored. 
I understand that I may contact the researcher or supervisor if I require further 
information about the research. 
Signed ..... ..................................................................... . (research participant) 
Print name .............. ............................................................ . Date 
Contact details 
Ilke Ozdemir Ibxio(ail1ottingham.ac.lIk 
B 113, Institute for Science and Society, West Wing, Law and Social Sciences Building, 
University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK 
1 18 
Protection from harm 
My research topic was a sensitive and intimate one, and I expected the 
interviews to be challenging, especially for an inexperienced researcher like 
me. All participants were told that although the interview questions were not 
designed to be psychologically challenging they might cause emotional distress 
due to the sensitivity of the research topic. This could have deterred 
particularly the pregnant participants from giving interviews, nevertheless it 
was deemed necessary to protect the subjects from harm. 
There are a number of issues which I felt were difficult. First, the opening 
question - "Could you tell me about your experiences which led you to 
consider donor conception?" - brought up the participant's treatment history. 
Most participants had a number of failed cycles and miscarriages. When the 
participants talked about their emotional experience of infertility treatment, and 
the frustration that each failed cycle or miscarriage caused, I felt sad, however I 
refrained from expressing my sympathy as I was not quite sure how to respond 
to these intimate details. A few participants also brought up issues about their 
relationship with their partner or children. For example, one participant talked 
about her dilemmas about having a child due to her partner's reluctance to 
receive treatment; another talked about the disclosure problems with her 
husband's non-biological children from a previous marriage which were a 
result of his ex-wife's affairs; and yet another talked about her attachment 
problems with the child that she had adopted after having an embryo donation. 
Some women also were not convinced that they could relate to a donor-
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conceived child and reflected on their worries about not being able to bond 
with the resultant baby. 
One participant contacted me and wanted to gIve an interview as she was 
planning to become an egg donor. Although she was not a would-be parent, I 
was reluctant to tum down this request. I advised her that the interview might 
not be used in my study, but she was willing to talk to me. During the 
interview, I realised that she was 18 years old, never had a child before and 
knew only a little about the complications of donating eggs. At that point I 
could not help suggesting to her that she should talk to a counsellor. I knew 
that it was not my place to make suggestions, but during the natural flow of the 
interview there is little space for reflection. After a while she contacted me to 
let me know that a medical examination had revealed that she was suffering 
from infertility due to polycystic ovarian syndrome, therefore she would not be 
able to donate eggs. 
The right to privacy 
Anonymity was guaranteed to all respondents. All names were changed and no 
infonnation was passed to third parties. The infonned consent fonn included a 
statement about the participant's right to privacy: "Everything you say will be 
treated as confidential to the researcher and her supervisors, and nothing will 
be published in any way that will allow you to be recognized, and all names 
will be changed." 
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The interviews required openness and emotional engagement. Since the 
interviews, I have been in touch with some of the participants as they showed 
an interest in my research. Some participants update me about developments in 
their lives (e.g. having new babies, finding potential participants for my 
research) for personal reasons. Although it would have been interesting to 
conduct follow-up interviews with those who had children as a result of gamete 
donation, I did not want to use our friendship to bring up my research-related 
inquiries. I believe that the subjects should not feel uncomfortable or 
threatened by the fact that they have shared confidential infonnation with me, 
and I respect their right to privacy. 
Data saturation 
Purposive samples are the most commonly used fonn of non-probabilistic 
sampling, and their size typically relies on the concept of data saturation, the 
situation in which the data has been heard before. After the sixth interview the 
basic elements were present, but I continued recruiting participants until no 
new infonnation or themes were observed in the data. Admittedly, I did not 
refuse any potential participants who approached me, as I was aware that there 
would never be many people who would want to give interviews. Furthennore, 
I interviewed one egg and one spenn donor who were aware that these 
interviews might not be used in this study. Their interviews are not analysed in 
this thesis, but they gave me an insight about what it was like to be a donor. 
The egg donor was also a member of Repromed, so we were able to talk about 
this support group which helped me to understand the community better. 
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Description of the virtual ethnography study 
While the interviews were continuing, I was also perfonning a virtual 
ethnography study on Repromed, one of the online support groups that I used 
as a recruitment channel for interviews. This study is described in greater detail 
in Chapter Five. 
The reasons that led me to perfonn the virtual ethnography study were not 
related to the difficulties I ran into during the recruitment process. The 
interviews and the ethnographic study were conducted synchronously, but 
independently. The accounts of the Repromed users were not considered as a 
substitute for the interviews, and have been treated in their own right. Three 
interviewees were also members of the online support group and initial 
analysis and comparison between forum posts and interview accounts indicated 
little or no discrepancies between the narratives told. Nevertheless, I did not 
merge their interview accounts with their posts, as potential differences can be 
observed in narratives due to the different nature of data collection methods. 
Collecting data from online environments is not new. A number of studies, 
particularly in fields of technology and media, have assumed that the Internet 
can be viewed as a social context in its own right. Hence, online 
communication can be analysed for the fonns of meaning, the shared values 
and the specific contextual ways of being that emerge in this environment 
(Baym, 1995: Correll, 1995; Reid, 1995). 
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Support groups increasingly use online environments to offer affinnation, 
consolation and understanding to individuals in distressed or vulnerable 
situations (Mann and Stewart, 2000). 
An online discussion forum32 can be defined as "an interactive computer-based 
communication system organised around the interest of the users" (Ogan, 
1993: 177). Hosting such data, digital space shows potential for ethnographic 
study. 
Virtual community 
It is worth mentioning that virtual ethnography is sometimes addressed as 
digital ethnography. This can cause confusion. By virtual ethnography I refer 
to ethnographic studies conducted on virtual 'communities', not to a digital 
method or a digital medium. 
People interact, exchange views and share experiences in digital space, and 
create spaces resembling communities in the 'real' world. Rheingold (1994) 
argues that one of the explanations for this phenomenon is the hunger for 
community. He argues that communities can now be based on emotional or 
intellectual proximity, instead of geographic proximity: 
People in virtual communities use words on screens to exchange 
pleasantries and argue, engage in intellectual discourse, conduct 
commerce, exchange knowledge, share emotional support, make 
plans, brainstonn, gossip, feud, fall in love, find friends and lose 
them, play games, flirt, create a little high art and a lot of idle 
32 Internet forums are also referred to as web forums, message boards, discussion boards. 
discussion forums, discussion groups and bulletin boards. 
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talk. People in virtual communities do just about everything 
people do in real life, but we leave our bodies behind. You can't 
kiss anybody and nobody can punch you in the nose, but a lot 
can happen within those boundaries. To the millions who have 
been drawn into it, the richness and vitality of computer- linked 
cultures is attractive, even addictive (1994: 3). 
In digital space, despite the absence of physical matter, people build personal 
relationships and social norms that are real and meaningful (Paccagnella, 
1997). Some researchers therefore use the 'community' metaphor to address 
these social assemblages. They suggest that Internet forums facilitate ongoing 
discourse between subscribers with a common interest, effectively creating a 
'virtual community': "social aggregations that emerge from the Net when 
enough people carry on those public discussions long enough, with sufficient 
human feeling, to form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace" 
(Rheingold, 1994: 20). Therefore, virtual communities present opportunities 
for ethnographic research. Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) note: 
[0 Jur historical preferences for face-to-face communities and intense, 
local sites of interaction should not blind us to the fact that 
contemporary forms of communication can transform our sense of what 
is 'local' into widely distributed networks, and that communities can 
(and do) exist in many different forms (1983: 138). 
For example, the density and speed of instant exchange of electronic messages 
"can create a more intense sense of shared experience and of a shared world" 
(1983). The community metaphor however has not escaped criticism. Online 
groups have been criticised for being homogeneous as the participants are 
similar people with similar interest (Baym, 1995). Further, because there is no 
moral obligation to stay in the community (the participants can leave with a 
mere click), some argue that, as virtual gatherings do not require 'inhabitance', 
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they fail to create a sense of community (Jones, 1997). The lack of geographic 
proximity also means that online communities usually require less moral 
obligation, endeavour and commitment. Some worry that online groups will 
have negative effects on morality and ethics offline (Healy, 1997), and others 
are not convinced that online communities are an alternative to offline ones 
(Lockard, 1997). Doheny-Farina's (1996) statement voices these concerns: 
A community is bound by place, which always includes complex social 
and environmental necessities. It is not something you can easily join. 
You can't subscribe to a community as you subscribe to a discussion 
group on the net. It must be lived. It is entwined, contradictory, and 
involves all our senses (1996: 37). 
In academic discourse, it is clear that while community is a term which seems 
readily definable to the general public, it is infinitely complex and vague: 
A community is a bounded territory of all sorts (whether physical or 
ideological), but it can also refer to a sense of common character, 
identity, or interests, as with the 'gay community' or 'virtual 
community'. Thus, the term 'community' encompasses both material 
and symbolic dimensions .... (Fernback, 1997: 39). 
Brown (2006) has claimed that resistance to the idea of online communities 
stems from a nostalgic connection to the original conception of community 
when there were few other choices than for community to be defined by 
geographic proximity. Brown argues that if community is understood and 
defined by these a priori assumptions, the idea of virtual community will 
remain controversial. 
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I have presented the debate over the community metaphor in order to clarify 
why I called my method 'virtual ethnography'. The study I present in Chapter 
Five is certainly different from a conventional ethnography study based on 
face-to-face interaction. In my opinion, virtual communities are not substitutes 
for 'real' ones; they are social phenomena in their own right. The digital space 
creates new forms of communication, relatedness and belonging. As Bruckman 
(2006) suggests, energy and time expended on developing definitions may not 
be the best way to proceed. Trying to understand how virtual assemblages 
emerge, live and are sustained could be a more productive way of evaluating 
community-likeness. 
Virtual ethnography 
Although the 'community' metaphor is debated in academic discourse, many 
observers and participants find this term appropriate because it captures their 
sense of interpersonal connection and internal organisation (Baym, 1995). The 
virtual community metaphor makes it possible to apply to cyberspace the 
methodologies that have been used to observe traditional communities. 
Observational studies on virtual communities are referred to as virtual 
ethnography. In traditional ethnography as Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) 
note: 
[t]he ethnographer participates, overtly or covertly, in people's daily 
lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening 
to what is said, asking questions; in fact collecting whatever data are 
available to throw light on the issues with which he or she is concerned 
(1983: 2). 
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Obviously, text-based CMC (computer mediated communication) is not 
appropriate for all traditional observational techniques. Since there is no 
geographical research setting to be observed, virtual ethnography requires the 
researcher to pay attention to other indicators, mostly textual and graphic ones, 
such as images, abbreviations, language, etc. In this respect, as Pearson (1996) 
argues, analysing po stings can be seen as documentary analysis. 
There are multiple approaches to performing ethnographic studies on the online 
environment. Researchers may: 
[t]hemselves participate in the activities of the group they are observing 
(participant observation); they may be viewed as members of the group 
but minimize their participation; they may assume the role of observer 
without being part of the group; or their presence may be concealed 
entirely form the people they are observing (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996: 207). 
Although I signed up as a member of the website, Repromed, the study I 
conducted cannot be regarded as participant observation. The research would 
have been more similar to participant observation in a real setting if I had been 
observing a chat room. 'Chat' is the form of CMC used to conduct real-time 
online discussions. In such an environment, researchers who wish to conduct 
overt research should introduce themselves, as their presence fairly closely 
resembles face-to-face interaction. In a real-time chat environment, users can 
take immediate action on whether to stay in the chatroom or log off after 
discovering the presence of the researcher. Informed consent is requested and 
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given in 'real' time: interactively and instantly. Repromed did not provide an 
environment for a 'real time' chat. Although the web site provides certain chat 
facilities, there is no synchronised structure: if users in a certain forum are 
online at the same time they can follow the posts made by other users with a 
short time delay. Even if Repromed had provided a synchronised chat 
environment, I would have hesitated to announce my presence. As Paccagnella 
(1997) suggests, "a stranger wanting to do academic research is sometimes 
seen as an unwelcome arbitrary intrusion". Even in the case of 'soft', 
qualitative techniques, as in participant observation, problems arise because of 
the presence of the researcher in the field (1997). 
Ethical issues 
Ethnographic studies of virtual communities not only allow the researcher to 
conduct research in settings that would not exist in the real world but also 
enable them to make observations without informing the subjects being 
studied. However, subjects have the right to be aware that they are being 
researched and to be informed about the nature and purposes of the research. 
Therefore, researchers who want to make use of forum posts must decide how 
to tackle the issue of gaining consent from those who post to such forums and 
whether consent in fact needs to be obtained (Reid, 1995). Opinions on getting 
consent differ. 
A number of ethical dilemmas arose related to quoting and analysing forum 
users' posts for the purposes of this study. One ethical dilemma was whether 
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the users in publicly accessible forums should be informed that their posts were 
to be the subject of research. Does the researcher need permission to quote a 
posting from an Internet discussion thread? 
Sudweeks and Rafaeli (1996) list different opinions on the rights of authors of 
the po stings suggested during ProjectH (1993-1994), a large international 
group of researchers using computer-mediated communication to study 
computer-mediated communication, 33. During the discussions, some 
researchers claimed that authors must be accredited and permission obtained if 
quotations are used. Given that forum posters are expecting that the audience is 
limited, definable and identifiable, and that the content is not redistributed and 
quantified, some have questioned whether the researchers have a right to 
intrude in the lives and activities of others, regarding such intrusion to be 
exploitation. It was suggested that, if copyright of public posts is surrendered 
on joining a list, this should be made clear to subscribers at the time of joining. 
Finally, some considered that the use of posts should be governed by 
professional and academic guidelines, for example, that short excerpts can be 
quoted without author permission. After lengthy debate, the group agreed on an 
ethical policy that would not seek permission for recording and analysis of 
publicly posted messages: 
We view public discourse on CMC as just that: public. Analysis of such 
content, where individuals', institutions' and lists' identities are 
shielded, is not subject to 'Human Subject' restraints. Such study is 
more akin to the study of tombstone epitaphs, graffiti, or letters to the 
33 The participants of ProjectH represent fifteen countries, and numerous universities and 
commercial firms. Participants represent a wide range of age groups (early 20s to late 60s), 
academic positions (graduate students to professors), and disciplines (approximately 40° 0 from 
the social sciences. 3 5 ° ~ ~ from the humanities and 25% from applied sciences. 
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editor. Personal? - yes. Private? - no (Rafaeli, 1992, quoted III 
Sudweeks and Rafaeli, 1996: 121). 
It is important to highlight that the project discussed above aimed to treat 
messages quantitatively. This policy cannot therefore be accepted as a 
universal ethic (Paccagnella, 1997). However, it does suggest that 
conversations on publicly accessible IRe channels or messages posted on 
newsgroups are not equivalent to private letters. 
There is an ongoing debate regarding the adequacy of any analogy between 
online communicative venues and public spaces. Mann and Stewart (2000) 
suggest that there are parallels with the conventional face-to-face context 
where consent is usually not obtained: 
Must researchers identify themselves if they are only participating the 
electronic equivalent of hanging out on street comers or doughnut 
shops where they would never think of wearing large signs identifying 
themselves as 'researchers'? (Garton et aI., 1999: 93 quoted in Mann 
and Stewart, 2000). 
Mann and Stewart note that, given the lack of consensus in the area, it is not 
surprising that researchers do not always declare explicitly whether they 
obtained consent for their study. However there are some research precedents. 
The authors quote Denzin' s words with reference to his work where he 
participated in a mailing list: 
I never identified myself to the group, nor did I obtain permission to 
quote from postings, thereby violating many of Schrum's (1995) ethical 
injunctions for electronic research (Mann and Stewart, 2000). 
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In the absence of clear guidelines, it is worth providing an explanation of the 
ethical safeguards which I put in place for my study. First, observation of the 
po stings took place with the knowledge and consent of the forum co-ordinator. 
My correspondence with the forum moderator was as follows: 
I am a PhD student studying at the University of Nottingham working on the 
removal of donor anonymity. I am particularly interested in this web site which 
provides an alternative route way of communicating for patients having 
infertility treatment. I am researching the way people exchange information 
and express support for each other in confidence without making official 
claims about the problems surrounding infertility treatment in the UK. I have 
been interviewing some of the users of this web site and with their reference I 
figured out Repromed provides an insight about the issues that I would like to 
explore. 
I'd like to study and quote some of the postings in certain forums. Although I 
have an impression that Repromed is a public space I felt that it would be 
appropriate to ask your permission. I am not going to use Repromeds name 
and all the user names will be changed. 
Please visit my web site if you want to check out my credentials: 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/igbis/research/student project 
eg donor insem.php 
The reply from the moderator was as follows: 
Dear Ilke 
I would have no objection for you to use the Repromed website in your 
research. It would be appropriate to acknowledge this website as a 
source of your information. It is a publically accessible but clearly you 
would not wish to offend any patients by quoting them by name in any 
publication you produced (Administrator). 
Interviews were also conducted with volunteer forum members to assess the 
relationship between the accounts presented in online and offline contexts, 
although few discrepancies were identified. The purpose of the study was 
explained to these users, and consent obtained about quoting their posts. 
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However, I did not attempt to get consent from the entire population of the web 
site. 
In this study, a number of reasons can be proposed to justify not informing the 
users that research was being conducted. First, the disclaimer on the web site 
itself clarifies that any information given by the user is considered public 
information. Secondly, the study was not conducted in private chat rooms: the 
forums were open to the public, even to unregistered users. 
Because the Repromed website is open to public, I did not get any consent for 
viewing the posts. In many respects, the study that I conducted as a 'lurker' (a 
person who reads discussions on a message board with a limited participation) 
is similar to covert research. Murphy and Dingwall (2001) note that recent 
work recognises that the distinction between covert and overt research is less 
straightforward than sometimes imagined: 
In complex and mobile settings, it may be simply impractical to seek 
consent from everyone involved. Unlike experimental researchers, 
ethnographers typically have limited control over who enters their field 
of observation. All research lies on a continuum between overtness and 
covertness (200 1: 342). 
The asynchronous structure of the setting raised ethical problems related to 
obtaining consent. I did not hide my identity as a researcher. I posted an ad to 
recruit participants for the interviews using my pseudonym and real name. I 
also e-mailed the admin and the forum moderators to obtain consent for the 
research, and some of the users to conduct further interviews and quote their 
posts. Nevertheless, due to the asynchronous structure of the forums, it was 
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useless to announce my presence each time I visited the website. The forums 
closely resembled message boards: in such a setting, the posts remain unless 
the user takes an action (deleting or editing). If I sent a post announcing my 
presence, that post would stay even when I was offline along with the other 
posts. The impracticality of obtaining consent in an asynchronous structure is 
self-evident. More importantly, as noted above, the content of the website is 
considered public information. 
Online pseudonyms and copyright 
In cyberspace, pseudonyms can function just like a real name. Some people use 
the same pseudonym over an extended period of time within a community of 
people who come to know them by that name. The reputation associated with 
the pseudonym matters to them. Therefore, it has been suggested that 
pseudonyms should be treated as real names, and be changed (MediaMOO, 
1997). 
Paccagnella (1997) argues that just because particular online sources may be 
public, this does not mean that they can be used without restrictions. Therefore, 
not only the pseudonyms but also the identity of an institution and/or list 
should be changed. However, it shouldn't be necessary to take any more 
precautions than those usually adopted in the study of everyday life: 
Changing not only real names, but also aliases or pseudonyms (where 
used) proves the respect of the researchers for the social reality of 
cyberspace. 
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The argument that materials posted on the Internet are to be treated as authored 
material requiring permission for citation raises the question as to whether 
there is a need to protect the identity of the subjects or the name of the research 
setting (Ess, 2001). For example,fertilityfriends.co.uk permits quotations only 
if attribution to the name of the website is included: 
wwwfertilityfriends.co.uk hereby authorizes you to copy and display 
the content herein, but only for your personal or informational and non-
commercial use. However, the content herein shall not be copied or 
posted in any network computer or broadcast in any media. Any copy 
you make must include this copyright notice. Limited quotations from 
the content are permitted if attribution to www.fertilityfriends.co.uk is 
included, but you may not display for redistribution any portion of the 
content without the prior written permISSIOn of 
wwwfertilityfriends.co.uk. No modifications of the content may be 
made. 
Such a disclaimer was not placed on Repromed. However, as presented earlier, 
after consulting the administrator of the website, I was advised to acknowledge 
this website as a source. The administrator only warned me not to use the real 
names of the users in my work. Even so, after careful consideration and 
consultation to the forum moderators, I decided to change the pseudonyms 
given that it is possible to relate certain pseudonyms to the real names. 
Sampling 
On the home page of Repromed, there is a link to the discussion area, which is 
the subject of the empirical work that will be presented in Chapter Five. This 
discussion area has different forums covering infertility, IVF and related 
treatments, intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), egg and sperm donation, 
adoption. pregnancy, new parents, etc. My study focuses on the forums dealing 
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with issues related to gamete donation, going abroad for treatment, disclosure 
and donor anonymity. Forums not involving anything relevant to these items 
were excluded. However, if any post seemed to be relevant to the topics under 
examination it was analysed, regardless of which forum it was placed in. 
Although more than 5000 po stings were scanned, the final sample included 900 
postings sent between 13 July 2005 and 26 April 2006. 
Representativeness 
Despite the fact that virtual ethnography is an obvious candidate for developing 
a broad understanding of online behaviour within particular contexts (Preece 
and Maloney-Krichmar, 2005), some critics suggested that the 
representativeness of the findings is questionable and the study of online data 
alone is probably insufficient to understand how people use things they have 
read or said in their offline lives. For example, Bruckman argues: 
It is important to remember that all Internet research takes place in an 
embedded social context. To understand Internet-based phenomena, 
you need to understand the broader context. Consequently, most "online 
research" really also should have an offline component (Hine, 2000: 52; 
quoted in Bruckman, 2002: 3). 
As a response, Hine notes "in stressing the significance of access to users' 
offline contexts, we run the risk of implying that online interactions are not as 
authentic as offline ones, nor is the information the researcher generates from 
them" (2000: 52). She also argues that "the point for the ethnographer is not to 
bring some external criterion for judging whether it is safe to believe what 
informants say" (2000: 49). In my study, there was no reason to believe that the 
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interview accounts were more SIncere than the postings on the online 
discussion forums. 
Some would-be parents do not use online support groups to exchange 
information and there are other online support groups that may have different 
concerns. However, Repromed was clearly one of the most active sites (based 
on the number of messages posted, and the depth of the threads) during this 
period and represents an important source of data on voices that were not fully 
heard in the public debates over ending donor anonymity. 
Data Analysis 
Qualitative studies aim to describe and explain a pattern of relationships, which 
can be with a set of conceptually analytic categories (Mishler, 1986; quoted in 
Huberman and Miles, 1998) Both inductive and deductive analysis are useful 
paths however, the iterative procedure that I adopted called for the use of 
analytic induction. Analytic induction suggests that there are regularities to be 
found in the physical and social worlds, and the theories and constructs that we 
derive express these regularities (Huberman and Miles, 1998). In order to 
uncover the constructs in would-be parents' accounts, I used an iterative 
procedure which corresponds to the 'grounded theory' (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967) approach in qualitative research. Grounded theory acknowledges that 
analysis will be disjointed until the researcher has some acquaintance with the 
data (Huberman and Miles, 1998). This approach is based on the view that 
research can itself generate theoretical frameworks. 
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Inductive approaches aid an understanding of meaning in complex data through 
data reduction (Thomas, 2005). For both the interviews and the posts on the 
discussion forum, my data analysis involved the development of summary 
themes or categories from the raw data. During the process, when a t h e m e ~ ~
hypothesis or pattern was identified inductively, I tried to confirm the finding 
which keyed off a new inductive cycle. 
Posts on discussion boards 
Internet postings resemble other common sources of data used by qualitative 
researchers. Virtual ethnography can be regarded as a form of interviewing, in 
that the responses to each o t h e r ~ s s comments elicit contributions from 
participants on a particular topic (Pearson, 1996). It can also be regarded as a 
form of observation, in that a researcher can witness naturally occurring 
interaction between the forum members on particular topics, unprompted by 
the researcher's questions or interventions (Pearson, 1996). 
Analysing posts is similar to analysing texts. (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, quoted 
in Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 110) distinguish documents and records on the 
basis of whether the text was "prepared to attest to some formal transaction". 
Records are prepared for official reasons, such as marriage certificates, driving 
licences, contracts and bank statements. Documents, on the other h a n d ~ ~ are 
prepared for personal reasons and include diaries, memos and letters: posts, in 
that sense, are similar to documents. Posts on online discussion forums have 
the potential to become very important for qualitative research because, 
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generally speaking, access to them can be easy and low cost, the data is 
transformed less during the analysis, and the stress of face-to-face interaction is 
avoided. In digital space, people "connect with strangers without much of the 
social baggage that divides and alienates" (Poster, 1994: 83). This means that 
virtual communities may provide marginalised or stigmatised individuals with 
a feeling of solidarity, while at the same time maintaining their anonymity. 
And user anonymity promotes conversations that might have been avoided if 
participants had to provide identifiable information: "[W]ithout visual cues 
about gender, age, ethnicity and social status, conversations open up in 
directions that otherwise might be avoided" (Poster, 1994: 83). On the other 
hand, as I have discussed earlier analysing posts does raise a range of ethical 
issues, as I have discussed earlier. 
For data analysis, I first printed off the entire thread of the discussion topics 
that I included in my sampling. Documenting online data is important as 
sometimes websites are shut down or updated. This was the case with 
Repromed: although the website still exists, it has been updated due to an 
address change and the administrators have cleaned up the old posts and moved 
them to archives. Many posts, including the ones in my sample, are not 
accessible anymore. 
After printing off the threads, I read them several times and identified common 
themes. Threads are similar to transcripts of a conversation and the posts are 
close to speech, or an extract from an interview. Some forum users who I 
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interviewed noted that sending posts can at times be similar to keeping a diary, 
except that the diary is open to public. 
Just like the interviews, the posts required a contextualised interpretation. For 
that reason, I considered the meaning of each post in its context (the context 
should be considered as the entire thread, and sometimes the discussion topic 
in general), rather than treating it as an independent piece of text. I also traced 
the pseudonym of the poster, and checked their medical history and their 
profile, as these were potentially directly related to the post that I was 
analysing. As some users are more familiar to each other than others, some 
posts had references to a medical condition, or an earlier discussion, that did 
not make any sense to me, the analyst. Therefore, in some instances, checking 
the profile information, and earlier posts or discussions might be was 
necessary. This was the most time-consuming part of the analysis. 
The Interviews 
I listened to each interview several times. As noted earlier, during or 
immediately after each interview, I made a summary, including demographic 
data about the participant, details of the interview (where, when, for how long, 
phone, written or face-to-face, etc.) and the general feeling of the interview 
(aggressive, friendly, reserved, distant, etc.). I revisited these notes while 
listening to the tape recordings of the interviews. The notes helped me to 
remember my immediate feelings and impressions. These steps were taken 
before I started making transcripts. 
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I did not transcribe the interviews immediately after the interviews. All 
transcription was done when the fieldwork was finished. However, before I got 
to the transcription stage, I listened to all interviews and read my notes a 
number of times, and thought about the common themes. Although it was time-
consuming, having done transcription of the interviews on my own helped me 
to become more familiar with the narratives. Later, I read the transcripts 
several times to identify themes and categories. I then developed a coding 
frame. I used NVivo in the beginning, but then realised that it was more 
efficient to use manual tools such as highlighters for coding. If new codes 
emerged, I updated the coding frame, and reread the transcripts according to 
the new structure. This process helped me with developing categories, which 
were then conceptualised into broad themes. 
Some reflections 
This chapter has presented my account as a research student who intended to 
study a social problem which has not been articulated in conventional ways of 
communication. As I have explained, ethnographic studies enabled me to 
interrogate some of the policy assumptions about donor conception families, 
and the donor conception families' responses to these assumptions. This 
empirical study cannot claim to give definite answers to the question as to 
whether the new law encouraged or will encourage openness, but it can help us 
to understand social norms about donor conception and why it is unreasonable 
to expect that these willi should change by legal initiatives. 
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By trying to have would-be parents' VOIces heard, inevitably, I have also 
become an actor who is engaged in problem definition activities. This was not 
set as a goal, but was an inevitable consequence of my approach to data 
analysis. Spector and Kitsuse (1977) have argued that while studying a social 
problem, analysts are entitled to participate in these problems as practical 
actors, but they should not enter the social problems as experts. This is 
probably because Spector and Kitsuse wanted to promote social 
constructionism as a value-free and scientific way to examine social problems. 
Their approach does not contain an explicit social change agenda (Loseke, 
2003). As I discussed earlier in Chapter Two, the strongest interpretations of 
social constructionism avoid making (even implicit) assumptions about 
objective reality. For them, the actual social conditions are irrelevant. However 
I chose to adopt contextual constructionism on account of its policy relevance, 
and I seek to locate claims-making within its socio-Iegal context. This involves 
making assumptions about the broader context from which claims adopt 
elements, analysing the nature of claims, and evaluating why certain claims, 
rights, and needs remain unrecognised in the public realm. The inclusion of 
socio-cultural context is an important part of my analysis and, for this reason, 
the thesis departs from the value-free relativist tradition of constructionism. 
Furthermore, by giving voice to the stakeholders who silenced their claims 
during the debate, this thesis itself can be considered as a definitional claims-
making activity in relation to donor anonymity as a social problem. 
l--ll 
CHAPTER FIVE: VIRTUAL ETHNOGRAPHY ON 
REPROMED 
As I mentioned in Chapter One, during the donor anonymity debate in the UK, 
would-be parents remained silent. The overarching question of this thesis is 
"how may donor conception families' reactions to the disclosure policy in the 
UK better be understood?" In Chapter Two I argued that, occasionally, 
stakeholders in a problem cannot articulate their claims in a conventional, 
formal manner because of the perceived lack of legitimacy attached to these 
claims. The silence of stakeholders does not mean that there is no problem to 
be postulated. I suggested that by studying the natural history of the donor 
anonymity debate we might better understand how donor anonymity was 
defined as problematic, what kind of claims-making discourse was perceived 
as legitimate, and how these claims were successful in bringing about a change 
in the law. I presented the natural history of the removal of donor anonymity in 
Chapter Three, revealing that the voices of would-be parents were missing 
from the public realm. Despite the absence of these parents from the public 
debate, the media reported that growing numbers of people were seeking 
fertility treatment abroad, with the most popular destinations being countries 
that maintained donor anonymity. I argued that this fertility travel indicated 
that there is a 'silent resistance' to the law which deserves to be subject of 
empirical investigation. 
I-t2 
In Chapter Four, I pointed out that, despite their reticence in voicing their 
concerns in fonnal modes of communication during and after the donor 
anonymity debate, infertility patients in the UK have been protesting 
anonymously against the new law on the discussion forums of online support 
groups. This means, however, that their voices may not be heard by public 
bodies, like the HFEA, which can only deal with issues through formal and 
transparent modes of communication. Hence, as I suggested in Chapter Four, 
these discussion forums should be seen as providing valuable data for 
exploring claims-making activities that have escaped the public eye. 
This chapter describes the virtual ethnography study that I conducted on the 
patient discussion forums of Repromed (www.repromed.co.uk), which is the 
website of the Bristol Centre for Reproductive Medicine (BCRM).34 Repromed 
was one of the most active sites during the review of the law and represents an 
important source of data on voices that were not fully heard in the public 
debates over ending donor anonymity. I presented the rationale of this study in 
Chapter Four: it focuses on would-be parents' own communications in a setting 
where issues about gamete donation are discussed. 
As noted in Chapter Four, my starting point was that fertility-patient support 
groups in cyberspace offer substantive data to understand collective claims-
making by would-be parents. I acknowledge that, in many respects, cyberspace 
is different from the traditional settings in which ethnographic studies are 
carried out. While exploring collective definitional activities, particularly in 
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cyberspace, the degree to which a setting has the characteristics of a 
community may be important. Moreover, given the sensitivity of my research 
topic, it was particularly important to find the right setting. I took the view that 
people might feel more comfortable sharing intimate aspects of their lives in a 
setting where they could become connected with others who had had similar 
experiences. According to Rheingold (1994), the social glue that binds 
formerly isolated individuals into a community is the ability to network, gain 
knowledge, or find 'communion' within cyberspace. 35 . Similarly to Rheingold, 
Watson argues that the continued interaction of participating members creates, 
re-creates, and maintains community in a particular online setting. The 
technological ability to communicate, however, does not itself create the 
conditions of community: community depends not only upon communication 
and shared interests, but also upon 'communion' (1997: 104). 
I was keen to conduct my study in a setting where community-likeness and 
communion existed. However, there is no clear guidance on where such 
settings are to be found and how they are to be identified: researchers must 
make their own judgements. Watson (1997) suggests that this should not cause 
anxiety given that judgements have to be made about all sorts of things, and 
researchers should certainly be capable of making judgements about the claim 
of cyberspace residents to be a community. 
34 At the time of this study, the clinic behind the Repromed website was the University of 
Bristol's, Centre for Reproductive Medicine. This centre has now merged with the Southmead 
Fertility Service. 
35 He describes communion as a human feeling that comes from the communicative 
coordination of oneself with others and the en\'ironment. 
................ _ ........ _----- ---
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I used a range of criteria to evaluate the community-likeness of three potential 
settings: Repromed; fertilityfriends.co.uk; and infertilitynetworkUK. At the 
time at which I was conducting my field study, fertilityfriends.co.uk, provided 
the largest amount of data with 639,645 posts sent by 14,000 users. Being the 
largest on-line community of UK infertility patients, the website is 
recommended by the HFEA and also by other websites, including other online 
support groups and clinics that host online discussion forums. The opportunity 
to have access to this amount of data was tempting; at the same time, however, 
the large population suggested that it would be very difficult for any researcher 
to become familiar with the users. Indeed, the size of the population might also 
be a potential problem for members of fertilityfriends. co. uk, given that a 
website's popularity may threaten the possibility for, or existence of, intimacy 
(Watson, 1997). In this respect, infertilitynetworkUK (702 members) and 
Repromed (881 members) seemed to be more suitable as settings for a study 
that I could feasibly conduct within the limitations of a PhD. 
I also had to take account of the fact that user numbers in online settings can be 
inflated by peripheral users (those who tap into the community, drop a question 
and disappear) or 'lurkers' (those who read posts but do not post messages 
themselves). In order to get a clearer picture of the continuous presence of 
members, I made some rough calculations: my aim was to have an idea about 
the depth of the threads, and user involvement in discussions. These 
calculations showed that Repromed had the highest average 'post per topic' 
compared to the other two websites. This figure shows the depth of the threads, 
which indicates that "people carry on public discussions long enough" 
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(Rheingold, 1994). Hence, although 'post per user' was higher in 
fertilityfriends.co.uk, I decided on Repromed as a more suitable setting because 
of the depth of its threads. 
Total Post per Post per 
Members posts Topics user topic 
F ertilityfriends. co. uk 13881 639645 30453 46 21 
Repromed 881 27829 704 32 40 
InfertilityNetworkUK 702 5615 661 8 9 
Figures as of 17.04.2006 
It must be said that objective indicators and calculations such as these can only 
offer limited help in assessing 'continuous presence', or community-likeness. 
Watson's observation on the community-likeness of Phish.net is worth quoting 
here: 
Subjectively, when one looks into a virtual forum, itfeels like what one 
knows as a community. One feature which makes a space like Phish.net 
appear to be a community is continuous presence of other people there. 
One can 'tap into' CMC [Computer Mediated Communication] 
communities for a wealth of prepared information, or to pose a question 
to a large group of people with diverse backgrounds of knowledge 
(1997: 105). 
Similarly, Rheingold (1994) suggests that the community-likeness of an online 
setting can be assessed by a "sufficient human feeling". Scanning the posts to 
see whether users were familiar with one another and responded to each other's 
posts (rather than dropping a post and disappearing) gave me some insight into 
this. Compared to its counterparts, Repromed seemed to me to be more like a 
'community' and a 'communion', mainly because of the 'intimacy' among its 
members. Repromed's users sometimes refer to each other using real names 
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rather than pseudonyms, they organise off-line events among themselves, and 
they send their pictures and know each other's treatment histories. They notice 
quickly when a new member joins them. Community size may be one of the 
reasons that make this possible: Repromed has a relatively small and loyal 
member population compared to its counterparts. Another reason behind the 
intimacy at Repromed might be shared experience: most of the members had 
their first treatment at the clinic that hosts the website. Finally, members of 
Repromed enjoy a shared locality: this site is mainly used by patients having 
treatment in the South West region, specifically at clinics in the Bristol area. 
Clearly this shared locality may also be a key factor enabling members to 
organise offline events and meet each other. 
More importantly, what made Repromed different from its counterparts was its 
member profile. The other support groups have a more inclusive member 
profile: different stakeholders (patients, nurses, doctors, clinicians, journalists, 
etc.) share their views on discussion forums. I assumed that I would be more 
likely to reach my target population through Repromed as almost all members 
are would-be parents, new parents, or patients who have had at least one cycle 
(successful or unsuccessful) at the clinic that hosts the site. This population 
represents the stakeholders whose voices were absent in donor anonymity 
debate. 
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Repromed as a research setting 
Repromed introduces itself as a website for anyone in the UK interested in 
reproductive medicine. On the home page there is a link to the discussion area, 
which is the subject of the study that I performed. 
Visitors are required to give a small amount of information (user name and 
password) if they wish to be registered users. Much of this information is 
optional (real name, location, occupation, interests, date of birth, etc.). 
However, any information given by a user is considered as public information. 
Repromed forums are open to everyone and sometimes even unregistered users 
may post in them. It is up to the 'forums administrator' as to whether to allow 
unregistered users to post in the forums. Some forums are set up to allow only 
certain users or groups of users to access them. And in order to view, read or 
post, in a forum, users may first need permission from the forum moderator or 
a forum administrator. 
The forums are maintained in asynchronous structure. With asynchronous 
communication, participants do not need to be on-line simultaneously; they can 
read and respond at different times (Baym, 1995). 
The discussion area lists the forum titles, how many topics and posts have been 
carried on each forum, the date and time of the last post sent, and the poster's 
name. When the user clicks on a forum title, a new screen comes up which 
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conveys infonnation about the topics, topic starter, replies, views and the last 
post (the date and the time of the post, and the poster's name). Topics 'started' 
by the users include infertility, IVF and related treatments, leSI, egg and 
spenn donation, adoption, pregnancy and new parents. In order to see the 
thread of posts, one topic has to be selected and clicked on. The posts are in 
chronological order. 
Users can start a new topic unless it is related to topics that already exist. Each 
topic involves a question, or a brief introduction about the inquiry. For 
example: "Is anyone currently trying or pregnant with a DI baby? How long 
did it take to conceive and how have your emotions been along the way?" 
Users are not allowed to post any material which is vulgar, defamatory, 
inaccurate, harassing, hateful, threatening, invading of others privacy, sexually 
oriented, or in violation of any laws. Also, users are not allowed to post any 
copyrighted material that is not owned by themselves or the owners of these 
forums. Forum administrators and forum moderators, who have the highest 
level of control over the forums, can turn on and off features on the forums, 
ban and remove users, edit and delete posts, and create users and groups. 
The page that presents the forum list enables visitors to see how many topics 
and posts each forum holds. During my study, the 'IVF& Related Treatments' 
forum was the most popular, with almost 15,000 posts. More specific forums, 
such as 'Gamete Donation', held fewer posts; however compared to the other 
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forums hosted by similar websites,36 Repromed's forum on the subject is a 
comprehensive one. 
In Repromed, users are ranked according to the number of posts they send. 
During the time I was observing the website (February-April 2006), there were 
881 registered users.37 Ranks in the forums indicate to which user-group a user 
belongs. The forum administrator sets up ranks using a ladder system based on 
the number of posts that users make. There were three users in the 'moderator 
group' who had around 2,400-3,250 posts. These three users were registered at 
the beginning of 2004. The second group, which was called 'senior members', 
had 100-1,500 posts each. There were 87 senior members. 'Groupies' 
comprised the third largest group, with 61 users. These users had 40-100 posts. 
The largest group in Repromed was the 'newbies' who had less than 40 posts. 
The first posts were dated January 2003. By the time that I visited the website, 
users had posted 27,829 messages, on 704 topics, in 15 forums. 
Demographic information and the user identities 
The website did not provide any statistical information. Collecting 
demographic information about the entire population would have necessitated 
scanning approximately 900 user profiles. And, as noted earlier, the user 
number might have been inflated by lurkers. Random sampling would 
therefore have been both time-consuming and probably misleading (only 
continuous and active users represent the community). As a result, I made a 
non-random sampling. 
36 See, in particular, in/ertilitynet1l'orkUK; acebabies.com; and iv/connections. com. 
37 The following figures are as of 17 April 2006. 
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For my sampling, I ranked the users by the number of posts that they sent, and 
I scanned the profiles of the first 44 users who had more than 220 posts. This 
sampling covered the profiles of users who owned 97 per cent of the total 
posts. Regarding this, the demographic data that I collected was highly 
representative of the active users. Sixteen of the 44 users did not provide their 
date of birth at registration. The age range of the other 28 users was from 28 to 
43. The average age was 35 and there were two modes (the most frequently 
occurring age in the distribution) at 35 and 40. 
It is, of course, debatable whether demographic information collected in 
cyberspace is reliable. When visual cues, such as gender and age, are of the 
utmost importance to users, it is fairly easy to fake or modify them (especially 
in text-based computer mediated communication). However, given that the 
common purpose of Repromed users is exchanging information about 
reproductive health and infertility treatment, appearing more physically 
attractive to other users may not be a primary concern. On these discussion 
forums, providing correct information about one's body markers (such as 
ethnicity, gender and age) is deemed necessary as infertility treatment is 
directly or indirectly affected by these parameters. In other words, if the 
Repromed users expect to get sensible advice, they will benefit from providing 
accurate information about their body markers. As a result, it can be suggested 
that the demographic information provided by Repromed users should be 
treated as reliable. 
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In the off-line world, markers of gender and age are closely tied to social 
hierarchies but, in computer mediated communication (CMC), social-hierarchy 
formation does not need to establish itself along traditionally-structured lines. 
Poster (1990) claims that with CMC: 
... for the first time individuals emerge in telecommunications with 
other individuals, often on an enduring basis, without considerations 
that derive from the presence to the partner of their body, their voice, 
their sex, many of the markings of their personal history (1990: 11 7). 
Watson's (1997) work suggests that one's ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, 
and age may not be of importance on certain discussion forums. For example, 
he found that missing visual cues were not essential for the formation of 
communion on Phish.net. The users had developed their own cues of 
importance, such as displayed knowledge, repeated presence, and extensive fan 
expenence. Similarly, on Repromed, medical history is one of the most 
important components of user identities. Arguably, then, the users have 
developed their own cues of importance mostly based on their experience as 
patients. User signatures convey treatment details and any information relevant 
to the treatment, such as ages of the user and herlhis partner. Two signatures 
exemplify this: 
Me 30, DH 31 
DH - no fishes 
ME:FEB 06 1st DIUI canc'd = metformin 090306 for v mild 
pco. March 06 DIUI= -ve 
5 yrs TTC, 7 lUI (3 cancelled due to OHSS), 1 IVF, ICSI EC 
6/9/04, +tve result 22/9/04, EDD 30/5/05, Gorgeous baby Tom 
born 1/6/05! 
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These abbreviations provide a good illustration of meaning-making among the 
users. For someone who is not familiar with infertility treatment, the language 
used might be incomprehensible; for the users, whoever, this type of language 
is quite understandable. Repromed provides a list of abbreviations for newbies 
(those who are new to the website). Some of the abbreviations, especially the 
medical ones, are quite similar to those used in other online support groups: for 
example, a shortened form of a treatment, test or method. For example, 
BFN/BFP, which stands for Big Fat Negative/Positive, indicates the result of a 
pregnancy test, and is an abbreviation commonly used in many Internet forums 
on reproductive health. Some abbreviations however seem to be particular to 
Repromed. 38 For example, BD, Baby Dance, means having intercourse in 
order to conceive a baby, whereas BM, Blueberry Muffins,39 is a phrase that 
stands for sex. 
In my sampling, the most common abbreviations were: 2ww (2 week wait); 
TTC (Trying to Conceive); Tx (Treatment); IVF (In Vitro Fertilisation); DI 
(Donor Insemination); ICSI (Intra-Cytoplasmic Sperm Injection); PM (Private 
Message); DP (Dearest Partner); lUI (Intra-Uterine Insemination); PMA 
(Positive Mental Attitude); LH (Luteinising Hormone); and, as noted above, 
BFN/BFP or +ve and -ve (Big Fat Negative/Positive). 
3l! Arguably, as members of a community create social meaning through interaction with 
others. abbreviations will differ in similar online support groups. 
39 One of the users once posted that she had spent the afternoon cooking blueberry muffins 
with her partner. The other users took this as euphemism for trying to conceive. 
--------
--- -----_ ... _-----
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Emoticons and avatars 
In CMC, one way of replicating face-to-face communication is to position 
'emoticons' strategically in the text. Some of the Repromed members place 
emoticons in their posts to establish a relational tone. These emoticons may 
include verbal descriptions of feelings, sounds, or small images. Smileys are 
perhaps the most commonly used of all emoticons: examples include the 
smiling face :-); the frown :-( ; and the wink ;- ) . Avatars are another tool 
used to personalise posts. These are small icons or images shown next to the 
text. Two examples are as follows: 
Avatar-l Avatar-2 
An ultrasound image of the foetus, pictures of the user and her/his partner, 
images of candles, angels, flowers, scenes from nature, and spiritual symbols 
are the most common avatars used on Repromed discussion forums. The posts 
also carry graphics to show the progress of weight loss or of a pregnancy. An 
example of such graphics is as follows: 
. '. 
, 
. . . . .1.0 ~ ! ? ? ...... ~ 0 0 . . .. ' .. · ~ S S.. : . .-
. . 
. .. . 
.3.8. 
I'm 34 ~ ~ S ald 4 dS)$ p-egmnt! 0 nly 38 days to go! families.com 
Graphic 1 
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The setting up of the 'donor gamete' (later, 'egg and sperm 
donation') forum 
The data presented in this chapter draw mainly on the 'Egg and Sperm 
Donation' (formerly, the 'Donor Gamete' forum) forum on Repromed, which 
had the fullest coverage of issue of donor anonymity. I had the opportunity to 
find out about the setting up of this forum during one of my interviews. Before 
this forum was set up, fertility travel was being discussed in other discussion 
forums on the website. One of the patients, Elaine, who was receiving 
treatment at the BeRM (the clinic that hosts Repromed) had decided to receive 
treatment in Spain, mainly due to the removal of donor anonymity in the UK 
and length of waiting lists. She shared her experiences with other users of 
Repromed on discussion forums. She eventually met and became friends with 
six other women users. Like Elaine, these six women also ended up receiving 
treatment in Spain. According to Elaine, the fact that they were discussing their 
experiences on Repromed discussion forums was not well-received by the host 
clinic and the administrator set up a new 'Donor Gamete Forum' forum so that 
people receiving donor gamete treatment could interact in a setting separate 
from other patients of the clinic. The forum was set up in November 2005 with 
the following disclaimer: 
After much discussion we have set up the Donor gamete forum. Weare a 
little concerned about the oversees fertility treatment options as these are 
outside UK ethical and safety regulations, but we fully agree that UK 
patients receiving donor gamete treatment would benefit from mutual 
online support. 
Regards, Admin 
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Elaine expressed anger about this disclaimer. She claims that Repromed 
attempts to censor references to clinics abroad as "they can't stand to see all 
that money is going" to the clinics abroad: 
Well, what can I say, except my comments would be 
censored!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!! ( ... )I'm fed up with them having 
nothing but bad things to say every time it comes to going abroad for 
treatment.( ... ) Don't they know these "other" clinics have just as 
stringent guidelines as nay that can be laid before us in 
England????????????? All they seem to want to do is block us, every 
step of the way.( .... )Spain, and many other countries, have taken the 
technology which started here and are now leaders in the technology. I 
guess they just can't stand to see all that money going somewhere else. 
It's a shame they didn't read Lord Winston's article the other week, 
where he expressly iterated exactly these points and said "when money 
comes into the equation, ethics go out the door"-how true! (Elaine). 
In another post, she claims that people are travelling abroad to receive the help 
that the UK is "unable/unwilling to give": 
I am outraged, flabbergasted, very angry indeed. Tell them not to 
worry, many other open minded IVF sites offer full support to people 
travelling abroad for the help that the UK very obviously is 
unable/unwilling to give!!!!!!!!!!!! (Elaine) 
Some users expressed the view that the clinic was reluctant to have posts on its 
website advertising clinics abroad as it did not want to lose its HFEA licence. 
In reality, a large number of posts did make reference to overseas clinics, 
particularly to one clinic in Barcelona where a number of users received 
gamete and embryo donation: 
I think what admin is trying to address is the fact that this is a forum 
provided for by them and as they are licensed by HFEA they can't be 
seen to be encouraging tx which falls outside the boundaries of the uk 
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HFEA parameters. I think this is legal stance more then anything, this is 
a public forum so you never know who is looking in (Heather). 
Following this discussion, the moderator of the forum closed this thread 
sayIng: 
Admin have responded to the request to set up a separate section within 
the Repromed forum so that people seeking treatment using donors can 
have their discussion focussed should they wish it. Neither Admin or 
the Moderators will prevent threads discussing treatment being sought 
abroad, in the same way that people receiving treatment at other UK 
clinics are free to discuss their experiences (Sandy). 
Interestingly, five months later this forum was suspended as the clinic behind 
the site was concerned about the increasing number of posts advising users 
about overseas treatment facilities. I will discuss the closure and re-opening of 
the forum later in the chapter. 
Themes from the postings 
In what follows, I will present and analyse the posts according to the common 
themes that I identified during my analysis. The posts are not edited, except for 
the references to clinics or names of websites where sperm can be purchased. 
The contextual approach adopted in this thesis suggests that references must be 
made to social conditions in order to properly describe the context from which 
claims emerge. Therefore, while analysing the claims of the would-be parents I 
will not refrain from making references to objective indicators, such as donor 
statistics or surveys. The accounts of the would-be parents are not independent 
from the public debate, media presentations, anecdotal evidence, research 
findings - in short, they are not independent of various 'facts' which are 
157 
culturally, socially or physically available to them in a broader context. 
Ultimately, however, I am more interested in understanding where would-be 
parents' claims emerge from, and less interested in evaluating the accuracy of 
these claims. 
The donor shortage 
Most forum participants are on waiting lists for gamete donation and clearly 
associate the donor shortage with the change in the law to remove anonymity. 
Examples of posts expressing this view are as follows: 
I just think it's such a crying shame that the HFEA took it into their 
heads to remove the anonymity from donors thus drastically reducing 
the number of volunteers and now forcing us all to go abroad, where 
donors can remain forever anonymous (Elaine). 
... the legal change has made a huge difference to the numbers of 
donors. The number of accepted Donors around the UK is in the low 
100s now (I read this somewhere and it used to be in the 1 ODDs) 
(Suzanne). 
Apparently out of 500 applicants to give sperm in the last year only 2 
actually do so, predominantly due the anonymity issue and the low 
sperm counts of the younger applicants. Very frightening stats don't 
you think? (Mandy) 
BCRM have written to us today to say they are unable to offer tx as 
they have no available donors( iui with donor). We have to contact 
them again in 3 months if we haven't heard anything. Having been on 
this journey with CRM,since 2003, and having only just had first iui 
DH and I are now understandable at our wits end (Julia). 
i do think that the change in the law has got every thing to do with it 
especialy if you are donating eggs or sperm and you are haveing 
difficulty consiving yourself .i have also been told that sperm donations 
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have gone down because there use to be alot of students that use to 
donate but have stoped because they dont want a knock on the door in 
18 years do you know if it the same if you go out side theuk and have 
treatment and donate at the same time cause im not sure about that one 
from the first time i went for icsi to now things seame to have got more 
compucated and expensive 101 (Sheila). 
One of the users, Sylvia, claims that in order to resolve the sperm shortage, the 
law should be changed back, reinstating anonymity. She calls upon other users 
to sign her petition: 
if you think sperm donors should be legally allowed to remain 
anonymous please sign my petition. i am petitioning the prime minister 
of the uk to change the law so sperm donors can go back to being 
anonymous so the sperm shortage can be resolved. if you agree with 
this please sign at the following link: http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/sperm-
donor-anon! (Sylvia). 
Sylvia claims that the new law prevents "a loving couple from having the child 
they wish to have": 
i think anonymity should be brought back after watching a documentary 
on it. being someone who possibly may need a sperm donor's help in 
the future id rather not be waiting for years because of the shortage if 
you agree could you please sign my petition. i understand the reasons 
why it shouldn't but why should we prevent a loving couple from 
having the child they wish to have? 
come on sign it if you agree :D (Sylvia). 
As I noted In Chapter Three, since the removal of donor anonymity, the 
Department of Health and the National Gamete Donation Trust have been 
running a campaign to raise awareness of donation and recruit new donors. 
While an initial fall in donor supply was predicted, the Department assumed 
that the donor profile would eventually change, with older men who have 
children coming forward for altruistic reasons. One user, Tara, draws attention 
to this: 
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Well I read the SEED review I think the HFEA are hoping that older 
men will come forward and donate their sperm. Its a BIG chance they 
are taking. They should have left well alone I say. The simple truth is 
there are now less donors because of the anonymity issue and have they 
thought that these older men may want to stay anonymous. I dont think 
they would cherish the idea of a child knocking on their door in 18 yrs 
time. Besides how would the rest of his family feel???? Have the HFEA 
taken this on board?? No I don't think so (Tara). 
Tara expresses the view that, in changing the donor recruitment policy, the 
HFEA made false assumptions. Furthermore, in her view, the Authority did not 
handle the donor crisis well. She accuses it of infringing would-be parents' 
human rights: 
Anyway on another note we should thanks Dame Suzi Leather and her 
syndicate for causing this mess!! I wouldnt be surprised if a couple took 
them to the court of human rights - essentially they are stopping 
couples having a baby!! To me thats enfringing on our human rights. Of 
course this is my personal opinion, but I havent yet found anyone who 
is happy with what the HFEA have done (Tara). 
These posts can be better understood when located in the donor anonymity 
debate. During that debate, both the claims-makers and the counter claims-
makers referred to experience from countries that had lifted anonymity. 
Sweden was the first country to remove anonymity. The Swedish Insemination 
Act 1984 was followed by an initial decline in donation40 (Daniels, 1994): 
however, shifts in recruitment methods led to a resurgence in donor numbers 
(Daniels, Ericsson and Bum, 1998). But it has been argued that the Swedish 
40 Prior to 1985, 230 children were born in Sweden. After the law passed, the figure was 30 a 
year. Daniels (1994) reports that the reasons for the decline were reluctance of donors who . 
want to remain anonymous, reluctance of couples who do not want to get 01 where anonymIty 
of donors is no longer guaranteed, doctors' opposition to the legislation (they were referring 
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law is comprehensively avoided, with many infertile couples either obtaining 
insemination illegally or going abroad for treatment. 4 I The legislation may 
have therefore increased the psychological and medical risks involved in DI, 
for those who seek to avoid its measures (Daniels, Ericsson and Burn, 1998). 
By recommending that the donor be married and the donor's wife should be 
informed of the donor's decision (Daniels, 1994), the Swedish Act also created 
a new donor profile. A recent study conducted on Swedish sperm donors 
reveals that the mean and median age for providers in one clinic were 37 and 
40 years and 34 and 33 years for the other (Lalos et a!., 2003). While pre-
legislation donors were predominantly students donating for financial gain and 
men recruited from military establishments, post-legislation donors are older 
men in their late 30s or 40s, married with children, motivated by a desire to 
help infertile couples (Daniels, Ericsson and Burn, 1998; Lalos et a!., 2003). 
Some argue that the new donor profile is more ethical, and is therefore 
preferable. However, the fact that semen volume and motility decrease 
continuously with age42 (Eskenazi et a!., 2003), and that such sperm is less 
capable of fertilising an egg, makes older sperm donors less desirable in 
practice. Moreover, despite having a significant impact on the donor profile, 
the Swedish Act has not been successful in changing disclosure patterns 
(Gottlieb, Lalos and Lindblad, 2000; Lalos et a!., 2003). 
couples to neighbouring countries), and an increase in government allowances for adopting a 
foreign child. 
41 There is evidence from one Danish clinic, where Swedish couples made up 39 per cent of the 
total number of couples who received DI between 1983 and 1992. and a Finnish clinic. where 
couples from Sweden made up 50 per cent of total patients (Daniels et aI., 1998). . . 
42 In a convenience sample of healthy men between 22 and 80 years of age from a non-chmcal 
setting, significant age-related decreases in semen quality were observed, most n o t a b l ~ ~ for 
semen volume and sperm motility. For example, a 20 per cent decrease was observed m semen 
volume in 50-year-old men compared to 30-year-olds. 
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Further evidence about the impact of disclosure on the supply of gametes in 
other countries has emerged more recently. In the Netherlands, 15 years of 
debate on the abolition of donor anonymity was associated with the number of 
donors decreasing by 70 per cent and the number of semen banks by 50 per 
cent (Janssens et aI., 2006). Since the removal of donor anonymity in Norway 
in January 2005, clinics there have also reported donor shortages (Tisdall, 
2006). 
During the donor anonymity debate in the UK, the expenence from other 
countries was interpreted in different ways, according to the agenda of the 
claims-makers. The post that I present below summarises how many of the 
would-be parents' on Repromed's forum view the matter: donor shortage 
should have been foreseen by the regulatory body and precautions should have 
been taken in advance. 
They (HFEA) should have warned clinics to overstock a year ago in 
case this should happen. From what I could gather from the clinics I 
rang they had warned the HFEA that this would happen!! The HFEA 
knew there could be a dip in donors as this happened in Australia and 
New Zealand and Sweden, I would like to know if they ever 
recovered!! All I can say is well done (not) HFEA (Tara). 
From the conversations I have had this week, it does feel as tho people 
have been completely unprepared for the law change (not xxx -name of 
the clinic) just the whole fertility sector!), i am cross to know that there 
as been precedent in Australia and the UK could have used this for 
guidance - but didn't. I didn't think that trying to conceive would entail 
so much fighting and would make me feel so much like a criminal 
(Suzanne). 
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Matching donors 
The users of the website express the view that the reduction in donors has also 
compromised their chances of finding a donor with a reasonable match to their 
own physical characteristics, or those of their partner. For example, Amanda 
refers to her conversation with a nurse during which she was told that donor 
sperm gets used up quickly and that clinics had problems getting donors 
because of the change in the law: 
The nurse said they would match as best as they can but no guarantees, 
she said they would do their best, but they don't have as much choice as 
before the law changed (Amanda). 
Some users think that it is important to 'match' the donor with the 
characteristics of the recipient family. This is expressed in terms of the 
importance of a physical resemblance. In one clinic, a user reported being told 
that there was a limited supply and they would do their best to match as near to 
her husband as possible. 
I was also told by the clinic that dark hair and eyes were harder to come 
by!! I do think the HFEA have a lot to answer for. They have these 
great ideas! ! !! But hey put them into practise and what do you get, zilch 
on the sperm front and couples with no donors and having to pay more 
money (Tara). 
Even though at least one of the partners is not capable of contributing to the 
biological make-up of the baby, users desire a child that reflects their union as 
much as possible. Therefore, they look for a donor who resembles at least one 
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of them. Despite the fact that there is no guarantee that the offspring will share 
those characteristics, users want to try with a matching donor rather than a 
random one: 
I think with nature my view is what will be will be, but as we may have 
to use a sperm donor, it has been difficult for me to get my head 
around. I therefore would like as close a match as possible to hubby if 
you see what I mean. I am sure most people would agree that it is nice 
to get a match as near as possible and it does seem that your egg donor 
is quite close in colouring to you. I watched a program not long back 
about a white couple who got a black couples embryo, it turned out in 
the end that they had to give the black baby to the black couple even 
thought the white woman carried it and gave birth. I still think its 
reasonable to get a close match not only in colouring and build, but also 
in race. In the end I think its down to personal choice and how a couple 
feel about it (Tara). 
Suzanne and her husband are worried about eye colour. She has green eyes and 
her husband has brown ones. Her husband thinks it would be 'odd' if their 
baby had blue eyes. As the DI appointment approaches, Suzanne gets nervous. 
A day before DIUI, she posts that she is very excited and she keeps worrying 
about what the donor looked like. She knows the eye and hair colour and the 
weight, but wishes she knew more details: 
I wish that they had a few more details but I think that they are in short 
supply of donors as the characteristics of the donor match me more and 
not really my DP (Suzanne). 
Jenny, who has a DI child, notes that she had similar worries before giving 
birth: 
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just wanted to say that one of the huge things I was worried about 
before having G ... (4 months old now) was her appearance and who 
she would look like. Most people say she is the spit of me, most also 
notice her colouring being the same as her Dad's and if I'm asked who I 
think she looks like, I say me or herself. Mind you, it wouldn't be a fib 
to say she looked like DH, just cos the genes are borrowed, it doesn't 
mean she can't look like him (Jenny). 
Physical resemblance is perceived to be important because users feel that even 
if the child knows about their origins, s/he should not have to deal with these 
kinds of questions. The following post is from a user who got pregnant 
following a frozen embryo transfer but had considered donor sperm as an 
option: 
One big issue in our minds when chosing to use DS was will people 
notice that the child looks different to Dh or will they have some 
noticable difference to our looks and when we sorted that out in our 
heads it was fine for us (this was an issue for us because we didn't want 
to tell anyone and worried people would say they looked nothing like us 
it might sound silly but it's something that really worried us) (Miranda). 
It is also the case, of course, the people choose their partners based in 
part on characteristics that attract them. Having a donor who is very 
clearly different from one's partner can also be seen as an indirect 
rejection of that partner: 
the worst thing for me is what if hubby dies, I wont have anything to 
remember him by. I know this is really morbid, but it does keep going 
through my mind. Somebody did say that by nurturing some of him will 
come out in the child anyway, which is probably true so feel a bit better 
about it now (Tara). 
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The accounts presented earlier indicate that users have had difficulties in 
accessing the treatment they need due to the donor shortage. But is the donor 
crisis as bad as these accounts suggest? Few studies are available, because the 
change in policy is relatively recent. One older study, conducted at two gamete 
donation clinics in the UK, indicated that 85 per cent of potential donors would 
not enter a sperm donation programme unless anonymity was maintained 
(Robinson et al., 1991). Robinson et al. concluded that, if anonymity was lifted, 
recruitment of new donors would be significantly reduced. This would be 
detrimental to gamete donation programmes and to the infertile couples who 
request this form of treatment. A more recent study, involving retrospective 
analysis of 1,101 potential sperm donors in a centre in N ewcastle-upon-Tyne 
between January 1994 and August 2003, shows a significant decline in the 
number of men applying to be sperm donors, from around 175 in 1994 to 25 in 
2003, with the sharpest drop occurring from 2000 onwards (Paul, Harbottle and 
Stewart, 2006). The authors suggest that "the significant decline in released 
sperm donors coupled with the potential effects of loss of donor anonymity 
means that new strategies for sperm donor recruitment are urgently required" 
(2006: 150). The study reveals that the acceptability rate of donors (donor 
release rate) also declined because of the introduction of stringent criteria 
aimed at improving standards of recruitment. At the end of the testing process, 
only 3.63 per cent of the men were accepted as suitable donors. 
According to a BBC investigation in 2006, 50 of the 74 clinics in the UK were 
reporting that they had insufficient sperm or none at all. The BBC found only 
169 registered donors in the UK, with none in Northern Ireland, one in 
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Scotland, and SIX In Wales (Dreaper, 2006). A BBC Scotland survey of 
Scotland's five IVF clinics found a crisis in supply that had completely halted 
treatment in two clinics and brought long waiting lists in others.43 According 
to the HFEA registers (HFEA, 2008d), in 2000 there were 325 men registered 
as donors. The latest figures from the Authority show that this figure dropped 
to 307 in 2006. The substantial donor profile change that was reported in 
Sweden has also been observed in the UK: the HFEA register shows that 
whereas in 1994-1995 the most common age group for sperm donors was 18-
24 years,44 this figure changed to 36-40 years in 2004-2005. 
Egg sharing: being a donor 
Despite being not as fully ingrained in secrecy as sperm donation, there is also 
evidence that egg donors are concerned about anonymity (van den Akker, 
2006). Craft et al. (2005) surveyed past egg donors and recipients to explore 
whether loss of anonymity had an impact on egg donor recruitment. The results 
indicate that removal of donor anonymity for egg donors is likely to lead to a 
further restriction of already unsatisfactory egg donation programmes. 45 The 
HFEA registers show that between 2000 and 2006, the number of egg donors 
43 The survey revealed that two of Scotland's four NHS clinics have suspended services 
because of a lack of donors. In one clinic, the waiting time for egg donation treatment has more 
than doubled since the law was introduced, from 2 years to at least 5 years. Another clinic had 
no new donations since the law was introduced and there had been between 30 and 40 patients 
that the clinic was unable to treat. One clinic reported that for the first time they had to start a 
waiting list for treatment using donor sperm at the end of last year and they were no longer 
able to offer any treatment until supplies became available (BBC News, 2006). 
~ ~ ~ In September 2005, the HFEA issued a report 'Who are the Donors?' which showed that 
modem sperm donors were typically family men aged between 36--40 years. rather than the 
stereotype of a medical student in their teens or early 20s (HFEA, 2007). 
~ 5 5 Egg donation is more intrusive than sperm donation: egg donors have to undergo a procedure 
stimulating their ovaries, eggs are then removed from the O\'aries by a surgical procedure, The 
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dropped from 1,242 to 812 (although, unlike sperm donors, the age distribution 
of egg donors has remained relatively unchanged over the last 10 years). 
Currently, waiting lists for egg donation may vary from 18 months up to two 
years.
46 
Some clinics encourage women into egg sharing to circumvent these 
delays. In egg sharing, the cost of the treatment is paid directly by the recipient 
to the clinic which then provides a free treatment cycle for the donor.47 
Johnson (1999) argues that egg sharing poses complex ethical issues: there are 
fundamental problems with respect to both patient autonomy and the 
commodification of eggs. The posts quoted below exemplify the problem that 
Johnson notes: neither Gina nor Amy would agree to share their eggs if egg 
sharing did not reduce the cost of their treatment. This procedure is "within the 
letter of the law, but arguably not within its spirit" (Johnson, 1999: 1915). 
I dont really like the idea of sharing my eggs but if it means not having 
to get into debt then we will try it (Gina). 
DH and I thought about it long and hard but decided not to as we were 
really worried about giving away the best eggs. I can see why it's so 
appealing to go for egg sharing as it dramatically reduces costs ... but at 
the same time is also dramatically reduces the number of eggs .... sorry 
if I'm preaching to the converted but it's a big decision (Amy). 
use of foetal or cadaveric eggs is prevented in current licensing practice, and UK law prohibits 
the purchase of eggs for cash (Johnson, 1999). 
46 Infertility Network UK Fact Sheets - egg donation, infertilitynetworkuk.com. 
47 In February 2007, the HFEA announced that women would also be allowed to donate their 
eggs to research, both as an altruistic donor o ~ ~ in conjunction wi.th their own IVF treatment 
(they will receive treatment at a reduced cost III return for donatIOn of some eggs). 
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Diana calls egg sharing an "emotional m i n e f i e l d ~ ~ : : she has to trust medical 
practitioners to ensure that her eggs are in good hands. It is interesting that 
Diana portrays her eggs as akin to children that need "nurturing" and "caring": 
... as a donor you have to put your faith in these professionals that 
have parents they choose will be nurturing and caring, just as they will 
assess us if we decide to become recipients. Really it is an emotional 
minefield whichever way you look at it! (Diana) 
Under the open donation system, egg sharing raises further concerns. Unlike 
other gamete donors, who have a choice not to donate n o n - a n o n y m o u s l y ~ ~ egg-
sharing donors have a reduced choice as they are infertile women whose 
financial circumstances compel them to 'volunteer' donations in order to 
subsidise their own treatment. In egg sharing, it is possible that the donor will 
not achieve a pregnancy whereas the recipient does. Gina notes: 
I don't think I could do egg sharing because I think it would be awful if 
I was not successful, but the other lady was. It would really rub it in if I 
didn't have children, but my biological children were running around 
somewhere (Gina). 
There is also the possibility of being contacted by the resulting child. Many 
users describe this situation as "a person knocking on our door": 
The thing with donating my eggs is that I cant guarantee the receiving 
couple would not tell the child(ren) and am not sure if I would like to 
be contacted in 18 or so years. Its just the way I feel, especially if ours 
didnt work. I would always be wondering if I had a biological child 
somewhere! (Tara). 
when I did my lesl treatments I considered egg-sharing. but decided 
against it as I have not had any children. As the laws have now changed 
concerning anonymity and children finding their donors I am not so 
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sure if 1 could handle a child knocking on my door in 18 years time 
(especially if we never had one!) (Tara). 
how would 1 feel if I'd never got pregnant but 18 years later a child 
from one of the eggs 1 donated turned up at my door (Sofia). 
i was just wondering ,because when i went for icsi we desided to donate 
eggs to help with the costs and also i could help some one who longed 
for a child as much as we did .we went for the treatment but i did not 
prodce enoughtt egg to donate and this was the lowest point of the 
treatment for me .while i was pre gnat with my daughter i heared on the 
new that by law the child could find out who there biolgical parent was 
just like adoption.this is one reason why i dont think i would want to do 
that again because i dont think i would like a child or young adult to 
knock on my door one day and what if the teatment that i would have 
did not work. well i supose the question is dose anyone els know more 
infomation on this and has it put anyone els off donating eggs or sperm 
(Sheila). 
There were 500 egg sharers in the UK in 2004. HFEA registers (HFEA, 2008d) 
show that this figure had dropped to 323 in 2006. The posts presented above 
may explain the reasons behind the reluctance of patients to join the 
programme. 
Donating eggs 
On Repromed, a number of egg donors posted their views on donating eggs. 
According to one, it is as tough a decision to be a recipient as it is to donate: "I 
think the decision to use a donor is as hard to make as to whether to be a 
donor" (Eve). Leona finds it difficult to write a goodwill message to the 
resultant child, because "it feels like I'm writing to a child I have given away 
for adoption": 
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I donated eggs back in 2000 and again this year. The rules regarding 
donation have changed since my first time and now I have to fill in a 
form which includes a goodwill message to any children born resulting 
from the donation. I'm really struggling with this. I'm happy that I 
donated and I'd be over the moon if it was successful for the couples 
(the whole point of the donation in the first place). BUT I can't get my 
head around giving a message or personal details ie hobbies interests 
etc. It feels like I'm writing to a child I have given away for adoption. 
This isn't how I view it as any babies will belong to their mothers and 
not to me. Am I being too detached from it all? I've love to know what 
info a child born from donation would like to know? (Leona). 
A number of users express concerns about the emotional difficulties involved 
in donating biological material that has the potential to become a child. The 
following post suggests that Leona would like to see egg donation by analogy 
with tissue donation. However, at least by comparison with her husband's 
experience in donating bone marrow, she did not get a positive reaction from 
people about her egg donation: 
haven't really told many people about my latest donation because I 
didn't get very good comments last time. My Husband was found to be 
a bone marrow match to someone at the same time as i donated this 
year and everyone seemed so proud of him for that but i didn't get the 
same reaction. People don't seem to understand why i would want to 
donate eggs? I was even asked whether i would wonder if every child I 
saw on the street was mine? NO I don't. I've helped someone ( I hope) 
to have their baby, not mine. I have mine with me ( and one in heaven) 
and other babies belong to their Mummies. I do not want to take 
anything anyway from the recipients. My job is done! (Leona). 
Terry and Nicky also express the view that donating eggs is different from 
giving away a child: in Nicky's words, it is a "potential gift of life": 
i am currently going through the process of being an altrustic egg 
donor, i've completed all my screening, being matched with two 
recepients and will soon be starting my injections.To be honest i have 
found the whole process ok, emotionally i mean, i have children, they 
know what their mum is doing and i know there maybe a possibility in 
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18 years time i may have someone tum up on my door step. I know 
they will carry my DNA and genetically be half mine, but i don't see it 
as i'm giving my child(ren) away. I'm helping two couples hopefully 
become parents, with all the highs and lows that brings I . ~ ~ (Terry). 
I don't see it as giving my children away either but I do see it as giving 
the potential gift of life. I'd like nothing more than to donate and have 
the couples dreams come true. No amount of payment in the world 
could top that knowledge that you helped someone achieve their dreams 
and have their own family. To give them a (hopefully) life long gift that 
they can mould and change and watch grow. That will be appreciated 
day to day whether they know the donor or not (Nicky). 
In this discussion thread, several posts suggest that gamete donation is different 
from giving a child away for adoption. These views can best be understood 
when located in a broader context. As I showed in Chapter Three, an adoption 
analogy has dominated the donor anonymity debate. This analogy was initially 
employed to draw attention to the similarities between the rights of adopted 
and donor-conceived children with regards to knowing their 'biological 
parents' . The posts above indicate that the adoption analogy also has 
implications on how people view donating gametes. These users stress that 
donating gametes does not make them parents - the resultant child does not 
belong them. Instead, donating gametes is similar to donating tissue. These 
views echo O'Donovan's observations about donor conception. She argues that 
donor conception is a form of procreation: the act has its own integrity and 
completeness - it is the would-be parent(s)' act and the child is unquestionably 
their child. "The act of procreation which takes place by artificial insemination 
is undoubtedly the act of the couple, and more particularly of the mother" 
(O'Donovan, 1988: 36). In this act, social links are established between the 
procreator and the child, not with the donor. Some egg donors in this study 
however express anxiety that, in the public sphere, "donating a tissue which 
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has potential to become a child" is conflated with "giving away a child". 
Presumably, the government's insistence on the adoption analogy, and on 
creating a donation culture where donors are considered as biological parents, 
is a challenge for potential egg donors who do not see egg donation as an "act 
of procreation" on their part. 
The users describe donation as a "wonderfully generous gesture", "a lovely, 
generous and thoughtful gesture", "an incredible thing", and "an enormous 
decision". Whilst donating gametes is a "generous gesture", "having someone 
knocking on your door" (that is, being contacted by the resultant child) is an 
undesirable situation. Therefore the identity of donors should be protected, and 
"donors should not be punished" for "giving the gift of life". One user refers to 
an article about an anonymous sperm donor who was tracked down through the 
Internet by a 14 year old who claimed that the donor was his father. This user 
thinks that it is "scary" that the donor can be traced through the website: 
i think they could trace by dna throught the website somehow, scary, no 
wonder not so many people want to be donors anymore, but the sad 
thing about it all is that its a shame, as people need them (Pam). 
The anonymity Issue IS taken into consideration in both egg and sperm 
donation. Some users express concern about being identified by the resulting 
offspring if they become donors. Un surprisingly, due to their own worries, they 
assume that fewer donors will be likely to come forward under the current law. 
Based on the user accounts, it might be argued that those who undergo 
infertility treatment express their sympathy for people who are on waiting lists 
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for donor gamete donation. However, whether this sympathy outweighs the 
physical, emotional or moral implications of being a donor is questionable. 
Disclosure 
Before analysing the posts of would-be parents on the issue of disclosure, I will 
discuss the findings of a number of studies that investigated the degree to 
which donor conception parents disclosed, or were likely to disclose, 
information to their children about the circumstances of their conception. 
Despite expectations that children's right to official information will lead to 
greater parental openness, research draws a different picture. Gottlieb et al. 
(2000) studied the implications of the removal of anonymity in Sweden to see 
whether parents told their children they had been conceived through Dr. Only 
11 per cent of parents had told their child. The most common reasons for not 
telling were that it was 'unnecessary' and 'may hurt the child'. The authors 
concluded that legislation alone is not sufficient to change personal attitudes in 
a population. A more recent study of Swedish DI families reaffirmed the 
discrepancy between the legislators' intentions and parents' actions. Sixty-one 
per cent of the parents had told their children about the Dr. Parents who did not 
intend to tell their children considered DI a private matter and were afraid of 
other people's attitudes. The same percentage, sixty-one per cent of the parents 
had not yet told their children about the possibility of ident?jj'ing the donor 
(Lalos, Gottlieb and Lalos, 2007). And, as reported in Chapter Four, a recent 
UK study found that, despite the greater encouragement towards disclosure in 
recent years, less than 8 per cent of egg donation parents and less than 5 per 
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cent of DI parents had begun to tell their children by the time of the child's 
third birthday (Golombok et aI., 2006). 
The research evidence identifies three main reasons for secrecy: first, that 
couples may view the decision not to disclose as protecting them from negative 
societal reactions, and preventing their child being considered different from 
others (Lalos, Gottlieb and Lalos, 2007; Nachtigall et al., 1997); second, that 
male partners may have concerns that the acknowledgement of infertility 
would cause their masculinity to come under suspicion (Courtenay, 2000; 
Glover et al., 1996; Miall, 1996; Nachtigall, Becker and Wozny, 1992); and 
third, that family relationships (particularly father-child) would be damaged if 
the child's real genetic identity was revealed (Gottlieb, Lalos and Lindblad, 
2000; Lalos, Gottlieb and Lalos, 2007). I found that the users of Repromed 
express similar concerns. 
Stigma 
Elaine has no intentions to disclose, as she does not want her children to be 
marginalised. Some of their friends and family members were only told that the 
couple was receiving help for conception, because the couple does not want 
any resultant children to be marked out: 
Well, I for one have absolutely no intention of ever telling our children 
that they are anything other than "'ours" because I feel that in every 
possible sense they are. I will carry this child and give birth to it. We 
don't want our children to feel "different" in any way and nobody ever 
needs to know anything. Being a parent isn't about the egg or the 
sperm, it's who wipes their bum/noses from the day they're born. S.ome 
of our friends and family know we're having "help" but that really IS all 
they need to know. I don't want people for ever looking at my child and 
trying to work out if it looks Spanish or not! (Elaine). 
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Suzanne's partner had cancer as a child, so his family has always expected that 
he would have problems in conceiving. Therefore, the couple decided to tell his 
family about the DI if they were asked. Although the family know that the 
couple is getting treatment, they never questioned what kind of treatment it 
was. Suzanne's family, on the other hand, do not live in the local area so the 
couple decided not to tell them. Suzanne comments: 
We just feel it will be easier for DH if less people know. Only a few 
people know about our fertility issue, but not DI - usually 'cause I had a 
bad day and let it slip. But on the whole I want to keep it private. I don't 
view it as a lie, DH and I are trying to have a baby - true. He will be the 
father - true (Suzanne). 
In the following post, Christine mentions that she wants to protect her partner 
from the "embarrassment" of infertility: 
I know that my family and my partners would support us but also I feel 
that it's embarressing for my partner to have to tell others when I'm not 
sure if it's really necessary (Christine). 
Samantha had a four-year history of unsuccessful DI treatment and she moved 
on for adoption. She says "using donor eggs seems far more acceptable than 
using donor sperm and far easier to talk about": the "donor girls" think that the 
most important subject is "wanting to be a family rather than where it came 
from, whose eggs/sperm, adoption etc". The users have the impression that 
men are not as comfortable as women when sperm donation comes into the 
picture: 
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I think you are lucky if you have the choice of going done the route of 
supplying the donor - but it gives you another set of challenges to think 
of regarding who knows what and the emotions involved. i KNOW my 
hubby would not allow this. How would your DP feel about it? 
(Suzanne). 
Male partners of those who obtain donor insemination are somewhat 'in 
disguise'. The Internet forums are important in giving voice to the male 
partner. Despite the fact that it is a very a long quote, I think it is therefore 
important to include Will's post here: 
My wife and I had icsi treatment because of my low count. At first I 
didn't want a soul to know - I was terrified that all my aunts, uncles and 
cousins might initially assume that the problem was my wife's seeing as 
my family tend to think they're all perfect and therefore, by association 
so must I be. To save my wife suffering the thought of being whispered 
about I thought I'd have to tell them all the truth and then suffer the 
whispering myself. But then I decided it was none of their business and 
that they could think what they liked - xxx was happy with that too. 
They know we had treatment but the reasons remain unknown to them. 
I know what you mean about not telling people the finer details. I don't 
think the girls at work want to know anyway (though it will stop them 
all asking when on earth I'm going to get round to having kids!) and I 
shudder to imagine my extended family's hushed whispers at get 
togethers-' "There is no fish in his pond you know". I guess at least my 
parents are going to have to know though if I'm going to ask them 
about any history of similar problems- that'll be a tough one-Mum's 
been a nan-in-waiting for years watching all her friends' children have 
children. I'm sure they'll be so supportive but taking the first step and 
telling them will be hard (Will). 
Linda, Will's partner, says: 
People ALWAYS assume it's the woman that has the problem and it 
makes me mad!!!! ..... to me it doesn't matter..but why do people always 
assume that it's the woman who obsessively wants a family and are 
dragging the poor ole feela through hell to get there (Linda). 
As a response, Betty says: 
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I know exactly how you feel Linda. We had no idea that we had a 
problem and so to discover that it was with DH was a real bombshell. 
Only our parents know exactly what the problem is and we've refused 
to tell anyone else, but I always think they assume it's me, especially 
when they keep asking 'isn't there anything can be done about it, as 
Doctors know so much these days' and you end up with thinking 'you 
haven't got a clue!' (Betty). 
These accounts indicate that Repromed users feel stigmatised. During the 
donor anonymity debate, one argument made by those advocating removal of 
donor anonymity was that the stigma surrounding donor conception had faded. 
But this stigma is profoundly clear in both the posts I read and in the accounts 
of my interview participants. Drawing on Goffman's (1963) Stigma 
framework, the issue of stigma will be discussed in detail in Chapters Six and 
Seven. 
Protecting the child 
The posts on Repromed suggest that would-be parents are mostly concerned 
about the potentially adverse affects of disclosure on a child's development. 
Some users express the view that knowing the truth can hurt the child: 
If we go down the DIUI route I am not sure if I want the child to know 
(if I am blessed that is), I think sometimes knowing the truth can be 
more damaging to a child especially if told later in life. Their whole 
world must be turned upside down especially as who they thought was 
mum or dad isn't (Tara). 
Golombok et at. (2006) found that only half of the DI parents in their study 
were open about the donor conception with maternal grandparents, and less 
than one-third told paternal grandparents. In line with these findings, the users 
of Repromed also express concern that, if they were to tell the child and other 
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family members found out, their extended family might disapprove and reject 
the child. Elaine's husband has children from his previous marriage who are 
not biologically related to him. He did not know this until his infertility was 
established during the medical examinations which he and Elaine undertook. 
The couple do not intend to disclose this information to the children, who were 
aged 11 and 15 years at the time of my fieldwork. Elaine believes that 
disclosure would make them question their identity. Also, she fears that the 
grandparents would be frustrated: 
My husband now knows that he's 99% certainly not the biological 
father of my two step daughters (he can 't be), but what good would it 
possibly do to tell them? Other than completely destroy their sense of 
who they are? ( ... ) It really is a personal choice, but I have absolutely no 
qualms about keeping quiet, after all, my husband's wife has done so for 
the last 11 years and still doesn't know that we know what she did!!! 
What do you think his parents would say if they knew??? So if we told 
them about our problems, they'd know their grandchildren weren't 
there grandchildren after all, assuming that it's all about whose 
egg/sperm it is. In fact, they still remain very much his children and 
their grandchildren, because it takes a lot more than a bit of DNA to be 
all of that (Elaine). 
Another user, Helen, shares this view: 
I suppose 1'd be worried about telling people in case it had an effect on 
the child - would people see him/her differently - would they react 
differently to them than there other Grandchildren? (Helen). 
Gabrielle joined Repromed to talk about the disclosure issues. She is reluctant 
to disclose to her parents because they will be "horrified and very 
unsupportive". However, Gabrielle is planning to disclose to the resultant child 
that she was conceived by egg donation, although she does not know when and 
how: 
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I do feel any child of ours should know they were conceived through 
DE and there is an issue there in going to Spain as they will never know 
any further details about the Donor. I would still wish to tell them but 
as to others particularly my parents it would definantely be a question 
of when and how (Gabrielle). 
The fact that there are social fathers who are not biologically related to their 
children directs other users towards disclosure: 
As to the whole issue of telling, we decided to tell our close family and 
close friends as they are our support network and these people are there 
for us. And we will tell the child when the time comes (being positive 
here!) as we don't think of our situation as that unusual. After all, how 
many kids are brought up by their biological father nowadays? (Lisa). 
In the UK, mothers are under no obligation to name a child's father on the birth 
certificate. In other words, with unassisted or 'natural' conceptions, the 
mother's interest in keeping the father's identity secret is allowed to trump a 
child's interests in knowing his/her identity. Moreover, as Jackson (2001) 
notes, a significant proportion of the naturally-conceived population is 
biologically unrelated to their presumed fathers. Estimates vary but a recent 
systematic review suggests that the figure lies somewhere between 2.0 and 9.6 
per cent, with a median value of 3.7 per cent (Bellis et at., 2005).48 Infidelity 
may therefore be a statistically greater threat to accurate knowledge of one's 
biological origins than the relatively smaller number of donor assisted births 
(Jackson, 2001). Jackson draws attention to the inconsistency between 
revealing the parentage of children conceived by assisted means and allowing 
concealment of the parentage of those conceived by natural means. Her view is 
echoed by the informants in this study. They observe that people who had 
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affairs are not obliged to disclose this infonnation while those who undergo 
donor conception are expected to be open about it. Elaine uses an interesting 
metaphor: telling the child is like "having an affair" and then having to tell the 
spouse about it; it does nothing for the spouse but makes the "confessor" feel 
better. She believes that disclosure will do "damage" and cause "huge 
problems" when the children reach adolescence. Another user also claims that 
there is an analogy between having an affair and having DI: 
Also there are loads of women out there who have had affairs and dont 
know or tell who the real father is, so some children grow up thinking 
that their father is the 'known' father when actually he isnt. Do we 
consider the welfare of children in this situation? (Tara). 
As a matter of fact, during the donor anonymity debate the advocates of a 
child's right-to-know did address this analogy. As I noted in Chapter Three, 
during the debate in the House of Lords on 9 June 2004, Baroness Warnock 
argued: 
There can be no moral justification whatever in deceiving a child about 
the circumstances of his birth. It is a very awkward doctrine to 
enunciate, considering the number of children born by adulterous 
relationships (HL Deb, 2003-04b). 
N achtigall et al. (1997: 89) argue that the nuances of a couple's disclosure 
decision-making process are complex and involve "an interaction between 
psychological states of the parents and the social, cultural and familial context 
within which this decision must be negotiated". User accounts are consistent 
with this argument. The child's welfare is of concern but a web of concerns, 
48 The higher figures quoted in some earlier studies are the result of sampling from populations 
where paternity is already disputed. 
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beliefs, and past expenences also influences the disclosure decision. For 
example, Sarah had a successful DI treatment and is now the mother of a 3-
month-old baby. She feels that there is only ever "right for you" as no one has 
the same experiences, families, and feelings when it comes to what to do to 
create a family. She and her partner told their parents, Sarah's sister, and her 
partner's brother but they asked the brother not to share it with his children so 
that the child does not accidentally find out from one of them. During the 
pregnancy, they also told their very close friends, as Sarah was feeling the 
pressure of people thinking they had had IVF and not being able to talk about 
how she felt. Sarah also says that: 
children who are told rarely see it as a big deal, but those who find out 
accidentally often do - but you will be the parent and you will know 
what's right for your child and your family (Sarah). 
Suzanne, who is undergoing DI treatment, mentions that she and her partner 
had a meeting with their counsellor who wanted to get them thinking about 
how they would tell the baby it was conceived using donor sperm. She 
comments: "We were honest and said we would have to consider what was 
right for the child, when it was right for the child." Lora, another user, takes a 
similar view: 
My DH [dear husband] felt same as you to start with that any child 
would not feel 'ours' if there was an identifiable 'dad' out there 
somewhere - but after a lot of thought we agreed it is the child's right, 
even if that is to choose to never look up anything at all about their 
donor, that really need to 'come first' (Lora). 
Although the welfare of the child is perceived as paramount, user accounts 
indicate that opinions on 'what is best for the child' differ. Will disclosure 
harm the child? Will the child reject the social father? Will relatives see the 
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child in a different way? Telling the child that he/she was conceived by 
medical assistance (some participants in the study refer to medical assistance as 
to "having help to conceive") is different from telling the child that he/she can 
find out who their biological father/mother is. A study by Lalos et af. (2007) on 
Swedish parents who obtained Dr also shows that revealing the donor's 
identity may not be as natural as telling the child about Dr in general terms. 
Among the parents who had disclosed the Dr to their children, less than two 
thirds had also told them about their right to obtain information about the 
identity of the donor. 
As the user accounts indicate, parents who choose not to disclose may justify 
their non-disclosure on the grounds that it protects the best interests of the 
child. O'Donovan (1988) argues that this kind of justification is dangerous: 
The argument that the deceived would be better off not knowing, or 
would prefer not to know, runs into problems of lack of consent. There 
can be no consent in advance of lies about parenthood, for this would 
defeat the object. So the justification advanced is that the liar knows 
better than the victim what is good for the victim. This type of 
paternalistic argument, generally put forward in relation to persons of 
lesser capacity, is dangerous here. The child will develop into an adult 
(1988: 38). 
Eekelaar (2006) also recommends openness in the child-parent relationship: 
Children have interest in having knowledge of the physical truth 
because it provides an underlying certainty about the world they have 
come into, incapable of manipulation by the adults. The children may 
stake their claims against those who is responsible for their being. My 
argument has been that the interests that children have in knowing the 
physical truth are always stronger than those of the adults, because for 
children they give rise to claims in justice, whereas for adults they form 
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the basis for attempts at exercising power, sometimes beyond the grave 
(2006: 75-76). 
In line with 0 'Donovan's argument, Eekelaar (2006) notes that while assessing 
what is best for the child, attention will always need to be directed towards 
ascertaining the child's viewpoint. Moreover, efforts must be made to adopt the 
child's perspective, considering how the child would act if hel she was an adult. 
Advocating respect for a child's autonomy, he argues that openness will 
empower children against their parents' manipulative power. Both O'Donovan 
and Eekelaar warn against the dangers of a paternalistic mindset that treats 
children as people with lesser capacity. 
However, parenthood is inherently paternalistic as all parents treat their 
children as persons of lesser capacity (at least) until they reach a certain age. 
While raising children, most parents consider the child's welfare and decide on 
what is best for her/him. The posts on Repromed indicate that parents of donor-
conceived children are no less paternalistic than parents of naturally-conceived 
ones. Some of the user accounts indicate that parents are more concerned with 
protecting the child from the potential harm of knowing the truth, rather than 
giving the child greater autonomy at any cost. Openness in the parent-child 
relationship is not always thought to be best for the child's interest. There are 
also posts however which suggest that it is best for the child to know about his 
or her origins. Nevertheless, what is clear is that legislative initiatives seem to 
have no significant impact on parents' assessment of their child's welfare. The 
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members of Repromed stress the view that the decision on disclosure should be 
left to the parents. As one user, Samantha notes: 
Like Elaine says the children conceived will ALWAYS be yours no 
matter how they were conceived. We are lucky to live in a society that 
gives us the choice of telling or not telling the child that you had a little 
bit of help to get there. Lets hope we all get there one way or another 
(Samantha). 
Fertility travel 
Following the removal of donor anonymity, would-be parents who prefer 
anonymous donors have no choice but to seek treatment abroad or purchase 
gametes (sperm) through the Internet, which has recently become illegal. The 
posts presented in this section are all excerpted from a thread about the options 
available for those who attempted to receive treatment in licensed clinics in the 
UK but for various reasons could not access the treatment they need. 
Try xxx [a clinic in Spain] - anonymous donor sperm is 260 Euros per 
go and I flew from Bristol to Barcelona for £50 each way! (Elaine). 
A shortage of donated gametes or embryos results in lengthy waiting lists. 
Given that fertility decreases with increasing age, many would-be parents 
choose to seek treatment abroad. Tara stresses that would-be parents '"have to 
go to the ends of the Earth to get donor sperm": 
Now it has happened, where and what do people needing donor sperm 
do??? If clinics dont start recruiting their own donors then we will have 
to go to the ends of the Earth to try and get one, thats our only choice, 
its so unfair (Tara). 
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In another post, after complaining about the fees that each couple has to pay to 
undergo treatment, Tara addresses the risks of back-street arrangements. She 
notes that the new law leads people to consider less legitimate ways of 
overcoming their childlessness and to take health risks. For example, one can 
use the 'turkey baster' method and achieve pregnancy using fresh sperm, but 
this sperm cannot be screened for certain diseases. Licensed clinics are 
required to freeze and store the sperm for six months, the incubation period of 
HIV, before insemination to ensure that it is virus free . 
. . . basically they are ruining couples (like us) chances of having a child 
using donor or want for a better word 'harder'- they are actually going to 
force this underground. Couples will go to other agencies (not so 
legitimate) and abroad to get donors is that fair??? The sad thing is that 
the women like us may not have as much in the way of protection 
against certain things like HIV etc I really think they have made the 
whole donor issue a lot worse (Tara). 
Another user asks for others' opinions about an online sperm provider: 
I have found this company on the web and wanted to know your views: 
[the web-site's URL] Having quickly read it through it seems as tho 
they send you the sperm and you self inseminate (?!) for under £400. I 
know people have been going abroad, but i can't find a place that does 
D lUI (Suzanne). 
Tara says: 
Also there is another site [the web-site's URL] as anyone thought or 
used this one??? I have heard they are fairly good. I have to say it 
makes me wonder whether all the sperm donors that went through 
clinics and wanted to remain anonymous are now going to these places 
in order to help people needing it??! !(Tara). 
After this study was completed, in July 2007, the HFE Act was amended to 
prohibit distribution of gametes without a licence from the HFEA. Therefore, 
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even if would-be parents would like to take a risk with fresh spenn, they have 
to think twice. As I explained in Chapter Three, the chair of the HFEA, Lisa 
Jardine, has 'strongly' advised "any person who became aware that a person or 
organisation may be procuring, testing, processing or distributing gametes 
without a licence to contact the police". The new regulations ensured that 
Internet spenn providers will be subject to the same rules as HFEA licensed 
clinics. 
Suzanne's clinic found a donor for her but he did not match either her physical 
characteristics or those of her husband. They chose a donor profile from Spain, 
to be imported by their licensed clinic in the UK, but the clinic infonned them 
that UK law prohibited the purchase of spenn from an anonymous donor. If 
would-be parents cannot purchase anonymous spenn online, they have no 
option but to go abroad for treatment, because even licensed clinics in the UK 
are prohibited from importing anonymous spenn. 
Other reasons behind reproductive travel are addressed in the following post by 
Elaine. Specifically, the donors are anonymous, the cost of the treatment is the 
same, there are no waiting lists, and there is no HFEA: 
In the end, I think more and more people will go to Europe for 
treatment, as it costs the same, is completely anonymous, has no 
waiting lists and, best of all, not bl**dy HFEA!!! That's not to say they 
aren't regulated, but by sensible people with our interests at heart!!! 
(Elaine). 
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The following post by Tom summarises many of the issues raised by other 
users: 
There are many infertility news groups out there, so it becomes quite 
easy to compare the approaches taken by different clinics. Some UK 
clinics seem to be several steps off the pace of both other UK centres 
and overseas centres. Treatments used almost routinely in other centres 
are dismissed with the excuse that it is not current clinic policy, or the 
treatment isn't proven. The result is that the patient feels that they are 
not being treated as an individual, and they are left with many 
unresolved questions about their particular situation, and they are 
paying a premium price for this unsatisfactory state. 
In many cases patients find that they are managing their own treatment, 
pushing the medics to try something outside the standard for that clinic. 
This is probably the most wearing part of treatment for infertility, 
dealing with a system that you are not part of. It is probably also the 
reason why many more women in the UK will tum to overseas centres. 
Overseas treatment will also be favoured because any form of medical 
treatment in the UK means that at some stage the patient will come up 
against the NHS, a hugely expensive medical insurance scheme which 
has now turned into a useless quivering jelly of administrators, 
processes and targets; fertility treatment is way down the list of 
priorities (Tom). 
The fertility travel survey conducted by INUK (Infertility Network UK, 2008) 
gives further insight into the phenomenon. INUK had 339 responses to the 
survey which was put on their website, and linked from a number of other sites. 
The first question was "W ould you consider travelling abroad for fertility 
treatment?" 337 people answered this question and 256 of them (76 per cent) 
said "yes". 210 people responded and 129 people skipped the question "What 
would attract you to overseas fertility clinics?" The main attractions were short 
waiting times (70.5 per cent), cost of treatment (69.5 per cent), success rates 
(61 per cent), availability of donor eggs/sperm (53.8 per cent), positive reports 
from other patients who have been abroad (51 per cent), and anonymity of 
egg/sperm donors (23.3 per cent). For the 24 per cent of respondents who 
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would not consider treatment abroad, the mam reason was concern about 
standards in overseas clinics (selected by 67.5 per cent). Only 75 people 
responded to the question "What treatments you had?" Forty-one percent had 
egg donation, 7 per cent spenn donation, 1 per cent embryo donation, and 3 per 
cent surrogacy. Of those who had been abroad, 88 per cent were happy with 
the treatment they had (77 people answered this question). The question "What 
would you say were the positive points of overseas treatment?" was answered 
by 116 people. Short waiting lists (78 per cent), cost (66 per cent), availability 
of donor eggs/spenn (60 per cent), higher success rates (41 per cent), attitude 
of staff at clinic (38 per cent), atmosphere at clinic (40 per cent), facilities at 
clinic (36 per cent), and donor anonymity (30 per cent) were addressed as the 
mam reasons. 
120 of the 339 respondents answered the question "Which country did you go 
to for your treatment?" Spain was by far the most visited country for fertility 
treatment, with at least three times as many patients going there as anywhere 
else. The patients questioned had visited 22 different countries for treatment, 
and other popular destinations were Russia, the Czech Republic, the USA and 
India. Greece, Belgium, Cyprus and Barbados followed behind. Some of the 
more unusual and far-flung destinations included Thailand, China and Egypt. 
Spain appears to be the most popular destination for Repromed users due to 
donor anonymity, the large numbers of donors available, and the high success 
rates achieved. 
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Closure of the forum 
The Egg and Spenn Donation forum was suspended just after I completed my 
fieldwork. The website administrator infonned me that the forum had been 
closed because members of the HFEA-licensed centre hosting the site were 
concerned about the increasing number of posts advising participants about 
offshore facilities for assisted conception using anonymous gametes. One week 
before the closure, at the First World Forum on Science and Civilization, Dame 
Suzi Leather, then chair of the HFEA had noted that "the Authority would urge 
patients to think twice and consider the risks and implications before going 
abroad for treatment". However, there is no direct evidence linking the HFEA 
to the closure of the forum. 
The forum was reopened five months later with a disclaimer stating: "In view 
of popular demand the donor gamete forum has been reopened, but anyone 
thinking of going abroad for treatment should first consider the guidance 
provided by the HFEA, which is quoted below." The HFEA' s warning about 
fertility treatment abroad (HFEA, 2006) and Leather's speech were both 
quoted. Repromed users made a range of posts, responded to the disclaimer, in 
which they express their discontent about the HFEA' s approach to fertility 
travel: 
I really do get fed up with the HFEA scaremongering about going 
abroad, especially when they've done so much to prevent successful 
treatment in the UK, for example, removing donor anonymity and 
successfully wiping out the entire UK spenn bank in one go!!!!!! I for 
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one can only express my utmost admiration at the extremely expert and 
professional treatment I received at [name of the clinic], which was 
vastly better than the treatment I received in the UK and resulted in my 
gorgeous baby at the first attempt. In total, six of us became pregnant 
after only one or two transfers after going to [name of the clinic], two 
with twins, which would never have happened if we'd remained in the 
UK. I think that says it all! (Elaine) 
I'd like to see the HFEA or perhaps other organisation carry out a full 
investigation into the standards of clinics abroad, to provide some hard 
evidence that will allow potential patients to make their minds up once 
fully informed (Will). 
I do think the HFEA is very heavy-handed in its approach to this issue, 
and has also made some very poor regulatory decisions (especially 
about donor anonymity, for example) which may well end up 
encouraging people to seek treatment elsewhere. I guess they would 
open to considerable criticism if it could be shown that, in order to 
avoid the consequences of their approach, lots of people are travelling 
abroad for treatment, so now they are trying to discourage them with 
'scare tactics'. Not a very grown up approach, really (Melissa). 
I feel that if donor anonymity was guaranteed in the UK you wouldn't 
be going to abroad anyway. That's down to the government perhaps in 
places they shouldn't (Gemma). 
On the note of the HFEA 'warning' all I will say is that I was offered a 
very high quality individualised treatment at xxx in Spain. I very 
carefully researched a number of clinics abroad as there were no further 
options left for me in the UK - I did not have 5 years to wait for Egg 
Donation in the UK. I was offered a service and support at xxx that was 
not on offer at any of the three clinics I was under in the UK. Will, I 
agree whole heartedly with you - it would be good for the HFEA to 
produce some good statistical evidence of what they claim - I'd like to 
know just how many people have complained to them about treatment 
abroad (Kelly). 
As noted earlier, at the time of this study, the clinic behind the Repromed 
website was the University of Bristol's, Centre for Reproductive Medicine. 
This centre has now merged with the Southmead Fertility Service. After the 
merger, as a result of a site update, most of the posts were removed from the 
website. I requested access to website archives, but the administrators did not 
respond to my e-mail. Fortunately, for data analysis I had printed out all the 
threads in the forum before the website update commenced. 
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Conclusion 
The virtual ethnography study presented in this chapter offers some potentially 
important insights into the manner in which would-be parents explore the 
issues of donor gamete donation interactively and collectively on discussion 
boards. The topics generated by users of Repromed provide an indication of the 
issues that they perceive as important or problematic with regards to donation. 
The most important issue that users raise is that, despite the warnings of a 
likely donor shortage, the government lifted anonymity at the expense of 
would-be parents' access to treatment. Experience from other countries 
suggested that the proposed reforms would cause a decline in donations and the 
would-be parents express the view that the HFEA should have taken measures 
to avoid the preventable crisis. Both the government and the HFEA have 
expressed the view that there will be a revival in donations, but the would-be 
parents on Repromed do not share this view. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
despite the campaigns launched by the government, HFEA registers show that 
there is a continuing severe sperm shortage, with only a small revival in donor 
numbers of 6 per cent. Donor insemination treatments are down 28 per cent, 
with 4,225 treatments carried out in 2006 compared to 5,865 in 2005. Egg 
donations dropped from 1242 to 812 between 2004-2006 (HFEA, 2008d). The 
HFEA, as mentioned earlier, makes it clear that recruitment of donors is not its 
responsibility: "The HFEA' s remit does not extend to the recruitment of 
donors; this is a matter for the sector and should be addressed as a matter of 
urgency. Our role is to develop and maintain policies which strike a balance 
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between the needs of donors, recipients and donor offspring and which do not 
create unreasonable barriers to recruitment" (HFEA, 2008a). 
Shortage of donor gametes means that patients have to wait longer for 
treatment and have less choice with respect to donor characteristics. This 
picture becomes clearer when one looks into the discussion threads about 
fertility travel and online sperm providers. The user accounts indicate that 
donor shortage problems lead couples to find alternative solutions to their 
childlessness. Would-be parents have readily available alternatives III their 
access to treatment in other medically-advanced countries. Success rates, the 
lower cost of treatment, donor availability, and anonymity make clinics abroad 
increasingly attractive. 
As I showed in Chapter Three the HFEA refers to infertility travellers as "a 
relatively small number of people" (HFEA, 2006). There are no official 
statistics about fertility travel, but INUK's recent survey shows that a majority 
(76 per cent) of would-be parents (256 out of 339 who responded to the survey) 
are 'considering' treatment abroad. The survey results also indicate that Spain 
is the most popular destination for infertility treatment. It is followed by a 
number of countries which also maintain donor anonymity. Obviously, would-
be parents who strongly advocate the child's right to access identifiable 
information about the donor would not consider seeking treatment in countries 
where donor anonymity is maintained. Anne's post is worth quoting here: 
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We decided against going abroad for tx [treatment], specifically 
because the donor remains pennanently anonymous, as you say. It's a 
shame that the waiting lists for DE [donated eggs] are so much longer 
now that anonymity has been removed; but on the other hand, I can't 
imagine telling my child that they'd never be able to find out who their 
genetic parent is, should they wish to. Adopted kids can, so why not DE 
kids? Most people seem to want to know where they 'came from', at 
some point in their lives. I wasn't keen on the idea of saying, just 
someone from Spain ... I imagine it would be very frustrating for them. 
And I wouldn't want to pretend they weren't from a donor. I know loads 
of people have tx abroad though and I'm not criticising that at all. Who 
knows, in a few years' time I might be out there myself! Never say 
never (Anne). 
UK patients, who have similar views to Anne, are free to exercise their right to 
receive treatment elsewhere using gametes from identifiable donors (such as 
Sweden, Norway, and The Netherlands). But the fact that INUK's survey 
shows that countries with donor anonymity are the most popular fertility travel 
destinations suggests that there are many UK patients who want to use gametes 
from anonymous donors. 
The user accounts show that a number of women who donated eggs under the 
anonymous donation system became reluctant to donate again after the change 
in policy. This cannot be explained as simply a fear of being contacted by the 
resultant child. These women express anxiety about the new donation culture, 
where their altruistic act is questioned by their social contacts: "why would 
anyone give their child away?" A number of egg donors in this study state that 
they would like to see their donation as analogous to donating tissue that 
happens to have the potential to become a person. They do not consider 
themselves to be a 'biological mother' to the resultant child. They also express 
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anxiety about a form which they are expected to complete. These 'emotional 
letters' to which recipients refer, not only make the donors feel like they are 
'giving away' their children for adoption, but also distresses the recipients who 
are convinced that there is a 'mummy' out there waiting for the resultant child, 
with 'open arms'. I will return to this issue in Chapter Six. 
Becoming an egg donor is viewed as a highly altruistic act, and most of the 
users express their admiration for donors. It is however seen as involving a 
number of serious emotional risks, which many feel will deter potential donors. 
What is the value of a right to openness for a child who is never conceived 
because of the reluctance of gamete donors to take on a long-term commitment 
from which they may reasonably only expect to derive emotional costs rather 
than benefits? It is clear that the UK government's insistence on the 
comparability between adoption and gamete donation is highly questionable. 
This analogy is also a significant threat to the gamete donation culture. 
If one looks at the accounts in discussion threads with regards to disclosure, 
there is no clear consensus on the issue of whether or not the child should be 
told. The posts say little about the content of the information to be shared with 
the child. Nevertheless, all posts relating to disclosure suggest that whether to 
tell or not, the content of the information, and the timing of disclosure are 
perceived as private family matters, and there is a consensus that the disclosure 
decision should be left to the parents. Some parents express the view that 
maintaining secrecy, or limiting information, about the child's conception is 
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the safest way to protect the child, themselves, and the extended family. They 
prefer to tell their child that they got 'help to conceive' rather than that the 
identity of the donor who helped with the conception is accessible. There are 
would-be parents who take a different view, believing that the child should be 
told about the nature of herlhis conception. While some users stress that the 
child has a right to know, others express concern about the possibility of 
inadvertent disclosure which would be potentially damaging to the child and to 
the parent-child relationship. The analysis of the posts suggest that the notion 
of kinship and family relationships is too complex and intimate to be directly 
influenced by regulations; disclosure policies do not have control over which 
secrets are revealed or kept in the family. 
Presumably, the desire to overcome childlessness may outweigh the perceived 
necessity of the child knowing about the donor. A number of user accounts in 
this study suggest that, given a strong desire for children, even would-be 
parents who initially intended to receive gametes from identifiable donors seem 
to compromise this principle and seek treatment abroad to avoid the lengthy 
waiting lists. In short, the would-be parents' accounts indicate that a majority 
of parents are not willing to risk childlessness in order to safeguard the child's 
right to know. This is not surprising. Yet for those who cannot afford to travel, 
or are not willing to seek treatment abroad, the current policy may prevent 
donor-conceived children from being born unless more satisfactory donor 
recruitment mechanisms are introduced. 
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The data presented in this chapter documents the protests of would-be parents 
against the disclosure policy. It suggests that there are two conflicting social 
problems related to donor anonymity: the donor conceived-child's right to 
know and would-be parents' right to seek assistance with conception. 
However, as the natural history of the donor anonymity problem revealed, in 
the absence of an explicit reaction from would-be parents, children's rights 
came to monopolise the rights claims in the donor anonymity debate. 
Arguably, involvement of would-be parents in the debate could have changed 
the trajectory of the problem. But as the users of the Repromed forums suggest, 
would-be parents may feel a strong need to keep donor conception a secret. As 
the accounts show, those who are most directly affected by the disclosure 
policy are also those who prefer to keep the means of conception secret and, in 
part, their desire for secrecy is about protecting the resultant child's welfare. 
Openness and transparency marginalise these people. They are also 
stigmatised; their "passionate desire to bring children to life at any cost" by 
receiving treatment abroad and using anonymous gametes is condemned. And, 
as I show in Chapter Six, their infertility (involuntary childlessness) and need 
for donor gametes are also associated with stigma. If claimants believe that 
there is no way to have their problem solved or recognised, they may choose to 
find alternative ways to cope with it (as a group or individually). Hence, 
silence by stakeholders does not necessarily mean that they do not see their 
condition as a social problem. In the next three chapters, using Goffman' s 
(1963) Stigma theory, I will analyse interview data where would-be parents 
talk about their experiences and their coping strategies for dealing with the new 
law. 
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CHAPTER SIX: STIGMA AND DEVIANCE 
In the virtual ethnography study which I presented in Chapter Five, I identified 
a number of claims by the users of Repromed. The posts showed that a large 
number of would-be parents consider removal of donor anonymity as a 
problem. First, they are not convinced that disclosing the means of conception 
is in the best interests of the child. Secondly, even those would-be parents who 
intend to disclose express concern about the effects of the disclosure policy. 
The would-be parents on Repromed were united in the view that the removal of 
anonymity had identifiable detrimental effects: donors are reluctant to donate; 
UK clinics cannot meet the demand for gametes; and there are long waiting 
lists for patients who wish to get treatment. 
These findings indicate that the removal of donor anonymity is defined as a 
social problem by would-be parents. However, additional data are needed in 
order to understand why would-be parents do not mobilise around this problem 
in a conventional manner: the posts on discussion forums offer limited 
information on this latter point. In this and the following chapters, I draw on 
data from interviews with people who have considered or received treatment 
abroad using donor gametes/embryos. As noted in Chapter Three, for members 
of marginalised social groups (such as would-be parents in the UK), self 
narratives are often the only means of making their voices heard (Wegar, 
1997). The posts on Repromed discussion forums constitute such narratives, 
however, I found that the interviews allowed increased insight into the 
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participants' experiences and enabled me to ask questions about the issues that 
I wanted to explore. 
As I explained in Chapter Four, the interview questions were designed to 
assess specific areas of the donor conception experience, namely infertility 
treatment, disclosure, would-be parents' reactions to the new law, and fertility 
travel. Interestingly, the common themes I identified during my analysis of the 
interviews were more or less the same as those that were set by the users of 
Repromed discussion forums. Admittedly, as the interviews and the virtual 
ethnography study were conducted simultaneously, my interview guide was 
influenced by my observations of the discussion forums. However, it is also 
likely that users of Repromed and interview participants shared common 
concerns about the problems surrounding donor conception, as well as similar 
responses to the change in the law. 
As I discussed in Chapter Four, much of the research concerned with donor 
conception families assumes that being a donor conception family IS a 
pathological situation and must constitute a problem. The research also 
attempts to analyse the impact of this problem on family life and interprets 
parents' responses as indicators of the family's psychological and social 
adjustment to this pathological situation. However, as explained in Chapter 
Three, departing from studies concerned with psychological or social 
experiences of those who received donor conception, I aim to locate the 
interview accounts in the donor anonymity debate. 
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During the interviews, the participants constructed a representation of the 
world in a particular way. Many distinguished themselves from 'normals' 
(those who can conceive naturally) and reflected on the stigma that surrounds 
infertility. The stigma of infertility (Miall, 1986; Greil, 1991; Kohler Riessman. 
2000; Remennick, 2000) has been studied before. Like most social research on 
stigma, my analysis draws on Goffman's Stigma (1963) theory. While 
analysing the accounts of the would-be parents, I also draw on two studies that 
have elaborated Goffman's theory: namely, Dingwall's analysis of illness 
experience in Aspects of Illness (2001) and Voysey's work in A Constant 
Burden (2006), wherein Voysey interviews parents with disabled children to 
understand what it is like to live with a disabled child. 
The interview data is divided into three: first, the nature of stigma, and the way 
that participants experience it; second, participants' information management; 
and third, participants' coping strategies in the face of the disclosure policy, 
namely 'fertility travel'. This chapter focuses on the first issue, that is, 
understanding the nature of the stigma invoked by the failure to reproduce and 
the use of donor gametes/embryos. Most participants reflect on the stigma 
surrounding infertility. Because their infertility is perceived as their own 
design, they attempt to defeat charges of deviance by explaining that 
undergoing treatment was not their 'choice'. Clearly, reproductive technologies 
do offer a 'choice' to those who cannot conceive using their own gametes: 
even if one cannot have one's 'own baby', one might be able to give birth to 'a 
baby' and that baby may even be genetically connected to oneself or one's 
partner. However, donor conception still invokes abnormality as having a 
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genetically-related child is perceived to be natural desire and a social norm. 
U sing donor gametes to conceive is therefore not so much a choice to 
reproduce but a choice to appear normal: "given the choice, to not so desire is 
somehow to be less of a person" (Strathem, 1992: 177). 
'Failing' to reproduce 
Goffman argues that "a necessary condition for a social life is the sharing of a 
single set of normative expectations by all participants, the norms being 
sustained in part because of being incorporated" (Goffman, 1963: 152). Society 
establishes the means of categorising individuals and the set of attributes 
perceived as ordinary for members of each of these categories. The routines of 
social intercourse enable us to deal with others without special attention or 
thought. When we meet someone, first appearances are likely to enable us to 
anticipate his or her category and attributes, their 'social identity'. Goffman 
goes on to argue that "we lean on these anticipations, transforming them into 
normative expectations, into righteously presented demands" (1963: 12). He 
calls the normative expectations about one's social identity 'virtual social 
identity', and the category and attributes s/he could in fact be proved to possess 
one's 'actual social identity'(1963: 12) . Stigma (or a failing, a shortcoming, a 
handicap) represents a discrepancy between an individual's virtual (normative 
expectations about what that individual should be, "a characterisation in 
effect") and actual (the attributes she or he possesses) social identity (1963: 
12). Failure or success in maintaining such norms has a very direct effect on 
the psychological integrity of the individual. 
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A stigma is an "attribute that is deeply discrediting" within a particular social 
interaction (1963: 13). Goffman notes that this failing reduces the individual in 
our minds "from a usual and whole person to a tainted, discounted one" (1963: 
12). He notes: 
While the stranger is present before us, evidence can anse of his 
possessIng an attribute that makes him different from others in the 
category of persons available for him to be, and of less a desirable kind 
- in the extreme, a person who is quite thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or 
weak (1963: 12). 
Goffman argues that "an attribute that stigmatizes one type of possessor can 
confinn the usualness of another, and therefore is neither creditable nor 
discreditable as a thing in itself' (1963: 13). In other words, individual and 
social expectations have a big role in the bearer's experience of stigma. Stigma 
spoils one's identity: "it has the effect of cutting him off from society and from 
himself so that he stands a discredited person facing an unaccepting world" 
(1963: 31). 
Infertility, deviance and stigma 
The participants in this study want to be parents. Having failed to reproduce, 
they suffered a profound sense of failing: failing themselves, and failing the 
expectations of the social category to which they belonged. Stigma is not 
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inherent in infertility itself but childlessness (which is a more evident status 
than one's infertility) can look like intentional deviance, a decision to reject the 
expectation that members of this social category will have children. As the 
Warnock Report (1985) pointed out: 
Family and friends often expect a couple to start a family, and express 
their expectations, either openly or by implication ... Parents likewise 
feel their identity in society enhanced and confirmed by their role in the 
family unit (Warnock, 1985: para 2.2). 
During the interviews, several participants reflected on the ways in which 
infertility made them feel different from those who can conceive naturally. 
They talked about the personal shame ("blame", "fault", "stigma" and 
"failing") of not being able to reproduce naturally: 
And it seems wherever you tum in infertility people are telling you 
there is no blame but then they seem to attach blame. You know, you 
feel that you are failing yourself. I feel that it is not my fault. You need 
fertility treatment. It is directed at you in a sort of blame way 
(Fiona).[ emphasis added] 
Because I think in my mind, I think there has perhaps been in the past, I 
don't know about it now, in my mind, there is stigma attached to 
infertility. It seems perhaps as a failing maybe (Darren). [emphasis 
added] 
Fiona reflects on the isolation that she has been experiencing due to her 
childlessness. By the time of the interview, she had been trying to conceive for 
eight years. Feeling overwhelmed by people asking why they did not have 
children, Fiona and her husband finally disclosed to a few members of Fiona' s 
family that they were receiving help. Fiona experienced isolation due to her 
childlessness. She noted that she lost some of her friends; her childlessness did 
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not gain much sympathy; and her friends who had children did not know how 
to connect with her and her husband. Eventually, the couple was excluded from 
social gatherings. Not only did her body let her down, but also she failed to 
meet the expectations of her family and friends. 
You lose so many friends to infertility, you wouldn't think that. People 
don't know what to say to you or they move on and have families and 
they just exclude you from, you know, when they meet up with other 
friends who have children. They just leave you out of it, or they just 
say... They just don't understand there is lots of disappointment 
involved in infertility. Whenever we encounter, yet another 
disappointment (Fiona).[ emphasis added] 
Defeating the charges of deviance: infertility and choice 
As Goffman suggests, a mere desire to abide by the norm is not enough as in 
many cases the individual has no immediate control over her or his level of 
sustaining the norm: "it is a question of the individual's condition, not his will; 
it is a question of conformance, not compliance" (1963: 153). He goes on to 
argue that one of the dimensions of stigma is the stigma bearer's perceived 
responsibility for the cause of the act. Observers may attach less stigma to a 
condition whose cause is perceived as being beyond the bearer's control. The 
participants in this study reflect on being blamed for their infertility; as I will 
explain later in the chapter, they present infertility as an illness for which one 
should not be held responsible. Parsons (1951) argued that illness is a form of 
deviance for which the sufferer cannot be held responsible. If so, why do 
participants reflect on "being blamed" for their "failing"? I will briefly discuss 
Dingwall's analysis of illness before I return to interview accounts. 
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A persistent theme of Dingwall's book (2001) is that there are no illnesses in 
nature and "illness is the outcome of human classificatory activity" (2001: 76). 
Dingwall points out that one of the more vigorous debates within medical 
sociology has been on the issue of whether illness is deviance. He argues that 
much of the confusion has arisen from differences in the usage of term 
'deviance'. When referring to deviance, I will adopt his definition: "to be 
accepted as a competent member of some collectivity, a person must display 
that he is ordinary, healthy and normal by the standards of fellow members of 
that collectivity ... any lapse is, in some sense, deviance" (2001: 71). 
According to Dingwall, deviance is a generic term covering all categories of 
breaches of social order and it "may be used as a term to apply to any violation 
of public morality" (2001: 71). Illness is behaviour that is non-conventional49 
and is, in this sense, clearly deviant. It is behaviour not in accord with what is 
to be reasonably expected, "the ill person is someone who might have behaved 
otherwise but has failed to do so" (2001: 74). Deviance ascription is a two-
stage process: first the observer (or the actor) evaluates the conventionality of 
the behaviour to determine if there are possible grounds to support it; and 
second, the observer (or the actor) asses the theorecity, "the extent to which an 
actor is taken to be aware of what he is doing" (2001: 73). Dingwall argues 
"deviance involves not merely following the same rule, but also the observer's 
ability to conceive of the rule being followable in the situation in which it was 
not followed" (2001: 72). For a charge of deviance the actor must be seen as a 
theoretic actor. For example, it is unlikely that children would have 
49 Dingwall (2001: 72) uses the term ' c o n v e n t i o n a ~ ' . . By USing. this tenn, he is. drawing. on 
McHugh's work where McHugh refers to conventIOnal behavIOur as a behavIOur that IS out of 
line with the relevant conventions of some setting. Having followed McHugh's usage, 
Dingwall nevertheless suggests that using the tenn 'non-conventional' might avoid confusion. 
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responsibility imputed since they are not regarded as theoretic actors (2001: 
76). 
Dingwall argues that illness is behaviour that is non-conventional and therefore 
deviance; it is no less of a problem to the public moral order than any other 
form of deviance. However, illness is marked by a relatively low degree of 
theoreticity. Dingwall notes "the more an actor is held responsible, the more 
his condition will be regarded as intentionally provoked and deserving 
punishment rather than therapy" (2001: 75). Actors charged with deviance can 
therefore attempt to defeat the charge against them. In order to defeat the 
charge of deviance, theoreticity may be implied: Dingwall notes that "migraine 
sufferers tend to promote biochemical explanations for their disorder; 
associations of families with a schizophrenic member seek to discount 
explanations in terms of family disorder; and infertile persons argue that their 
inability to reproduce is due to force majeure rather than selfishness or sexual 
aberrance" (2001: 75). He then concludes that "illness is marked by a relatively 
low degree of theoreticity, but it may overlap with categories with a higher 
degree of theoreticity which set the tone for its treatment" (2001: 75). 
Accordingly, one might argue that infertility is marked by a higher degree of 
theoreticity, especially ifit is considered a 'choice' or a preventable condition. 
During the last decades, the numbers of infertile couples in the UK has been 
growing (as in the developed world more generally), mainly due to delayed 
childbearing by women who invest their younger years in education and career, 
and a higher prevalence of STDs and sperm pathology caused by 
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environmental hazards (Remennick, 2000). Many sources, including the HFEA 
fertility guide for patients, point out that female fertility declines sharply after 
the age of thirty-five. Accordingly, in vitro fertilisation (IVF) success rates 
decline with age and most clinics will not treat patients over forty-five. 50 The 
following extract from a news report contains a fertility expert's statement on 
the matter which exemplifies the information available to women who are 
considering trying to get pregnant: 
Almost all cases of infertility are preventable. Two of the main causes 
of infertility - age and sexually transmitted disease - could be avoided. 
This problem could be dealt with by women marrying early and having 
one partner. Women are non-monogamous. Frequently, they have more 
than one sexual partner. The assumption is that concentrating on a 
career and deferring embarking on a family is not going to have 
consequences, but it does. If we look back at what was going on 
previously, women were marrying earlier, having monogamous 
relationships and having children early ... Women will not like hearing 
it, but infertility is preventable and wise women would find a 
compromise between their career and having children earlier. . .It is my 
responsibility to say this. Society needs to be confronted with the fact 
that infertility is preventable. I don't mean to be rude but it is important 
that, if women make different life choices, they should be aware of the 
consequences. They always say 'it won't happen to me" but it does 
(Professor Gedis Grudzinskas, Director of the Bridge Centre, London in 
Templeton, 2003). 
Professor Grudzinskas notes that "women will not like hearing it, but infertility 
is preventable and wise women would find a compromise between their career 
and having children earlier". He also points out that another main cause for 
infertility, sexually transmitted disease, can be avoided. He considers infertility 
as a choice. In the same news report, the Child Infertility Support Network 
Scotland calls for the causes of infertility to be taught to schoolgirls: 
50 Male fertility also diminishes by a considerable degree with age: nevertheless it is generally 
women who are warned about the consequences of attempting to start a family late. 
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What we really need is to educate women to be aware that if they wait 
until they are in their late 30s to have their first child then they are 
putting themselves at risk of infertility. Previously, women would 
marry at 18 and have their first child immediately. There is now a new 
generation of women who could not imagine doing that. We cannot 
make people marry early and have children early, but we can make 
them realise the risks. We have got to start in schools. There is nothing 
we can do for the generation who are in their late 30s. We have got to 
educate schoolgirls to let them know that their fertility declines in their 
30s (Sheena Young, Director of business development, Child Infertility 
Support Network Scotland, in Templeton, 2003) 
Both extracts stress that, in most cases, infertility is preventable and women 
should be aware that by postponing having children they risk their chances. On 
these accounts, a majority of the interview participants are deviants. They are 
women whose infertility was caused by age; they could have avoided being 
infertile, but they did not. Drawing on Dingwall's analysis, I would suggest 
that infertility can be marked by different degrees of theoreticity depending on 
the status of the actor. For example, women who suffer from early menopause 
will be less theoretic actors than women whose infertility is caused by delayed 
childbearing. The latter are more theoretic actors as not only have they failed to 
meet the expectations of the society, but their infertility is perceived as of their 
own design. 
However, sufferers may attempt to defeat the charge against them: it is possible 
to observe such attempts in the account that follows. Fiona experienced early 
menopause, and she finds it unfair that she is not eligible to get free treatment 
from the NHS (because her husband has two children from a previous 
marriage, the couple have to pay for infertility treatment). In the following 
extract, Fiona claims that infertility is an illness that needs to be treated. 
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Comparing her condition to cancer, she stresses that her husband's parental 
status should not affect her access to free treatment: 
If I had cancer they wouldn't refuse me cancer treatment because of my 
husband. They would treat me and at the end of the day because what 
happened to me with an early menopause we need to have the infertility 
treatment. I haven't chosen put myself through this or put my husband 
through this. Sometimes it is harder for the husband as well (Fiona). 
[emphasis added] 
In the following extract, Tina, a more theoretic actor (like most of the 
participants), whose infertility is caused by age, explains that she is not infertile 
because she prioritised other achievements in life. She did not meet her partner 
until later in life and, furthermore, she did not know he was infertile: 
I think here it is hard to be different in any way ... IVF. Everytime I see 
it on the news, 'ah people are choosing to have their children later 
going through IVF'. It is not funny and it is bloody expensive, you 
didn't choose, that you just didn't meet your husband later on, and you 
didn't know he was gonna be sterile, did you? It wasn't even my fault 
they make it sound like it is a choice. It isn't. You would rather. .. I 
actually worked for my life never thinking the women who go through 
these. They are really strong trying 10 or more years ... working class 
women would not have the opportunity. You didn't choose it they make 
it sound like it is a choice, it isn't (Tina). [emphasis added] 
What is common to all the accounts in this study, including the ones quoted 
here, is that they involve self-defence. By pointing to the underlying, essential 
normality of their situation (e.g. having an early menopause, delaying 
childbearing), they attempt to defeat the charges of deviance (Dingwall, 200 1 ). 
All participants share the view that undergoing infertility treatment is not a 
'choice' involving 'fault'; they present their failing as being beyond their 
control. 
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A choice to reproduce: using donor gametes/embryos to 
conceive 
F or those who fail to conceIve naturally there are medical interventions 
available. A thriving infertility industry offers solutions to what used to be an 
'"indisputable sentence of Nature" (Remennick, 2000). If natural conception is 
not possible, donor gametes/embryos can be used and people who failed to 
reproduce without assistance can experience something close to biological 
parenthood. Donor conception therefore has the potential to satisfy a desire for 
a child, as well as the desire to appear normal. 
As the participant accounts indicate, using donor gametes/embryos to conceive 
can be perceived as a choice to reproduce, but one of a different kind. Strathem 
(1992) argues: 
Persons who otherwise did not have the choice now do have the choice 
to reproduce themselves, for now they possess access to the enabling 
technology. But the 'choice' to reproduce is like 'choice' for style: to 
not so desire is somehow to be less of a person. The assumption is that, 
given a chance, one will take it, part of the wider nexus of prescriptions 
that presents failure to exercise one's capacity for choice as failure of 
motivation ... [I]f one cannot reproduce one's genes, one can reproduce 
(be parent to) choice itself (1992: 177). 
The first choice of all would-be parents IS genetic parenthood. As one 
participant says: 
I am not choosing egg donation over my own children. If I could, I'd 
have my own children. I would, but you know ... (Fiona). 
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Rosie notes that no one would 'choose' having a genetically unrelated baby: 
it is not something that most people going through with a 100% 
conviction, and of course it is not the way I would have chosen to do 
things. Not many people would say I don't wanna have my own child, I 
want to sort of give birth to a child that is not actually mine. No one 
would choose that (Rosie). 
Rosie is sceptical about getting an egg donation because the resultant child will 
be her partner's child, but not her child: 
I had doubts fears and worries about the whole thing [ ... ] Originally I 
just thought that there is no way I could considering doing that. Even if 
it was an option, I just thought that I cant, I couldn't ... that it wouldn't 
be my child, and it would be my partner's child, but it wouldn't be 
mine. I thought I can't actually do that (Rosie). 
Fiona is still in the contemplation stages of receiving egg donation. She makes 
a distinction between having her own child and a child with a donated egg. She 
says that she "grieves,,51 for not being genetically linked to the resultant child. 
She adds that building her family using donated eggs is a "big loss" for her as 
she will not be able to pass on her genes. However, for her and her husband 
having a donor-conceived baby is the only alternative to childlessness: 
My husband, he wanted a child. I decided to just go on with it and if it 
felt ok. It has started to ... it still not the same you know, if somebody 
gave me option to have my own genetic child I would jump into chance 
[ ... ] I had and still have lots of grief about not having my own natural 
child. Even if egg donation worked we go on have a family that way 
there is still big loss for me about not passing on my genetics, not being 
actually physically related to this child, and I do struggle with that for a 
long time until it came down to you know, we will try this or we will 
remain childless for the rest of our lives (Fiona). 
51'Grief and 'loss' are rather common words that the participants use when they describe their 
feelings about the missing genetic linkage with the baby. W h e t ~ e r r t,he participants adopted this 
vocabulary of emotional responses from some form of counselhng IS unknown, 
211 
------------------
Fiona is dubious about how she will feel about the resultant baby and whether 
gestation will have a positive effect in terms of bonding. Despite her therapist's 
advice, she is not convinced that carrying the baby will be enough to establish 
a biological linkage: 
My therapist keeps saying, you are still a biological mum, the embryo 
cannot survive without your womb, your blood you give birth, you 
carry the baby. And I also spoke to a couple of other people who had 
children through donor eggs and they are always saying you really 
really don't feel any different about this child (Fiona). 
Becker (2000) notes that women who have gone through menopause 
prematurely, in their twenties or early thirties, or women in their forties and 
older, may be 'eager' to use donor eggs as it represents their only chance for a 
baby. She further suggests that women in their late thirties and early forties 
find it difficult to give up the idea of having a genetically related baby. Unlike 
Becker, with regards to their reaction to receiving eggs (or embryos in two 
cases), I found no clear-cut age categorisation among the women who 
participated in this study. Most of the participants in my study who considered 
donor eggs were over forty years old. Because age is a significant determinant 
of the effectiveness of treatment, they gave up using their own gametes after 
failed attempts in their early forties. One participant, who received embryo 
donation, was in her early forties and had a chance of using her own eggs to 
conceive. However, after a few failed attempts with IVF, she did not want to 
try to conceive with her own eggs any longer. She feared that the procedure 
would be time consuming, risking her chances of carrying a baby. The other 
participant, who was diagnosed with an unexplained infertility had tried several 
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treatments to achieve pregnancy, including ICSI and sperm and egg donation 
(and she also considered adoption), until she finally achieved pregnancy using 
donated embryos. She wanted to start a family as early as possible and, 
surprisingly, embryo donation turned out to be the quickest way. She says 
"believe or not it [embryo donation] ended up being a faster way of having a 
child" (Lindsay). Due to conditions such as premature ovarian failure and early 
menopause, two of the participants in their early thirties knew that they could 
not conceive using their own gametes even before seeking treatment. 52 One of 
them reported that she had no reservations about receiving donor eggs; the 
other expressed concerns. These findings indicate that, regardless of age, 
emotional responses to receiving gamete/embryo donation are personal, 
unpredictable, and variable. What is common to all the accounts, however, is 
that they involve self defence: using donor gametes/embryos is not a choice, it 
is deviance - no-one would choose it. 
The importance of a genetic link 
Using donor gametes/embryos to conceive is deviance because it departs from 
a powerful social norm. Strathern (1992) draws attention to the changing 
constructs of biological parenthood: 
[W]hat is 'biological' is no longer subsumed under the parent-child 
relationship itself, the flow of blood that was supposed to connect 
parents and child through the act of procreation. It is literally the 
donation of genes. Blood could be imaged as some kind of metaphor 
for a bond; like the act of procreation it worked as a trope for a 
52 One participant who was in a same sex relationship reported no problems with the idea of 
receiving donor sperm. 
213 
relationship between individuals, a symbol of a communicative event. 
Genes are the bits of information themselves (1992: 178). 
Reproductive technologies create new forms of connectedness with the 
resultant baby (a woman can bear a baby and give birth to a baby to whom she 
is not genetically related) but the availability of technology does not appear to 
change the participants' understanding of normal parenthood and kinship. For 
example, for Fiona, "passing genes" is one of the main reasons for wanting to 
have a baby. When they decided to have a baby, she and her husband wondered 
what a "mixture" of her and him would look like. Fiona's husband's sperm 
count had been decreasing sharply since they decided to have a baby. She notes 
that achieving pregnancy would have been easier using donated embryos, than 
using donor eggs and her husband's sperm. Nevertheless, she does not 
consider embryo donation as an option at all. In embryo or sperm donation, she 
explains, men do not make a biological contribution which turns them into a 
social father: 
No I don't think we could face that [embryo donation]. At least with the 
egg donation I get to play some part. With a sperm donor I think it turns 
the man into just like a social father, really, just somebody to bring the 
children up and he has very little part then my husband would have 
such ... such a little part (Fiona). 
She does not see a point of having a baby that is not related to her or to him. 
She wants to have at least one string of genetic connection with the resultant 
baby, even if it is from the father's side. She says that she "grieves" for the lack 
of physical resemblance; the baby will not look like her: 
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One of the reasons ... there is many reasons people want to have 
children one of the reasons when we first started that, either way we 
wanted to have a family was we wanted to see what a mixture of him 
and me looks like. And to carry a baby that isn't gonna look anything 
like me and it is just a mixture of him and somebody else that's quite 
difficult anyways. I feel almost jealous feelings about that in a way but 
if we were looking to do without him either, that's not something I 
cannot contemplate that would be just having a baby for the sake of it 
then and I don't think we can put ourselves through that. And my 
husband already have two children anyways. So I don't think it would 
be something he would like to do either (Fiona). 
Rachael and her husband have an adopted child. By adopting a child, the 
couple were not able to enjoy the ritual of having a biological baby. She 
expects that getting pregnant will enable her to "feel or - at least appear 
normal": 
To feel normal- or at least appear normal, to be able to join in all those 
stupid conversations at preschool re labour and delivery, breast feeding 
etc. to experience the pregnancy and birth to have a child that is ours 
and that we aren't expected or feel obliged to share with birth families, 
to be able to give my husband a child that he is genetically connected to 
(Rachael). 
As with Fiona, Rachael also says that it is important to "give" her husband a 
child to whom he is connected. Both Fiona and Rachael express the view that 
their partners would want to pass their genes on to the resultant child. 
Thompson (2005) argues: 
It is grammatically appropriate that men would be genetically 
essentialist when there is no gestational role available to them and when 
the only way to overcome their faulty contribution to the couple's 
reproduction is through the genetic route or through displacement by a 
donor (2005: 121). 
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Thompson also points out, however, that men tend to support their infertile 
wives when there is no male factor infertility, which indicates that men should 
not be seen as genetically essentialist. My observation is that all the would-be 
parents in this study, irrespective of gender, do value shared genetics. For 
example, three of the women, Tina, Fiona and Rachael, are already social 
parents. Tina and Fiona have stepchildren, and Rachael had adopted a child but 
she still wanted to have a child who is genetically related to her and her 
husband. She ended up receiving egg donation, which she does not see as 
entirely different from adoption. In the following extract from the interview, 
referring to the egg donor and the birth mother of her adopted child, she says 
"two people have already given me their babies". This suggests that she does 
not see the donor-conceived baby as hers: 
I have given up the idea of having a child that looks like me. The 
emotional aspects to me were dealt with when we opted to adopt. 
Although I am extremely grateful that a stranger has stepped forward 
and offered to donate for me, well, two people have already given me 
their babies! You can't top that (Rachael)! 
Rachael's husband, Mark, explains that they decided to obtain egg donation 
"because it was a logical step if Rachael wanted to be pregnant and give birth". 
He had his own reasons as well, such as passing on his genes and gaining 
autonomy: 
So I could see a bit of me in the child. So we wouldn't have to deal with 
the wants and all birth family. Two birth families is enough (Mark). 
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Defeating the charges of deviance: "it is absolutely like a biological baby" 
Earlier in this chapter, I argued that the accounts of the participants indicate 
that they consider themselves as deviant because they failed to reproduce 
naturally. But, if having a donor-conceived baby is deviant, how will would-be 
parents achieve normalcy using these means of conception, and how will they 
normalise their kinship with the resultant baby? 
Egg and embryo donation may be perceived as a 'compromise' to have a 
genetically- connected baby, however they do enable women to experience 
pregnancy. Lindsay who received embryo donation says that the pregnancy 
was wonderful, and she did not feel any different about the baby. She says:" I 
took the test and that was it. I had my baby in my uterus" (Lindsay). Janine, 
who was expecting twins, believed that pregnancy was crucial in establishing 
biological bonds: 
Of course you can't avoid bonding. It is absolutely like a biological 
baby, I talk to my baby pray for my baby, yeah. I have a doctor scanner 
I can hear the heartbeat it is lovely it is like a normal pregnancy. 
[ ... ]You have to take the medication, which, you know, is ok. Yeah, 
apart from that it is the same. The baby develops in the same way, your 
body changes in the same way, the baby develops in the same way, you 
have the same symptoms with everyone else ... so ... yeah (Janine). 
It seems then that the gestational linkage might, to a certain extent, compensate 
for the missing genetic linkage. Tina, who had embryo donation, thought that 
the baby did not actually belong to her and her husband: nevertheless, the baby 
was not an "alien" either: 
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I don '.t sort ~ f f ~ i t t and think of carrying an alien [ ... ] I think this is early 
adoptIon, thIS IS not actually biologically ours ... carrying, I think the 
bonus is there (Tina). 
Although Tina calls embryo donation "early adoption", her account goes on to 
suggest that she does not see her unborn baby as an adopted baby: her 
gestational contribution in the development of the donated embryo 
distinguishes the baby from an adopted one. In the following extract, Tina 
explains why she did not want to adopt a child. She thinks that if one lacks a 
biological connection with a baby, one will be less tolerant: "you are more 
likely to lose your temper." Tina also thinks that giving unconditional love to 
an adopted baby is hard: 
Weare too old, he [her husband] has got children and we didn't want a 
damaged child unfortunately because they take so long for them to get 
adopted and usually you get a 6 year old with problems. I did actually 
work in a children's home for a year and I know what they are like, so I 
might have but my husband definitely wouldn't be interested in that 
[ ... ] I think you are more patient when it is your own children, you 
have a newborn, I think. If somebody hands you a 6 year old and it 
starts screaming out loud, I don't think you are gonna have that 
unconditional love for it, put up with it. You are more likely to lose 
your temper. I do think you are less tolerant because you lack that 
connection. I wonder when somebody hands you screaming 3 old, and 
watching you under microscope see how you are doing, it is awful 
(Tina). 
Tina's account suggests that biological connectedness is all that is needed for 
there to be unconditional love for a baby. Dingwall et al. (1995) refer to what 
Tina calls unconditional love as 'natural love'. They argue that it is assumed 
that all parents love their children as a fact of nature. Parental love is thought to 
be an instinctual phenomenon grounded in human nature to such an extent that 
it becomes very difficult to read evidence in a manner inconsistent with this 
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assumption. In child abuse cases, where the natural parents are suspects, "the 
challenge amounts to an allegation that deviant parents do not share a common 
humanity with the rest of us" (1995: 87), because they are deficient in natural 
love. Couples receiving donor gametes/embryos may also be seen as 
potentially deficient in natural love for their donor-conceived child. The 
participants in this study seek to sustain their normalcy by asserting other 
interpretations of their situation which deny its undesirability and legitimate 
any suffering on their part (Voysey Paun, 2006). The participants are 
constrained to present their kinship with the donor-conceived baby in such a 
way that "they appear to be fulfilling the demands of normal parenthood" 
(2006: 2). Tina's account, for example, denies charges of deviance and 
deficiency: although the baby is not biologically theirs, they will love it as their 
biological baby because gestational pregnancy compensates for the missing 
genetic link and naturalises the kinship. 
Thompson (2005) has argued that the understanding that blood relations 
usually reflect the genetic relationship had changed by the end of the twentieth 
century: 
As a result of donor-egg in vitro fertilization and gestational surrogacy, 
the overlapping biological idioms of shared bodily substance and genes 
come apart. The maternal genetic material, including the determinants 
of the fetus's blood type and characteristics, is contributed by the egg, 
which is derived from the ovaries of one woman. Nonetheless, the 
embryo grows in and out of the substance of another woman's body; 
the fetus is fed by and takes form from the gestational woman's blood, 
oxygen, and placenta. It is not unreasonable to accord the gestating 
mother a biological claim to motherhood. Indeed, some have suggested 
that shared substance is a much more intimate biological connection 
than shared genetics and is more uniquely characteristic of motherhood, 
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as genes are shared between many different kinds of relations (2005: 
149-150). 
Thompson's observations apply to my findings: a majority of the women in 
this study received egg or embryo donation so that they could have a biological 
claim to motherhood. This would not have been possible if they adopted a child 
(some of these participants had adopted children, or considered adoption before 
or after having a donor-conceived baby). For a majority, one of the reasons for 
receiving gamete or embryo donation was to make a gestational contribution to 
reproduction by 'shared blood' through pregnancy and child-birth. However, 
despite the growing understanding of the importance of the uterine 
environment in influencing gene expression,53 none of the participants 
commented on this potential influence. In other words, none of the participants 
expressed the view that these babies actually would be genetically different 
from how they would have been had they been carried to term in the donor's 
uterus. In other words, although the participants perceive using donor 
gametes/embryos as an approximation to genetic parenthood that enables them 
to experience pregnancy and child-birth, they do not perceive a genetic claim 
to parenthood. 
53 Recent research shows that gestation does influence the genetic make-up of an embryo and 
foetus. Epigenetics is relevant when considering the influence of the birth mother on the 
genetic make-up of a resultant child. Epigenetics refers to "all modifications to. genes other 
than changes in the DNA sequence itself' (Downer, 2002). Genes can express In a number of 
different ways depending upon the environment. Hence embryonic and foetal development is 
an extremely dynamic process: "[I]t is not simply determined by the genotype, and so does not 
occur solely in the form of an encapsulated, hardwired developmental "programme:' .. Instead, 
the developmental programme can be influenced by a range of e m l r o n m ~ n t a l l c,?ndltlOns and 
thcse interactions can havc long-term consequences for later health and disease (Gluckman 
and Hanson, 2005: 58). 
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Conclusion 
Having failed to reproduce naturally, the participants in this study experienced 
stigma and isolation. They failed themselves and failed to meet the 
expectations of the social category to which they belonged. Infertility increases 
with age: for a majority of the participants, their infertility is marked by high 
level of theorecity - it is perceived as their own design. Arguably, the 
availability of reproductive technologies increases the level of theorecity 
ascribed to those who cannot conceive naturally: as noted earlier, Strathern has 
argued that "given a chance, one will take it, part of the wider nexus of 
prescriptions that presents failure to exercise one's capacity for choice as 
failure of motivation" (1992: 177). On the one hand, the participants in this 
study wanted to become normal: they therefore chose this alternative route to 
parenthood. On the other hand, however, by doing so they departed from the 
social norm: using donor gametes/embryos may be as close an approximation 
to genetic parenthood as possible (Strathern, 1992), nevertheless it does not 
constitute an equivalent alternative for those for whom genetic relatedness to 
their children is of great importance. (Elsner, 2006): "A woman who has a 
child as a result of egg donation from another woman cannot have her own in 
the sense of her own genetically related child" (Chadwick, 1992: xvi). 
The participant accounts indicate that a donor-conceived baby is perceived as 
different from a natural one. Although it is not always evident in the terms they 
use, the participants distinguish shared genetics from shared blood: to them 
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genetic-relatedness means passing one's genes to one's offspring. For example, 
while referring to having a baby, they distinguish a naturally-conceived child 
from a donor offspring by using certain expressions indicating the nature of full 
genetic linkage ("real baby", "real mummy", "a child of my own", etc.). 
The participants who were still undergoing treatment were uncertain about 
kinship with a potential baby. They reported that they could not overcome their 
"grief' about not having a baby of their own. In other words, their accounts 
indicated that having a donor-conceived baby might not qualify them as 
'normal' parents. Conversely, the pregnant participants reported that, despite 
their use of donor gametes, the pregnancy, the baby, and their feelings about 
the baby were 'normal'. Although shared blood was not seen to be as powerful 
as shared genetics in building biological linkage, they reported that the natural 
flow of pregnancy seemed to help with bonding with the baby and feeling the 
same as everyone else. Voysey has argued that in drawing upon everyday 
understandings of normal family practices, parents are drawing upon 
ideological prescriptions. Accordingly, what the would-be parents in my study 
say tells us not only how it is to be a donor-conception family, it also presents 
socially constructed accounts of 'normal parenting'. The difference between 
the accounts of non-pregnant and pregnant participants is evident. While non-
pregnant participants reflect on having doubts about bonding with a donor-
conceived child and 'grief for not being able to have their own child, the 
pregnant participants attempt to normalise their relationship with the unborn 
baby: the baby is not different from other babies. These participant accounts 
should be read by taking into consideration the fact that moral expectations 
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about motherhood might not be easily dismissed by would-be parents. Voysey 
argues that: "parents say what they say because the alternative is not to be 
regarded as parents at all", and "in our society this is more or less equivalent to 
not being regarded as a competent person" (2006: 54-55). The ways in which 
the would-be parents seek to restore being a normal family tells us "both about 
its moral force and about the kinds of accounts that are honoured in our 
society" (Dingwall, 2001: 58). 
Although I am not able to evaluate to what extent the pregnant participants 
were emotionally or physically satisfied, gestational pregnancy - in one 
participant's words - enables them to "feel normal or at least appear normal". 
Donor conception makes it possible for would-be parents to enjoy the cultural 
and social practices of gestation: having a 'bump', carrying the baby and 
feeling the movements of it, monitoring foetal development through scans, 
sharing these images with friends and family and, finally, going in labour. To 
the participants in this study, the bump is a visible sign of normalcy; it may 
drive the would-be parents' and their social network's attention to the ends of 
conception, rather than the means of it. Having coped with the anomaly that 
infertility evokes, would-be parents may find comfort in the 'ordinariness' of 
pregnancy and childbirth. The child who is born as a result of these 
arrangements might be perceived as one's own child, even if s/he is genetically 
related to another person(s). Donor conception then cannot promise to satisfy a 
desire for a genetically-related child but it has the potential to satisfy a socially-
induced desire that presumably all would-be parents have: that is, the desire to 
appear as a 'normal family'. 
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Ultimately, the interviews were guided by one main question: why did not 
would-be parents press claims against the removal of donor anonymity? The 
interview accounts show that to understand this reticence, we need to 
understand deviance and stigma. It seems that the voices of would-be parents 
are suppressed because of the potential stigma which is actually underlined by 
the new law. The following chapter deals with how participants control stigma 
about donor conception in their daily lives and how the current law compounds 
stigma by obliging them to display their potentially stigmatising condition. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 'PASSING' AS 'NORMALS': 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
At the beginning of this thesis I argued that the silence of would-be parents in 
the public realm does not mean that they do not view the removal of donor 
anonymity as a social problem. The fact that infertility is viewed as 
stigmatising may affect how comfortable would-be parents are about disclosing 
their use of a donor to their children or their social contacts, or pressing claims 
publicly against the legal imposition of disclosure. In this chapter, as in 
Chapter Six, I use Goffman's Stigma (1963) theory. Here I focus on disclosure, 
examining the ways in which participants control the information which they 
perceive as potentially stigmatising in interaction with others and the resultant 
child, and how the new law disrupts their coping strategies. 
Both failing to reproduce and using donor gametes/embryos to conceive made 
participants feel different from normal parents and constituted a charge of 
deviance. Goffman notes "even where an individual has quite abnormal 
feelings and beliefs, he is likely to have quite normal concerns and employ 
quite normal strategies in attempting to conceal these abnormalities from 
others" (1963: 156). He goes on to argue: 
Stigma involves not so much a set of concrete individuals who can be 
separated into two piles, the stigmatized and the normal, as a pervasive 
two-role social in which every individual participates in both roles at 
least in some connexions and in some phases of life. The normal and 
the stigmatized are not persons but rather perspectives (1963: 163-64). 
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As I showed in Chapter Six, whilst participants who were undergoing treatment 
were negative about having a genetically unrelated baby, the pregnant 
participants noted that gestational pregnancy, and 'shared blood', had potential 
to make this new form of connectedness 'normal' to them. In other words, 
although having a donor-conceived child may invoke abnormality, pregnancy 
and child-birth may help bonding with the baby and, more importantly, the 
resultant baby will appear 'ordinary' to outsiders. Participants may, then use 
passing strategies to conceal the infertility treatment and the child's origins, 
because as long as donor involvement in conception is concealed, there is 
nothing that marks out a donor-conceived baby from any other. As long as they 
can control information about their infertility and/or donor conception they are, 
in Goffman's words, 'discreditable', but not 'discredited'. Clearly however the 
legal imposition of disclosure would force the participants to display their 
deviance. 
'Passing': disclosing infertility and infertility treatment 
Goffman distinguishes the stigma of the 'discredited' from that of the 
'discreditable'. The discredited person's failure might be quite evident (like a 
scar on the face), and known to others before they contact him or her. When 
the stigmatised person is not discredited but discreditable, the differentness of 
the person is neither immediately apparent nor known beforehand to others. 
The stigma experienced by the participants in this study falls into the category 
of a discreditable stigma. 
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Goffman notes that there are some stigmas that are so easily concealed that 
they have very little effect on the individual's relations to strangers: such 
stigmata have their effects chiefly upon intimates. Given that infertility itself is 
not a visible 'failing', the evident part that can be known to others is the 
bearer's (involuntary) childlessness. Accordingly, the issue is not that of 
managing tension generated during social contacts, but rather that of managing 
information about one's infertility: "to display or not to display; to tell or not to 
tell; to let on or not to let on·, to lie or not to lie and in each case to whom how , , 
when and where" (1963: 57). Goffman defines the management of undisclosed 
discreditable information about the self as 'passing'. 54 
The need to appear normal and to manage stigmatising information are not 
idiosyncratic needs but the foundations of everyday life. Few people are totally 
without discrediting attributes. In fact, normal and stigmatised can play each 
other's roles: 
One can assume that the stigmatized and the normal have the same 
mental make-up, and that is necessarily is the standard one in our 
society; he who can play one of those roles, then has exactly the 
required equipment for playing out the other, and in fact in regard to the 
stigma or another is likely to have developed some experience in doing 
so (1963: 156). 
54 It is worth noting that Goffman's work has been criticised on a range of grounds. Some argue that it 
does not offer the "possibility of any serious attempt by stigmatized individuals to destigmatize 
themselves" (Gussow and Tracy, 1968: 317). In fact, Goffman touches on destigmatisation, where he 
discusses 'passing' strategies. Secondly, it has been argued that his theory does not tell.us much about 
how individuals mediate the stigma depending on their social class, gender and age (Mlall, 1986). But 
Goffman does not deny the impact of social structure on stigma management; rather he uses a more 
inclusive term, 'social identity', to cover all social attributes. The fact that his theory "assumes a self-
determining, autonomous individual with choices, and a ~ a s s s society that allows for privacy" (Miall 
1986, p. 1 13) was however rightly found to be problematIC by some authors W!10. could not apply.the . 
theory in different cultures, in particular in the Asian context. Nevertheless, thIs IS not a problem III thIS 
study, which presents the accounts of a Western populatIOn. 
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Goffman notes that because stigma management is a general feature of the 
society, and the normal and the stigmatised are parts of the same complex, the 
stigmatised person can be called a 'normal deviant', rather than a 'deviant'. 
The participants in this study are able to play both parts in the "normal-deviant 
drama" (1963: 159). They employ various strategies to control information 
about their infertility and infertility treatment. Fiona, for example, would have 
preferred not to tell anyone about her infertility, particularly about donor 
conception, but people started to figure out that the couple were receiving help 
to conceive: 
I have only told two friends. And I told nobody in my family. There are 
few people in my family that know that we are having fertility 
treatment just simply because, you know, they grown tired after eight 
years of asking when we're gonna have a family ... And we got to the 
stage where they can see we are hurt every time they ask, or you know, 
sometimes we don't answer or. .. not that easy and that sort of saying it 
and they know about the miscarriages we had as well, so, my family 
has kind of gathered that we are having treatment. But I never actually 
said, yes we are having treatment ... so my family don't know and I have 
only told a couple of friends (Fiona). 
Goffman notes that, in passing, one strategy available to discreditable person is 
"handling his risks by dividing the world into a large group to whom he tells 
nothing, and a small group to whom he tells and upon whose help he then 
relies" (1963: 117). Rachael' s account is a good example of the type of 
information-control that Goffman outlines. Rachael did not expect to find 
support from most people about her infertility treatment. She thought that 
people would be interested in the treatment merely in a negative way: "people 
gossip, people are nosey, and few are interested in a caring supportive way." 
Moreover, she and her husband were surrounded by "fertile myrtles", people 
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who easily achieved pregnancy without getting any medical help. Rachael and 
her husband thought that those who had conceived naturally would not 
understand what they had been going through. They handled the risks to which 
they felt exposed by dividing their social network into two: a small group of 
people who would be supportive and helpful were told about the treatment, 
whereas a large group of people who would be critical were not told: 
We hide it from everyone apart from my parents and one couple who 
are our support. Because we are surrounded by fertile myrtles who 
think trying for three months is infertility! People gossip, people are 
nosey, and few are interested in a caring supportive way. People don't 
announce "we had sex on Tuesday night and believe we have conceived 
our future son or daughter" so why should they know when retrieval or 
transfer is? (Rachael). 
Rosie disclosed her treatment to individuals who had similar experiences: 
It [disclosing] was very hard with friends who were pregnant etc. 
Actually I found it not really helpful to tell people ... I told some 
people who either had been treated something similar or been through 
or experiencing infertility or have experienced ... for other people it is 
just...there is nothing really for them to say (Rosie). 
Goffman suggests that a strategy of those who pass is "to present the signs of 
their stigmatised failing as signs of another attribute, one that is less 
significantly a stigma" (1963: 117). For example, men may have concerns that 
the acknowledgement of infertility would cause their masculinity to come 
under suspicion, and ask their partners to conceal their condition. Such concern 
is rooted in experience of stigma (Nachtigall, 1993). Despite the high incidence 
of male infertility "the condition is invariably cast as a female problem that 
requires medical intervention" (Storrow, 2006: 398). Miall (1986) argues that 
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although physically infertile women feel more stigmatised, physically fertile 
women manage infonnation more actively to protect their husbands from the 
stigma associated with sexual dysfunction. It is possible then through 
infonnation control that a couple would reconstruct their narratives about 
treatment according to what they believe to be more socially acceptable. The 
following account exemplifies this strategy. Liz's husband has azoospennia. 
Being worried about how people will react to her husband's condition, when 
she is questioned about her childlessness she conceals the fact that they are 
suffering from male factor infertility: 
We have not told our friends. I am more than happy to tell my friends it 
is my fault we cannot conceive, which we have done. It's far easier for 
them to think I have the problem rather than my husband, in a way I 
suppose to protect his feelings. It always seems far more acceptable for 
it to be the female problems rather than the males when in fact its more 
like a 50/50 split (Liz). 
Goffman notes that another passIng strategy IS that the individual "can 
voluntarily disclose himself, thereby radically transfonning his situation from 
that of an individual with infonnation to manage to that of an individual with 
uneasy social situations to manage, from that of a discreditable one to that of a 
discredited one" (1963: 123). Darren's account exemplifies something akin to 
this. Darren and his wife could not conceive due to male factor infertility 
(azoospennia). He had always thought that there was stigma attached to 
infertility, and when he found out about his condition he did not want to talk 
about it. While surfing on the Internet to find infonnation about the condition, 
he came across the Repromed message boards. After joining Repromed, he 
started feeling more open about talking about his condition and treatment. On 
reflection, he says that he overcame negative feelings about his infertility by 
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being extremely open about it; in fact, he went, he says, "over the top being 
open about it". Sharing the details of the treatment with people made him feel 
'normal', almost 'proud' that he and his wife had a problem. He notes that by 
talking, he tried to prove to himself, rather than to anyone else, that infertility 
was not something to be ashamed of. Darren's description of his motives is a 
good example of what Goffman refers to as "being ashamed to be ashamed" 
(1963: 155): 
I suppose, maybe because I was worried that it [infertility] might 
happen to me, that I might feel others thought that about me, perhaps its 
because I wanted it not to be like that, I have almost gone over the top 
being open about it so that people see me as not feeling that 1 should be 
stigmatised. I felt normal, almost proud of that we had a problem in a 
while. Maybe I am trying to be more open to justify to myself that there 
is no reason to be embarrassed about it (Darren). 
Darren argues that, although infertility is fairly common, people do not talk 
about it. It was not until he talked about his condition that his friends came 
forward with similar stories: 
One in six couples have problem in conceiving and not necessarily all 
of those seek treatment, but lets say one in ten, you still expect to know 
somebody that either have treatment, or know somebody that knew 
somebody who had treatment. Now, of course I discovered now 
through being more open. The more 1 talk about it with friends and 
colleagues, the more they are likely to come back with a story about it. 
But otherwise I would never heard about it unless 1 said about my 
treatment [ ... ]1 think it is because it is very intimate (Darren). 
Would-be parents who are going through treatment need to pass, not only 
socially, but also 'biologically' (Thompson, 2005). By passing biologically, 1 
mean achieving success in conceiving using infertility treatment. Many 
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participants in this study who had failed cycles and miscarriages reflected on 
the emotional cost of not being successful in achieving pregnancy. 
It is really really hard when you are going through it because on the one 
hand, you hope there is a child. On the other hand, you know that every 
time you try again it is such an emotional rollercoaster hard to know 
that you are going to put yourself through something that is gonna be so 
painful and so emotional and ... it is really really hard to ... I didn't 
really want to do it again but then you know I had to ... I had to give a 
one more try . The more times I did it [having IVF cycles using donated 
eggs] I think the less people I wanted to know. I didn't find it 
[disclosing] helpful and, and it was a strain having everyone asking me 
"how is it going?", "what's happened?", "did it work?" You know, that 
was really hard (Rosie). 
Another participant, Darren argues that talking about infertility treatment is 
'embarrassing': "everybody knows that you are trying to conceive and there is 
a lot of expectation on you." Embarrassment has to do with unfulfilled 
expectations (Goffman, 1956). It occurs whenever "some central assumption in 
a transaction has been unexpectedly and unqualifiedly discredited for at least 
one participant" (Gross and Stone, 1964: 2). Darren notes that if one tells that 
one is getting treatment, one has to deal with intimate questions as to whether it 
worked: "in fear of having to tell somebody that 'no, it hasn't worked"', he did 
not tell many people about his condition in the earlier stages of the treatment: 
There is definitely I think people feel that there is something to hide 
about infertility and it is embarrassing to talk about it and it is personal. 
One of the things that I suppose if you compare people having fertility 
treatment with people conceiving a child in usual way, many many 
couples wouldn't tell anyone else that they are trying to conceive 
whereas if you are going through fertility treatment everybody knows 
that you are trying to conceive and there is a lot of expectation on you. 
We were very lucky and our treatment worked first time but as you 
know from reading the forum [Repromed's discussion forum] it is not 
always the way. People have four-five treatments before conceiving and 
then I guess there is a lot of ... a lot of people know about it. Then there 
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is a lot of people that you have to tell when it hasn't work and so maybe 
that's one of the reasons why people keep things more private I think. 
Certainly the reason, one of the reasons that we thought about keeping 
sort of quiet about it early on, and certainly one of the reasons why I 
didn't tell people at work early on I told important people that I needed 
to tell like management at work so that I could take time off to go for 
the treatment but otherwise I only told one very close colleague and a 
few friends. That was it. [ ... ]1 guess people ... yeah that might be one of 
the reasons because of that fear of having to tell somebody that no, it 
hasn't worked whilst you wouldn't have that if you were conceiving 
normally, you wouldn't be ringing everybody every month, oh we tried 
again .. .it would be almost a not normal thing to do perhaps (Darren). 
Another participant, Bette, who is in a same- sex relationship, achieved 
pregnancy using donor sperm. Bette notes that she wants to wait for a while 
before telling people for the same reasons as Darren: if the pregnancy fails she 
does not want anyone to know that she has been trying to get pregnant but it 
has not worked. It is worth noting that this is not an uncommon feeling among 
people who try to conceive naturally. However, a person who receives medical 
help to achieve pregnancy might feel that her or his attempt raises more 
curiosity than anyone else's, as it represents a challenge against nature. Also, 
failing to conceive despite medical help might be even more embarrassing than 
infertility itself: 
You try not to say because it is so because when you have to say that it 
hasn't worked that's not nice but ehm .. but our family knows, and close 
friends know.[ ... ] I am just a little bit pregnant .. .It is all that .. .If it 
worked, that's fine, then I would be willing to talk about it. But if it 
doesn't then I wouldn't want people to know that I have been trying it 
and it didn't work (Bette). 
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Disclosing having a donor-conceived baby to others: having a 
'sort of a monster' 
Public attitudes toward donor conception (using donor sperm in particular) 
suggest that approval for third-party involvement is lower than for adoption or 
other reproductive technologies (Klock, 1993). As others have noted, 
reproductive technologies embody a tension between that which is constructed 
as natural (reproduction) and that which is rational (technology). Throsby 
(2004) for example argues: 
This tension finds an uneasy resolution in the notion of "giving nature 
a helping hand" as long as the final outcome is a baby. The gametes, the 
end product and the desire for a child are still understood as "natural", 
and the use of the technology to facilitate this outcome is rendered 
invisible once the child is born, since there is nothing to mark an IVF 
baby out from any other (2004: 54). 
In contrast to traditional IVF (using the couple's own gametes), when medical 
intervention goes further than 'giving nature a helping hand' and donor 
gametes get involved, would-be parents may have to deal with two issues. 
First, as I have shown in Chapter Six, they have to come to terms with not 
being genetically connected to the resultant baby. Secondly, they have to 
consider whether the information about child's origins should be revealed. In 
earlier studies on disclosure, it has been argued that privacy about the 
conception allows both the child and parents to be protected from any negative 
societal attitudes, and prevents the family from being treated differently 
(Nachtigall et al., 1997), and also that both of these concerns are rooted in the 
experience of stigma (Nachtigall, 1993). As I showed in Chapter Six, all of the 
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participants valued having a genetically connected baby and some participants 
reported being uncertain about their kinship with a donor-conceived baby. If a 
person is uncertain about having a donor-conceived child, disclosing 
information about the donor conception to others could be problematic -
would-be parents may fear that the baby will be marked out if his/her donor 
origin is known. 
Having a donor-conceived child constitutes a permanent charge of deviance 
against the family. There are two charges of deviance: first, the selfishness of 
the would-be parents, who engage in 'manufacturing' a baby, and second, the 
donor-conceived child itself is deviant - it might be perceived as not quite 
human. If information is revealed about the origins of the child, the parents 
might have to manage the tension around the child's unnatural means of 
conception. But, unless the child's origin is known, there is nothing that marks 
out a donor-conceived baby from any other, and both the baby and the parents 
can 'pass'. By disclosure, the 'subnormality' (Voysey Paun, 2006) of the 
resultant child may become evident. The participants in this study may 
therefore try to hide the origins of the donor-conceived child, not only from 
others but also from the child him- or herself. 
Using donor eggs to conceive, Rosie found it very hard "not to tell" about her 
treatment, because she enjoyed being open about everything else in her life. 
However, after disclosure, she did not find people's reactions to be helpful. 
Both Rosie's parents and her partner's found donor conception difficult to 
understand. They dealt with the situation by avoiding the subject: 
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I am quite an open person so I don't really like to have to hide things 
because I find it more stressful than tell people but it is very hard 
because of some people's reaction. Even talking about just going 
through ordinary IVF. Some people for example my mother or my 
partner's parents they find it very difficult to understand and they think 
the best thing is not to talk about it, not to bring it up whereas to me 
that's actually worse than if you .. .if you say something or if you say 
you are going through something and they say, oh nevermind, lets talk 
about something else (Rosie). 
The fear of being marginalised may lead would-be parents to be more cautious 
about telling people about their treatment. Fiona did not want to tell people that 
she was using donated eggs to conceive because she thought that people would 
mark out the baby. Fiona comments on the widespread beliefs that, first, 
kinship is biological and, second, family members should resemble each other. 
Of course, identifying whether a baby resembles its parents rests on a particular 
kind of circular reasoning: there is a genetic link between parent and child, 
therefore the child should resemble the parents (Becker, 2000). If the observer 
knew that the child was donor conceived, he or she might claim to see no 
resemblance. For Fiona, having her child subjected to such an examination 
would generate a great deal of discomfort. She perceives donor conception as a 
taboo subject, and she fears that people might ridicule her and mark her child 
out as the "donor baby": 
Because it is still a subject of quite taboo I think in the society. It is not 
a subject that people talk about and I should imagine of people I know 
here on the Island [ ... ] It is all silly little worries and fears like that and 
even things like if we do manage to have a baby you know, I am 
already worrying about the comments that you get from the people ... 
"oh doesn't she look like you" that would really upset me because I 
know the baby wouldn't. But then if people say "oh she doesn't look 
like a bit like you" that's gonna upset me as well. It so feels like a no 
win situation ... well I think when people say those things, they, people 
just see what they want to see with babies as well they are desperate to 
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see so .. .1 think that's one of the reasons as well .. .it is a petty reason I 
know, but that's one of the reasons that I want to keep it as a secret. 
B e ~ a u s e e you know, I don't want people to go on like 'alright yeah, 
alnght yeah .. jt is the donor baby, isn't it?' (Fiona). [emphasis added] 
The attitudes of friends and family can trigger negative thoughts about 
treatment. For example, Rosie says that she was really hurt when a friend 
accused her of creating a "monster" and being "selfish" for wanting a baby. 
Already being cynical about the treatment, her friend's reaction led Rosie to 
question her decision to receive egg donation: 
That was really hard and then when I came to make the decision to go 
for the donor egg. I had a very difficult experience with a ... more than 
close friend of mine for many years. When I told her I was considering, 
she had a very very negative reaction to it and said that that I was 
incredibly selfish to do that, despite the fact that she has three 
children ... and she said it was selfish because I was going to kind of 
create this sort of monster that wasn't even my child and 
yeah ... Rather than she was wondering why I didn't adopt because there 
is always children out there and I was just selfish for saying I wanted to 
have a baby and how could I do this ... it was very very it was yeah very 
strong reaction [ ... ] She was also saying, well you don't need to have a 
child to fulfil yourself and you know, again it was sort of easy for her to 
say that and she said ... she had a very negative reaction I think kind of 
morally and everything about it so that's been very hard because we are 
not ... yeah I don't really feel the same about her after we sort of made it 
up. It was really really emotional but I couldn't really accept her 
attitude. She is an intelligent person. She knew, she thought it was 
more wrong than doing IVF because it wasn't going to be even my 
genes it was another woman, and I was creating a thing ... who knows 
what it will be like and on top of that it was selfish because I was 
doing it just because I wanted the baby. And I asked her why, did you 
have children, you didn't do for the sake of the children, you knew that 
it was for yourself and your husband you wanted to do it. ... she said 
yes it is different, because it is a natural instinct to want to pass on 
your genes and you are gonna have a baby that isn't even yours 
(Rosie). [emphasis added] 
Rosie's friend's reaction is a vivid example of a genetically essentialist view. 
Rosie states that her friend thought donor conception was wrong because the 
child would not be genetically linked to Rosie. According to Rosie's friend, 
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reproduction is motivated by one's natural instinct to pass on one's genes. It 
may therefore be acceptable to give nature 'a hand' as long as the medical 
intervention does not go too far. Donor conception is, however, "more wrong 
than IVF" because it is a major intervention in nature. This sort of opposition 
to gamete donation is not uncommon. Chadwick (1992) for example has 
argued that avoidance of doubt over one's genetic origins is hugely important. 
She emphasises that "when one does not know where 50 per cent of one's 
genes come from, it can cause unhappiness" (1992: 126). According to 
Chadwick, this unhappiness is so serious that "we must be cautious about 
producing a situation where children feel they do not really belong anywhere, 
because their genetic history is confused" (1992: 39). Chadwick goes on to 
argue that since not all desires for a child can be satisfied, some form of 
selection must be operated and she concludes: 
It seems wise to restrict artificial reproduction to methods that do not 
involve donation of genetic material. This rules out AID, egg donation, 
embryo donation and partial surrogacy (1992: 39). 
Rosie's friend refers to donor-conceived baby as a "sort of a monster". This 
invokes Dr. Frankenstein and his Monster, an attitude of fear toward 
reproductive technologies. Frankenstein stands as "a warning of the dangers 
inherent in scientists' ruthless and unending pursuit of knowledge" (Mulkay, 
1997: 116-117). 
Rosie's friend thought that Rosie was "creating a thing, who knows what it will 
be like" (given that the baby would carry someone else's genes), and that it 
was "selfish" to make a baby for the sake of it. The would-be parents in my 
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study were familiar with representations of donor-conceived babies as 
'manufactured'. For example, the mother of another participant, Tina, advised 
her to stop trying as she was opposed to the embryo donation process, which 
she called "buying a baby". An American theologian, Professor Paul Ramsey, 
expresses the view that acceptance of IVF inevitably leads to acceptance of the 
notion of "manufacturing": 
I'd rather every child to be born illegitimate than for one to be 
manufactured .... Already women think of themselves as machines of 
reproduction. Look at the ease with which young girls have abortions, 
so sure that they can have another child any time when they want. And 
now women are selling their bodies for nine months and people are 
talking about freezing fertilized eggs. Pretty soon, a woman will be able 
to go to the supermarket and pick out an embryo (Ramsey, 1980, 
quoted in Newton, 1983: 85). 
In the extract above, a few themes invoke Huxley's Brave New World: 
manufacturing babies, machines of reproduction, going to a supermarket and 
picking up embryos. 
Ramsey is American, but in the UK as well people who oppose embryo 
research have openly used elements taken from science fiction or dystopias 
(Mulkay, 1997: 123). Edwards (the test-tube baby pioneer) notes that science 
fiction such as Brave New World has had a negative impact on the public 
debate on reproductive technologies. 
The trouble really started way back in the 1930s, by courtesy of the 
brilliant Aldous Huxley. In his novel Brave New World ... Admittedly 
some of Huxley's notions have come true. Fifty ova can now be 
collected from a human ovary. This is a modest figure compared with 
his thousands, yet his ideas still grip prophets of doom more than any 
other science fiction, as the numbers of human embryos growing in 
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v ~ t r o o rise year by year, and as his fellow writers whip up forebodings 
dIre enough to alarm even the most phlegmatic science watcher 
(Mulkay, 1997: 120). 
Disclosing to the child 
As I showed in Chapter Three, during the donor anonymity debate there was a 
focus on conflicting rights between the resultant child and the would-be 
parents. By removing donor anonymity the UK government decided that the 
child's right to know should be championed at any cost, rather than weighed 
against the competing interests of would-be parents. The government 
considered registering 'by donor' on birth certificates of donor-conceived 
children to force parents to disclose to the child: the current regulations do not 
provide for this (although the matter has been kept under review), 
Nevertheless, as highlighted in Chapter Three, the regulations have placed 
increased pressure on would-be parents and donor-conception families, thereby 
creating tension for them. The HFEA advises would-be parents: 
It is certainly best to be open with your child/children about the 
circumstances of their conception. Secrecy on this subject isn't in their 
interests and they will have a right to find out about their origins from 
our register when they reach 18. There is evidence that finding out 
suddenly, later in life, about donor origins can be emotionally 
damaging to children and family relations. So it is in your 
child/children's best interest to tell them early in childhood. It is vital 
that your child hears about their donor from you and not from other 
people (HFEA, 2008c [emphasis added]). 
During the donor anonymity debate, parents who intended to keep donor 
conception a secret were accused of violating moral standards. As I pointed out 
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in Chapter Three, Baroness Warnock's speech in the House of Lords during the 
debate on the new regulations could be said to exemplify this view: "it is 
deeply morally wrong to pretend that a child is the son or daughter of a 
father or mother who is not his or her real biological parent. To insist on 
pretending shows self-interest on the part of the parents-that they are 
interested in their own status, not that of the child ... To treat a child as though 
it were a toy or a pet-to suggest that it does not particularly matter where it 
came from because it is your child-is genuinely immoral" (HL Deb, 2003-
04b), emphasis added). It seems that both the HFEA and Baroness Warnock 
are warning parents against non-disclosure. Some parents' inclination towards 
secrecy is condemned: disclosure is considered to be in best interests of the 
child. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the participants' understandings of welfare 
and kinship are different from those of the policy makers. 
It seems to me that Goffman' s observations help to explain the dilemma that 
would-be parents have about disclosing to the child: 
[A] child with a stigma can pass in a special way. Parents, knowing of 
their child's stigmatic condition, may encapsulate him with domestic 
acceptance and ignorance of what he is going to have to become. When 
he ventures outdoors he does so therefore as an unwitting passer, at 
least to the extent that his stigma is not immediately apparent. At this 
point his parents are faced with a basic dilemma regarding information 
management, sometimes appealing to medical practitioners for 
strategies. If the child is informed about himself at school age, it is felt 
he may not be strong enough psychologically to bear the news and in 
addition may tactlessly disclose these facts about himself to those who 
need not to know. On the other hand, if he is kept too long in the dark, 
the he will not be prepared for what is to happen to him and, moreover, 
may be informed about his condition by strangers wh? have no rea.son 
to take the time and care required to present the facts In a constructIve, 
hopeful light (1963: 113). 
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Children are not as skilled at information control as their parents. As some 
participants suggested, a child might not be able to judge with whom she would 
like to share such information. If the donor-conceived child is told about her 
origins, especially at an early age, she might be willing to share the news with 
everyone she knows, including those who can use this information against her, 
or those who does not need to know. She might be bullied at school, or be 
overwhelmed by questions concerning her origins. On the one hand, the stigma 
can be easily concealed; as long as the donor conception is kept a secret, the 
family can appear normal. On the other hand, if she is not told about her 
origins at an early age, she might be devastated when she is finally told, 
because she was "kept too long in the dark". Moreover, she can find out about 
her origins by accident, which might be even more traumatic than the fact 
itself. The remainder of this chapter deals with dilemmas in the disclosure 
decision. 
Parents' right to pass information on child's behalf 
Lindsay, who had a daughter, Sandy, as a result of embryo donation, told her 
"you came in a different way, you are special". Sandy is now four years old. 
Lindsay still struggles about how to manage the information about Sandy's 
ongIns: 
I am struggling ... that is, you know I have told people information that 
is basically Sandy's information and that is where I have the dilemma. 
Because she is not old enough to know who she would like to tell, and 
who she would not like to tell. And I am doing it on her behalf. .. And 
the information, once it is out you can't get it back. That is the reason 
that I keep cautious, not anything to do with me but because she might 
not want anyone to know (Lindsay). 
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Lindsay expresses concern that Sandy is too young to control information. She 
believes that her daughter has a right to know, but as a parent, Lindsay is 
responsible for how this information is controlled without causing any harm to 
her daughter. In other words, she is not willing to give autonomy to her 
daughter at the expense of her welfare. Moreover, she is not certain about how 
to control information on Sandy's behalf. Lindsay thinks that this information 
'belongs' to Sandy. She says of her daughter: 
She is not of an age that we can discuss it with her. So I think she has a 
right to know, but I am not sure if I have the right to pass that 
information on behalf of her. I do believe that it is Sandy's information. 
I am not worried that people look down on me if the find out, that 
doesn't worry me at all. But she might be telling to people at age seven, 
and then, when she reaches age fourteen: "oh, I don't want people to 
have known". Because she is young, she is not old enough to 
understand the full impact of what happens when you talk to people 
(Lindsay). 
Two years after Sandy was born, Lindsay and her husband also adopted a baby 
boy from South Africa. Their son, Martin, is black and, as Lindsay points out, 
it is quite evident to everyone that he is adopted, given that the rest of the 
family is white. On the other hand, their daughter is white so there is no reason 
for anyone to suspect that she is not genetically linked to Lindsay and her 
husband. The couple agree that their children should be told about their origins. 
They have a conflict, however, on what information should be shared with 
other people. Lindsay's husband believes that it would be fair that they reveal 
how their daughter was conceived, because the fact that their son is not 
genetically related is evident to everyone. However, Lindsay thinks that they 
should be more cautious about disclosing their daughter' s origins because, 
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unlike their son, their daughter should be given an opportunity to control this 
information: 
My husband has a stronger view on whether we tell anyone and 
everyone. We are both white, so is Sandy. Because Martin is black, the 
whole world knows that he is adopted or came from somewhere else. 
Just because Sandy has the same colour with us people assume the 
opposite. He [my husband] thinks we should tell everyone. But I think, 
it is really Sandy's information. If I could, I would not tell everyone 
that Martin is adopted, either (Lindsay). 
Alice has a similar dilemma about revealing the information about her twins' 
origins. Alice got pregnant using her late husband's frozen sperm and donor 
eggs. She notes that her twins might have trouble with the fact that their father 
passed away before they were born. Therefore, she wants to wait for the right 
time before telling the children about their means of origin. She expresses 
concern that if the egg donation is known, she cannot avoid her children being 
bullied at school by other kids. Hence she has shared her treatment only with 
immediate family and close friends: 
They're gonna have enough trouble with not having ... and their father 
passed away before they were born. If they come to an age I wanted it 
to be .. .1 know how easy it is ... I know everything that keeps the child 
at school, pick on things, this will be a big thing really (Alice). 
Alice is planning to write a book about her journey in seeking treatment using 
her deceased husband's frozen sperm. She stresses that Diane Blood's case is 
her inspiration and she wants to give hope to people who have a similar 
situation to hers.55 In fact, she was tempted to make a documentary with the 
BBC about her conception. However, whilst she was willing to talk about how 
she got pregnant using her late husband's sperm, she did not want to reveal the 
fact that she received donor eggs. Alice did not want to make this particular 
part of the treatment public before her twins were born and told about their 
origins. The BBC did not accept her terms and her plans to make a 
documentary have not materialised. 
I was at the beginning stage of making a doc with BBC. One thing 1 
wanted them not to mention I had egg donation :1 don't want the world 
to know before my child knows, when I consented to my child, using 
my husbands sperm I am fine. I really want to encourage them to do but 
BBC was not happy with keeping the whole donor egg thing 
confidential (Alice). 
Lindsay and Alice regard the information about the donor conceived child's 
origins as the child's own information. They are therefore reluctant to pass this 
information to other people on their child's behalf. They also express concern 
about a child's competence in managing the information. Young children may 
be eager to share the details of their origins at a young age. But once they start 
to realise the content of the information that they have been sharing with 
everyone, they might feel that they have made a mistake. And, as one 
participant says "once the information is out, you can't get it back". These 
parents are concerned not to give the child greater autonomy 'at any cost'. 
Having the genetic parent in the picture 
It might be expected that parents who lack a genetic link with the child might 
be more anxious about kinship issues than natural-conception families. Fiona's 
consultant told her that the donor-conception process would lead to a normal 
55 Diane Blood was pennitted to export the spenn of her deceased husband from the UK to 
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pregnancy; she would feel like a biologically related mother. However, once 
she becomes a parent she is expected to think about disclosure. In other words, 
although she has been told that she will be the 'mum', she still will not be able 
to enjoy normal parenting. 
My consultant spent a long time telling me the things we would be 
saying, before. I would be the biological mother, that the embryo can't 
survive without me, my blood feed it, I carry it, I give birth to it, I am 
the mum. She, my consultant have spend a long time really impressing 
that upon me, to trying help me to come to terms with egg donation and 
then, to feel then I have to treat my child differently from the way other 
parents can treat their children. It is sort of a little information that's he 
has given me. On the one hand they are telling me oh yes, you'll be the 
mum, you give birth to it. That's all it counts, that sort of thing and on 
the other hand, they are telling you what you have to tell your child 
(Fiona). 
In donor conception, because of the intimate nature of the transaction involved, 
the donor still remains a 'parent' of a kind, but overall a parent without rights 
and "therefore presumably without obligations toward the child" (Strathem, 
1992: 176). For some of the would-be parents in this study, the fact that their 
child can contact the genetically related parent(s) is deeply worrying. For 
example, although Fiona expresses the view that the resultant child will be 
biologically related to her, and therefore the child does not need to know his 
donor origins, she also reflects on her fear of the resultant child wanting to 
meet the donor. Her narrative contains a scenario in which she describes the 
feelings of the egg donor. In this scenario, Fiona pictures the egg donor as 
someone whose child was taken away. By the time the child finds out about the 
donor a reunion will be inevitable, which will cause the donor pain, especially 
if she does not have a child of her own. Clearly, this scenario is not impossible 
Belgium in order to receive treatment there that was unlawful in the UK. 
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- especially in egg sharing, where the donor does not know whether the 
recipient got pregnant with her share of eggs. 
I think I would always worry if. .. it is the kind of thing that a teenagers 
go through back in your face at some point, "you are not my mum 
anyway", and it is the kind of thing that how would I feel if that child 
than go looking for the donor in the future and also what sort of 
reaction they might give meeting her, if that donor are usually having 
IVF and so if that donor gone on and have no children, and I have a son 
or a daughter through that donor. How are they gonna feel when this 
child turns on their door step? That must be an awful situation to be in 
(Fiona). 
Fiona empathises with the feelings of the donor who has remained childless, 
and she notes that one cannot come to terms with childlessness, but one can 
move on. Nevertheless, if the donor meets with a child who is genetically 
related to her, she might have difficulties in coming to terms with the truth. In 
Fiona's opinion, disclosure is opening a can of worms, as it will not only affect 
the parent-child relationship but also will upset the donor. 
Just sort of 18 years later not come to terms with childlessness, cause I 
don't think you do, but find a new way of life and all of a sudden this 
child turns upon your doorstep. That you have this child walking 
around with your genetics in 18 years. I think that must be very, very 
difficult for the donor to come to terms with, as well. I just feel in some 
ways to tell children, to open up to lose the anonymity it is opening a 
can of worms to the future as well (Fiona). 
Fiona notes that her decision 'not to tell' is an emotional decision rather than a 
rational one; it is a way of protecting herself: 
You know in theory my head agrees but my heart doesn't. My heart 
feels like I want to it is a case where I protect myself in a way. I don't 
want the child I gave birth to just feel I need to go and look up 
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somebody else when they turned 18. It is more of a protection again for 
myself (Fiona). ' 
Pennings (2000) argues that "the general intention behind the organization of 
the procedure is to make the donor invisible and to conform the new-founded 
family to the ideal of the natural family" (2000: 508) . An unknown, 
depersonalised donor allows donor conception to be seen as a medical process 
and supports the normative formation of family (Grace, Daniels and Gillett, 
2008). Most participants in this study prefer anonymous donors. For example, 
Rosie notes that she would prefer her donor to be anonymous because she 
would not want the donor get involved in her child's life: 
I wouldn't want this aspect of someone having some kind of claim on 
my child and .. .If I had a child so ... yeah. I - I again, if it was like 
surrogate and you really knew the person and it would be maybe 
different although it would be somebody I knew or relative, I think it 
would be different. But if it is just somebody I knew, sort of could 
contact them but you wouldn't want them getting involved. I think that 
would be much worse than just someone who is anonymous (Rosie). 
Rosie notes that she would tell her children that they were donor conceived, but 
from her 'selfish' point of view, she would prefer using an anonymous donor to 
avoid her children contacting the donor: 
1- So you would tell the child how they were conceived but would not 
tell them they have an opportunity of contacting this person? 
R- No, not really. No. I suppose maybe for the child it would be ... I just 
didn't go through the whole thought process that much it is not 
something that I want to think about that much it is very difficult to 
imagine. I just don't know how whether this child would prefer to 
know. I mean I suppose they would ... so is most of children probably 
would if told them that they would want to know they would. It is a 
natural instinct to say, "who is my real, my genetic mother?" from the 
child's point of view it would be even worse it is worse but from my 
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point of view, from my selfish point of view I prefer them to be 
anonymous (Rosie). 
Tina's case is a good example of the complex relationships that embryo 
donation generates. Tina received anonymous embryo donation and had a baby 
boy as a result. If the donors were known and relationships were established 
between these two families, her son would have two pairs of parents: Tina and 
her husband as social parents, and the donor couple as their biologically-related 
parents. Had the couple who provided the embryo had their own children, 
Tina's son would have sibling(s) as well. Under these circumstances, Tina's 
son would already have parents, siblings and probably other relatives such as 
grandparents, uncles and aunts to whom he is genetically linked. By getting 
treatment in Spain, and using embryos from an anonymous couple, any 
potential social connection which would challenge her nuclear-family structure 
has been avoided. Recently, Tina went back to Spain and got pregnant using 
another embryo donated by the same couple, so that her son can have a 
biologically-related sibling. She is not planning to disclose to her children 
about their means of origin. 
In the following extract, Tina comments on the arrangements that need to be 
made: 
We will destroy every piece of paper that got my name on it. My GP 
knows, and my consultant knows, but these records are sealed. The 
child cannot get an access to them. Even they did they could still not 
find their parents. You can't. It is illegal. You cannot do. It is sealed. 
Unless there is a severe genetic thing at which point doctors in Spain 
would investigate for you to find you but they can't find that anyway, 
the doctors in Spain would not tell them (Tina). 
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Before she received embryo donation, Tina considered using donated eggs. 
She says that she was concerned that the egg donor would be waiting for the 
child to tum up. Tina mentions that egg donors write emotional letters to their 
prospective offspring, which she finds "very off putting". She describes the 
donor as an alternative 'mummy': 
What you will find very off putting is ... women donating will do a long 
emotional letter to their child about how much they love him, and 
valuing him ... and they are waiting for him ... with their open arms 
which is the last thing you want if you are already a mummy: "oh, by 
the way there is another mummy waiting for you!" (Tina). 
Interestingly, the posts of donors on Repromed discussion forums which I 
presented in Chapter Five also showed that donors found writing these letters 
to be challenging. Writing a letter to an unborn child made them feel like they 
were "giving away a child". It seems then that the donation culture that the UK 
government aims to create is far from meeting the expectations of the parties 
who are involved in this practice. 
Lindsay received embryo donation from semi-known donors. Since then, the 
donors have been a part of their lives. The donors made sure that Lindsay and 
her husband were Jewish, they checked the couple's bank statements to make 
sure that they had enough money to look after the resultant child, and even 
decided on how many embryos should be implanted: "The donors said 
maximum two. They had twins and they thought it was more than enough." 
Lindsay agreed to receive embryos from this couple because it was quicker 
than any other treatment method. She says: "believe or not it [embryo 
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donation] ended up being a faster way of having a child." She narrates her 
experience as follows: 
I started looking into Internet, and I eventually found people who were 
willing to donate embryos to us and that could happen straight away. 
Somebody said there was a couple, they were posting that they had 
Jewish embryo that they wished to donate. They were looking for a 
Jewish couple. I am Jewish, my husband isn't but I considered it 
anyway. The story was that they had these embryos, they had these 
embryos from an infertility treatment and they wanted a known 
donation. They didn't want an anonymous donation. They didn't want 
to give the embryos for research ... They wanted to know what kind of 
people we were, how much income we had was it enough to support a 
child, little bit about our families. They weren't religious, we are not 
religious but they wanted some kind of continuity. The situation in the 
UK was I wanted a known donation. I wanted to know where my 
embryos or my donor eggs were coming from. In the UK it wasn't 
possible. The descriptions you were given is the woman is a nurse, and 
the man is a carpenter. And you can have those embryos, you must be 
able to. And that was very unsatisfactory for me (Lindsay). 
Since the birth of their daughter, Sandy, Lindsay has been in touch with the 
couple who live in America. The donors also have a daughter two years older 
than Sandy and Lindsay thinks the two girls look exactly the same. Lindsay 
sent Sandy's pictures to the donor couple but beforehand some members of the 
family issued warnings about this: 
My brother's wife said don't send her [Sandy's] pictures to them, and if 
you send the pictures make sure that you are in the picture, too! 
(Lindsay) 
Sending pictures might have consequences. For example, having noticed the 
resemblance between Sandy and their daughter, the donor couple might want to 
be a part of Sandy's life. They might see Sandy as a child who was given away. 
Therefore, if pictures must be sent, Lindsay should be in them in order to 
remind the donor couple that she is the 'real' mother. 
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Bette used donor sperm to get pregnant. (By the time of the interview, her 
partner was planning to use the same donor's sperm in the future.). Bette notes 
that she will be open with her child about the sperm donation. Being in a same-
sex relationship, she notes that she and her partner do not consider disclosure 
as an issue; the child can figure out that a donor played a part in its conception. 
Nevertheless, she says that she does not want the child to contact the donor 
until s/he becomes an adult in case the donor gets involved in their life. Bette 
expresses the view that the child will not necessarily want to contact the donor: 
B- Most children even if they do know choose not to contact anyway. 
That's sort of interesting. I am sure I would feel a little bit funny about 
it when they do it ... if they decide to make contact but .. .1 don't think it 
is as bad I don't think as threatening in our case because neither of 
us ... you know ... a dad. So I'd be alright ... yeah it would be .. .it would 
be very interesting ... yeah I think I'd be fine. 
I-I thought you said you didn't want father to be involved. 
B- Yes ... but I think once they tum into adult it is a bit different. 
Some participants who indicated their intention to disclose had not decided on 
what information should be revealed (e.g,. that the child was conceived with 
'medical assistance', that the child was conceived with help of 'a' donor, that 
the child was conceived with help of an 'identifiable' donor), or when to 
disclose. Another concern was whether the child would understand her means 
of conception. For example, Hannah, who used surrogacy and donor eggs, had 
disclosed to her children. However, she said that her children were a bit young 
to understand what they were told: "they are obviously bit young to 
understand. " 
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Accidental disclosure 
Having had treatment in Poland, Alice notes that the eggs that were used in 
conception were donated by a Polish donor. She stresses that her twins will be 
half Polish and her children have a right to know that they have a Polish 
background. Even if she does not tell them, she fears that her children can find 
out about their background by genetic screening. Accidental disclosure might 
have negative consequences: 
In terms of genetic background, yes they would know genetically they 
are half Polish. Nowadays there is so much genetic testing going on. 
You can't take the risk that your child find out what's going on. Their 
trust in you will be shattered (Alice). 
Despite her wornes, she thinks that knowing one's ongIn IS a right, and 
accidental disclosure can hurt the child: 
I would definitely disclose56 to my child. My child will know this 
special lady who donated made their lives possible. I think it is very 
important to explain in a natural way. I suppose my experience is my 
sister was adopted. I wouldn't do any other way (Alice). 
Fiona is also anxious about accidental disclosure. Her account indicates that 
she and her husband are reluctant to tell anyone about donor conception to 
prevent the child from finding out about their origins by accident from a 
member of the family or a friend "as secrets have a way of corning out": 
It is a hard one. Our gut reaction at the moment is that we don't want to 
tell. We don't want to tell the child, we don't want to tell our families, 
we want to keep it between ourselves but at the same time we also feel 
56 Donor anonymity operates in Poland so the identity of the donor will not be available to the 
twins. As discussed earlier, the content of the information that is available to the offspring is of 
great importance: for many would-be parents' anxiety stems from the possibility that the child 
may want to contact the donor. 
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it is p r ~ b a b l y y would be best to tell the child because secrets have a way 
of commg out don't they? (Fiona) 
By the time that the interviews were conducted, Rosie had postponed her 
treatment for a while. She said that she only thought about disclosure 
theoretically. She had come across an article in a woman's magazine about 
children who had a 'terrible' reaction to accidental disclosure. She noted that, 
as her family and friends already knew about her treatment, the resultant child 
could find out about its origins accidentally, which would cause him/her to 
suffer: 
I think that obviously it is only theoretical, and I thought about it 
theoretically yes, I would certainly like to think that I would tell them at 
some point about how they came about, because I think it is something 
that will be so terrible if it came out some other way and of course 
because I had told some people and told family it is possible that those 
things can come out. And I think if that was to come out and my 
mistake, and my child didn't know, I think that would be such a terrible 
having been aware of certain things like that articles about I mean I 
read many things. I remember reading an article in magazine like Marie 
Claire or something about children of donors basically sperm donors, 
and there were two people, and they had different reactions one of 
them, you know really had a terrible reaction. The other one had really 
been ok about it and didn't have a problem with it but I think it is really 
terrible to have secrets in family, and I think you know, if you find a 
way to tell a child when they are quite young ... but of course it is all 
very theoretical for me (Rosie). 
The participant accounts show that disclosing to the child and disclosing to the 
family and friends are not entirely separate issues. If family and friends know, 
there is always a risk of accidental disclosure to the child; if the child knows, it 
may be only a matter of time before s/he spreads the word. 
The truth may hurt the child 
Some participants express the concern that if their family know, the 
grandparents might perceive the resultant child differently from their other 
grandchildren to whom they are genetically linked. Fiona, for example, fears 
that her parents may treat her child differently than her brother's children: 
I am also concerned about how my parents will react for example. I've 
got brothers when my brothers go on to have children. Will they treat 
my brother's children differently to mine, knowing that they are related 
to my brother's children and not to mine (Fiona). 
Some participants stressed that knowing their biological ongins was of no 
significance in children's lives; it is social parents who give a child its identity. 
Tina has two step-children from her husband's previous marriage. When she 
and her husband could not conceive, Tina thought that there was something 
wrong with her. However, during the tests it was revealed that her husband 
could not have been a biologically-related father to his two children because he 
was sterile. They decided not to say anything to the children. They have the 
same attitude towards their unborn child; he will not be told about the embryo 
donation. In the following extract, Tina explains why children should not be 
told that their biological parents are different from the ones they know. She 
thinks that telling the 'truth' would cause nothing but pain: 
You don't want to break a child's heart when they are 18 by saying you 
are not mine. There is no point in that [ ... ]1 understand what they are 
saying. But I think that being parent isn't about who gives the egg or 
sperm, it is about bringing up a child ... and 1 don't see what difference 
it makes in their lives if you don't say that's not your biological dad .. .If 
we told these children now that's not your daddy how would it help 
them? They say it is for child's benefit. 1 can't see that because if you 
destroy child's confidence by saying that person you thought it was 
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daddy since you were ... he has done everything for you. But it is not 
your dad and the other person did an unselfish act made a donation he , 
doesn't want a responsibility, does he? I just think what it would cost? 
What would you gain from it? Who gains? (Tina) 
The disclosure policy and discrimination 
Donor conception families have been under the focus of psychologists who 
have attempted to understand their functioning (e.g.,the emotional experiences 
of the recipients, the relationship problems of partners, disclosure to the 
resultant child and the psychological health of donor offspring). In recent 
years, particularly since the donor anonymity debate started, there has been an 
increasing focus on such families as a result of official concern about the 
welfare and rights of donor offspring. The UK government and the HFEA 
seem to be certain about how these children's rights should be protected: 
children who are born as a result of using donor gametes or embryos should be 
told that they can access identifiable information about their donors at a young 
age. Usually, parents decide autonomously what secrets will be kept from their 
children. They may agree to withhold certain facts from their children to 
protect them from feeling different. A baby might be a result of an affair for 
example, or sexual violence. Although 'natural-conception' families can 
employ information-control without constraint, the current law places an 
ethical demand or obligation on donor-conception families to disclose origins 
to their child. The accounts quoted in this section document the participants' 
responses to these demands. 
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Goffman (1963) argues that in many cases the stigmatised person may exhibit 
all the normal prejudices held toward those who are stigmatised in another 
regard. As I showed in Chapter Six, the participants perceive using donor 
gametes/embryos as deviance and, hence, potentially stigmatising. Invoking a 
counter-morality that denies their deviance, they compare their condition to 
another potentially stigmatising condition and conclude that donor conception 
is not as morally unacceptable as, for example, having a child as a result of a 
one-night-stand. In a way, they present donor conception as a more 'normal' 
(socially acceptable, or morally correct) way of family-building than certain 
ways of natural conception (i.e. having affairs or short term relationships). In 
the following extract, Tina talks about how some family-building practices 
before the arrival of assisted reproductive technologies. She says that in the 
past, if one wanted a child, one could have an affair, and this would be 
unspoken. She points out that the removal of anonymity does not apply to 
people like her husband's ex-wife, who got pregnant as a result of an affair: 
I often wondered people like my husband's ex-wife. If you try for a 
few years and find that you can't ... She obviously didn't know [that he 
was sterile] about him. How many women go out and seduce some 
bloke? You want a child, and how many, you wonder say in 1960s or 
something ... It was an unspoken thing, if you find out that the man had 
had a problem, then the woman turned to see ... She went off, have a 
little fling. Cause in those days you would expect a baby in a year. You 
wouldn't wonder how many women just go out ... and men knew it. .. 
sort of. .. didn't say anything (Tina). 
Fiona points out that the government does not intervene in other areas of 
family life and do not tell people how to bring their children up. She stresses 
that she is doubly discriminated against: nature has discriminated against her. 
and now it is the policy makers who remind her that she is different. 
_._----_._-_ .. _--------
The government don't tell in other areas of family life. They don't tell 
people what they must tell their children or how they must bring them 
up. So when you are already had such a battle, by the time we get 
another donor now and if we go through a cycle of successful we will 
be been trying for a child for nine years. Now, that itself is hard enough 
and put an enormous strain on a relationship as well. Being dictated 
what you have to tell the child it doesn't seem right to me. People have 
accidental pregnancies or you know, they just decide they want to have 
a baby therefore they get pregnant straight away. They are not told what 
they have to tell their children. I just don't feel like there should be any 
difference. [ ... ]Nature already discriminated against me and it feels like 
the law was written that way as well (Fiona). [emphasis added] 
Fiona and her husband have been foster parents to nine children. None of the 
children knew who their father was. Like Tina, Fiona also comments that the 
state does not intervene in disclosure matters if the family is built through 
natural conception, regardless of the means. Fiona expresses the view that the 
disclosure policy is not only discriminatory against those who use donor 
conception, but also against the resultant children. Her foster children do not 
know who their fathers are, because their mothers were not encouraged to be 
open about their means of conception: 
Another thing that makes it more difficult for me is that the foster 
children I have. In every single case we had nine foster children and in 
every single case none of them have known their genetic father. They 
have all been a result of one-night stands or short relationships and the 
government isn't there, telling these mums that they have to provide 
their children with genetic background so ... I can't help feeling a bit 
discriminated against. The young girls that we've got fostering at the 
moment they have no dads, there is six children in their family from the 
same mum with six different dad. Not one of them knows their dad and 
you know, their mum isn't forced to reveal anything to them, or even 
tell them the names of their dads or anything. And they know nothing 
about their background on their paternal side. So I do feel a bit sort of 
preached to be told that I have to tell any resultant children ... You 
know, when there is so many people they don't tell their children thing 
it does feel a bit discriminatory, I think. The foster children I had, and 
they are not allowed any genetic information, their mummies aren't 
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forced to give them and neither can she because in the case of youngest 
two, they were from one night stands, she doesn't even have names for 
these children. So if that's ok for these children and then it should be ok 
for mine. At least mine are wanted children and they are gonna be 
brought up in a stable mother and father relationship unlike the 
foster children we have (Fiona). [emphasis added] 
The participants' accounts contain a companson of the rights of donor-
conceived children and naturally-conceived ones who do not necessarily know 
their origins. As I showed in Chapter Three, during the donor anonymity 
debate this sort of comparison and moral justification was condemned. 
Baroness Warnock argued that there could be no "moral justification whatever 
in deceiving a child about the circumstances of his birth" and it was a "very 
awkward doctrine to enunciate, considering the number of children born by 
adulterous relationships" (HL Deb, 2003-04b) [emphasis added].Wamock's 
speech presupposes that "a single way of organizing the family will and should 
work for everybody" (Pennings, 1997). Such a moral position condemns 
donor-conception families for exercising their right to organise their life 
according to their own moral principles and creates anxiety. For example, 
Fiona argues that the disclosure policy makes her "rebellious" against 
openness. She would be more positive about disclosure if she were not 
"forced". Although under the current legislation she is not compelled to tell her 
donor-conceived child about its origins, Fiona feels that she is "dictated", 
"forced" and "preached to" about disclosure: 
I am not against it [disclosure]. I do think it is child's best interest to 
tell, I really do but that's an intellectual decision not an emotional 
decision as regards actually telling the child. If we are lucky enough to 
have one in the future, I hope I will, but I know that I would be really 
worried about telling and I certainly don't like being forced to tell. I 
also think that we would come around to that conclusion a lot quicker if 
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we ,:"eren't forced t ~ ~ tell. We would estimate that decision as good 
sensIble parents. I thInk we would come to the right answer but being 
forced to tell sort of makes me back away, you know, makes me want 
to do the opposite, makes me feel a bit rebellious as well 
(Fiona).[emphasis added] 
Pennings (1997) argues that in a democratic system although the majority has 
the political right to impose its views on the minority, a number of important 
ethical values should be considered: autonomy, tolerance and respect for 
different moral positions. Pennings goes on to argue that "imposing a moral 
opinion on persons who do not share this view increases the risk of conflicts" 
(1997: 2690). The potential consequences of such conflicts are obvious: the 
accounts quoted above suggest that the new disclosure policy may be 
increasing subterfuge rather than openness. 
Conclusion 
As I explained in Chapter Three, advocates of the disclosure policy suggested 
that infertility and donor conception would become less of a taboo subject and 
less stigmatising, and that removing the donor anonymity would further help to 
ease the stigma. It is unlikely that the new law will achieve this. As indicated 
by the participant accounts in Chapter Six, the reason for the initial secrecy 
derives from the deep individual and private pain felt by those who find 
themselves infertile (Mc Whinnie, 2001: 814). Having a donor-conceived child 
affords individuals and couples a cloak for this. The participants in this study 
employ information control strategies to conceal their infertility and the origins 
of the child from their social contacts or from the child herself in order to 
manage stigma. If donor conception is kept a secret, the family and the child 
260 
-------------------------------------------- --
may pass as nonnal. The new law may therefore reinforce stigma rather than 
remedying it. 
Although policy makers and experts assert that infonnation control is not in the 
best interests of the donor-conceived child, would-be parents operate with 
notions of what 'any' parent would do under such circumstances. Accordingly, 
they use strategies that are employed by anyone in society who finds 
themselves discreditable in any phase of their lives. By concealing potentially 
stigmatising infonnation about the child's origins, they want to protect the 
child and their family from hann. Disclosure to the child is a complicated 
decision and it appears to be an ongoing process. For that reason, neither the 
accounts of Repromed users, nor the interview accounts, claim to be a 
definitive statement of prospective parents' disclosure decisions. However, 
these accounts clearly demonstrate that this decision is not straightforward. 
Some parents are concerned with protecting the child from being stigmatised, 
not being treated as a 'monster'. By withholding infonnation on their child's 
behalf, the parents can protect their children from feeling "tainted" (Goffman, 
1963). Some participants feel that the child is not capable of understanding and 
controlling the infonnation that is disclosed her. Some consider that this 
infonnation belongs to the child and they have no right to pass on the 
infonnation on behalf of the child. 
On the one hand, there is increased value being placed on genetic parenthood. 
On the other hand, however, there are increased possibilities of assisted 
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conception using donor gametes/embryos. These facts resolve into a single 
answer: "the parent must be the one who desires to be a parent" (Strathenl, 
1992: 178). The accounts in my study show that this approximation is not 
straightforward under the new law. Although the law is based on the principle 
that the parents will be those who intended that a child would be born to them , 
there is still equivocation given that they do not supersede the • genetic parents' 
(Strathem, 1992: 178). In an anonymous donation system, the genetic parents 
remain invisible and disclosure can be manageable, whereas if the donors are 
identifiable the consequences of disclosure may be less predictable, for 
example the child might want to meet the donor. Not being genetically linked 
to the donor-conceived child might lead would-be parents to feel threatened by 
the presence of a donor in the child's life. For some of the participants, the fact 
that their child can contact the genetic parent(s) is a very real threat. Arguably, 
such anxiety may also constrain disclosure: they want to protect their fragile 
identity as parents. As I explained in Chapter Three, during the donor 
anonymity debate, adoption was regarded as a morally and psychologically 
relevant model for approaching the need to find out identifiable information 
about their origins that was claimed by some children born through donation: 
the recipient couple raise a child that is genetically related to the providing 
couple/or a donor and who may have full/half genetic siblings elsewhere 
(MacCallum and Golombok, 2007). This situation, however, does not parallel 
adoption because the recipient mother is also the gestational mother, and the 
birth story of the resultant child does not involve relinquishment. It is then 
questionable whether donor offsprings' interest in knowing their origins is 
identical to that of adopted children and whether would-be parents should be 
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given the same advice as adoption families about disclosure. Donor conception 
is an approximation to nonnal parenting and to the nuclear family structure; the 
participants in this study received gametes/embryos to protect this structure. If 
the child is told that she may contact her donor, she may attempt to find her 
'genetic parents', not necessarily because of a 'natural' desire to know her 
origins, but because such a desire is constructed, recognised, and legitimised by 
the law. 
Although people are usually entitled to control discreditable information in 
their everyday lives, donor-conception families' are advised not to do so. Some 
of the accounts document the participants' frustration and anger about being 
treated differently from 'nonnal families'. Some participants consider that the 
disclosure policy discriminates against donor-conception families by 
comparison with those with naturally conceived children who do not 
necessarily know their origins, either. People who conceive naturally (but for 
example, as a result of an affair or a one-night stand) are not told what to tell to 
their children. The policy reminds the donor conception families that donor-
conceived children are different from others (they are ascribed different rights 
such as knowing their means of conception), and this difference must be 
displayed if they want to be the family that policy reformers have idealised. 
Overall, the accounts show that disclosure is perceived as a matter of 
infonnation management, rather than an absolute right that should be given to 
the child at any cost. Disclosure cannot, then, be imposed on donor conception 
families as a moral obligation. As Thevoz (1997) points out, openness and 
truthfulness in family relationships and respect for the child's autonomy are 
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ethical demands, which are almost impossible to convert into a legal 
obligation. 
A major question that I wanted to answer during the interviews was why, given 
their concerns about the disclosure policy, the participants did not raise their 
voices during the debate? One reason behind their reticence may well be the 
fact that would-be parents are caught in a vicious cycle. Those who are affected 
by the policy change may also be the ones who have confidentiality concerns 
and who cannot face publicity. As one participant notes: 
It is a catch 22 situation. If you like it if you kick up a fuss about it, you 
gonna have to make yourself known, which defeats what you are 
kicking up a fuss about (Fiona). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: FERTILITY TRAVEL AS AN 
AVOIDANCE STRATEGY 
Throughout this thesis I have studied the removal of donor anonymity as a 
social problem which is not or cannot be articulated by would-be parents in 
formal modes of communication. I argued that the views of these stakeholders 
have escaped the public eye. In Chapter Three, I argued that the socio-political 
climate was not ideal for these stakeholders to press their claims. I also argued 
that due to the perceived illegitimacy of their claims and their confidentiality 
concerns, would-be parents used alternative modes of communication to lodge 
complaints and exchange views about the donor anonymity problem. In 
Chapter Five, I presented an ethnographic study that I conducted on an online 
support group, Repromed, and showed that, despite their silence during the 
debate, would-be parents continue to protest anonymously against the new law 
on the discussion forums of online support groups. I argued that, for members 
of marginalised groups like donor conception families, narratives maybe the 
only means of making their voices heard. The interview data I presented in 
Chapters Six and Seven exemplified alternative forms of claims-making 
activities. In these chapters I showed that most participants did not want to use 
gametes/embryos from identifiable donors, because they wanted to keep donor 
conception as secret to protect their children from being marked out, bullied or 
stigmatised. Drawing on Goffman's Stigma (1963) theory, I argued that 
information control in donor conception families was not idiosyncratic and 
parents with a donor-conceived child operate with notions of what • any' parent 
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would do under such circumstances (Voysey Paun, 2006). Would-be parents 
want to conduct their family affairs autonomously as normal families: therefore 
they felt discriminated against by the new law that potentially requires them to 
be open to the resultant child about his/her means of conception. 
Spector and Kitsuse (1977) argue that social problems which do not get 
recognition may develop in two directions: First, the stakeholders may create 
alternative institutions to represent themselves as a means of developing a 
social and political base for changing the existing policy. This option was 
neither possible nor desirable for these stakeholders. Secondly, the 
stakeholders may base their activities on the contention that it is no longer 
possible to work in the system. The stakeholders may withdraw from the 
institutional system to create alternative institutions as limited solutions for 
group members. Would-be parents in the UK have readily available alternative 
institutions. The national regulatory restrictions on availability of infertility 
treatment have created an international market for services. European law 
guarantees free movement to avail of services lawfully available in other 
Member States, including medical services such as infertility treatment. 
Growing numbers of would-be parents, including Repromed users and 
interview participants, exercise their right to seek cross-border treatment. 
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Fertility Travel 
Health travel owes its existence to the lack of world-wide legal consensus on 
treatments which will be provided. There is also a cost dimension: the costs of 
treatment may vary considerably from one country to another. Pennings (2002) 
argues "allowing people to look abroad demonstrates the absolute minimum of 
respect for their moral autonomy" (2002: 341). He suggests that what drives 
people abroad to seek treatment is not necessarily laws but "may also be the 
personal moral convictions of the health care provider, institutional policy 
guidelines, and recommendations by committees" (2002: 337). The interview 
accounts show that the participants seek treatment abroad not necessarily 
because of the law itself (given that they are not compelled to disclose), but the 
socio-Iegal environment that requires them to display their differences. 
Anonymity of Donors 
In the UK, would-be parents who want to use gametes from anonymous donors 
have no choice but to seek treatment abroad. The state has stringent control of 
the procurement, testing, processing and distribution of gametes and embryos 
for human use: these services must be licensed by the HFEA or subject to an 
agreement with a licensed service. Imported gametes or embryos must also 
meet UK requirements, and all medical fertility and non-medical fertility 
services such as Internet sperm providers must comply with the UK standards. 
For example, even if sperm is anonymously donated in Poland according to the 
Polish regulations, UK would-be parents cannot purchase it online, or have it 
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imported by their licensed clinic III the UK. They can, however tra el to 
Poland and receive donor insemination there in any clinic. 
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Picture 4: The advertisement notes that there are no waiting lists, and the 
patients have access to "a large and diverse pool of young donors from all 
ethnic backgrounds". It also notes that "Britain faces a fertility CrISIS 
precipitated by changes in the law. The loss of donor anonymity has seen egg 
donor numbers plummet". The clinic has "young, healthy, highly educated 
donors who are screened to the UK standards" and it claims to be working 
according to HFEA standards, except for the fact that donors maintain their 
anonymity In the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. (Fertility and 
Pregnancy, Media Planet, 7 December 2008) 
It is important to distinguish disclosure of identifiable and non-identifiable 
information. By making donors identifiable, the law attempts to build a parental 
connection between the donor and the child, established by the passage of 
genes. O'Donovan (1988) argues: 
[t]he only basis for a successful defence of gamete-donation is the 
outright denial that the donor is in any way personally present through 
his genetic contribution. We must regard the sperm and ovum rather in 
the same light as we would regard a donated kidney, as human material 
but not as personally human. Bodily spare parts are exchangeable 
because, although they belonged to someone in particular, and grew at 
the behest of his genetic constitution, they do not convey his genetic 
individuality (1988: 43). 
Where donors are anonymous, the donation is nothing but an altruistic gift, or 
marketed service, to provide assistance to another person in conceiving a child, 
"to contribute one's genes to the creation of a child is not congruent with the 
social role of parenthood" (Wallbank, 2004: 260). Even the donors do not 
know whether or not their gametes were effective in achieving conception. 
Tina and her husband had decided to receive sperm donation in the UK, but 
they changed their minds, and sought treatment in Spain, due to the removal of 
donor anonymity in the UK: 
Even though we both wanted DI, the law was changing. We could find 
old donor sperm, you didn't have to tell. With new donor sperm you 
have to tell (Tina). 
Some participants express the view that having access to a donor's identity and 
being told about donor conception are different matters: by removing donor 
anonymity. the HFEA risked the sustainability of gamete donation. For 
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example, Alice is uncertain as to whether knowing the identity of the donor 
would make a big difference to the donor-conceived child. Alice states that 
policy makers should have weighed the cost of lifting anonymity for would-be 
parents. Disclosure policy, she thinks, is preventing couples from being 
parents: 
Although I can understand, you know, for a child it is important to 
know what the background is, it is not possible in some families, even 
in natural families and you have to weight out what the cost of removal 
of donor anonymity would be. It may make a difference it may not. 
Look at how many couples left in the situation who want to be parents, 
left in the situation where they have to wait long periods. [ ... ] I know 
we all want to our children best we can but almost preventing couples 
to have the opportunity of becoming parents because ... Because these 
couples want this baby, they ... It is a tricky one. For me personally, I 
am a bit biased, coming from the point that I have donor egg I would 
say the disclosure policy is not the best policy that HFEA came up with 
(Alice). 
Alice states that, instead of lifting anonymity, the HFEA could provide a 
detailed profile of the donor without giving identifying information: 
I personally think that you can give information about donors without 
disclosing their identity if there is a way of doing at national level it is 
anything, the colour, hair colour, height etc., just knowing what kind of 
genetic background, did my father have the same, you know, eyes with 
me, what similar height. I think children who know that, it would 
suffice. Because we are not talking about adoption. If anything, 
knowing who the person is being born but not being born to that family 
knowing that different family. These children born of donor 
insemination, they won't know anything different (Alice). 
Alice claims that donor-conceived children will be satisfied with knowing 
about the characteristics of the donor; they do not necessarily need to know the 
identity of the donor: 
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Again going back to the whole child's right to know thing, I think there 
are ways t h ~ t t d i ~ c l o s i n g g infonnation without necessarily giving away 
the donors IdentIty because I really wonder whether and it would be 
interesting to see whether it would make any difference to children who 
were born with donor egg or spenn to know who their donor is as 
oppose to the characteristics of about their donor ... and some of them 
may not want to know who their donor is, and may just prefer to know 
the characteristics but of course we wont be able to tell that before 18 
years of time (Alice). 
She notes that the government removed donor anonymity based on an adoption 
analogy. She claims that this analogy is wrong because gestation distinguishes 
gamete donation from adoption: she carries the baby, she is going to give birth 
to the baby, and the baby will not know anyone else apart from her as mother: 
I think they are taking back step from adoption. But it is not like 
adoption, because I am carrying this child. It is in my body. I will give 
birth to this child; this child doesn't know anyone else apart from me as 
mummy. That's not the case in adoption (Alice). 
During the interviews other participants also talked about adoption cases in 
their family histories to highlight the differences between adoption and donor 
conception. For example, Fiona's father was adopted, and, when he discovered 
his birth certificate by accident, he was devastated. But Fiona stressed that her 
father never wanted to find out about his birth parents. Similarly, Alice's sister 
was adopted, and so was her father. She thought that at times her sister would 
wonder who her birth parents were but this never had a significant effect on her 
life. Tina, on the other hand, talked about the fact that her father abandoned her 
when she was a baby. She did not remember anything about her biologically-
related father, and she always perceived her step father as her 'real dad'. She 
stated that she neither wanted to meet her father, nor get to know him. She 
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thought that people wanted to know their birth parents so that they could blame 
them for the troubles they had been through. 
Waiting Lists 
All participants have suffered from the donor shortage which they viewed as a 
consequence of the new law. Rosie claims that lifting anonymity has had a 
negative effect on donor recruitment in the UK. She compares the programme 
in the UK to that in Spain, arguing that the latter is successful because the 
donors are able to preserve their anonymity: 
They say it [removal of donor anonymity] doesn't have any effect but I 
can't see how it doesn't. I mean I - I am sure it will. It is logical that 
and I am sure the programme in Spain would not be so successful, let's 
say if the donors were anonymous I think that they want to be 
anonymous. I don't think they want to be known or want to be 
contacted (Rosie). 
Alice also claims that the removal of donor anonymity caused a reduction in 
donations because the open donation system in the UK frightens donors: 
------------------------- -------------
I don't think donor egg is allowed in Gennany. So there is a lot 
infertility tourism going around all across the Europe and beyond some 
people go to Barbados. It is far reaching but how can you not equate the 
two? The removal donor anonymity will of course cause a huge 
deduction in donors who want to come forward, of course that will 
scare people and they are not going to want to donate. People who 
donate spenn have done it in past are frightened. People who egg share 
or donate spenn all have done so in the past are frightened, majority of 
them are. In 18 years past time this adult can come to the door step, say 
"you are my genetic father and mother", that's why (Alice). 
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Alice wonders how the HFEA will respond to the statistics revealing the 
decrease in donor numbers following the removal of donor anonymity: 
So it will be interesting to see what the HFEA confront with when they 
have to reveal statistics how many donors moved away to the ... There 
is so much opportunity going on at this moment. The way HFEA 
operates today, their statistics not include anyone who has gone abroad 
for treatment. So that's just completely not part of research to them, "oh 
no one is going abroad for treatment, you know because we are not 
doing the research in that area anyway" (Alice). 
Alice went to Spain and Poland, the countries that allow the treatment she 
needed (to get pregnant using the embryo which was created by insemination 
of her late husband's frozen sperm using donor eggs). She could have received 
the treatment in the UK, but she did not want to be on a waiting list for eggs. 
Alice states that it is the removal of donor anonymity and the long waiting lists 
which drive people abroad: 
It is difficult because you know I can see what they are trying to doing 
but I just wonder, you know, whether, sorry to use this but throwing out 
the baby with the bath water really, because it is driving people abroad 
and I think because I mean just in the website on infertility friends that 
has doubled and tripled it is obviously growing. People are not willing 
to wait and you know 30s 40 s ... They are not going to wait a couple of 
years they take the best option going to Spain, Russia or Poland where 
there aren't any waiting lists, cost is not a problem (Alice). 
Alice notes that the idea of gomg abroad was suggested by an HFEA 
consultant, who thought that after the removal of donor anonymity waiting lists 
would get longer: 
In Poland there are no restrictions on egg donation but the success rates 
are high. In UK removal of donor anonymity ... and I was told by 
interestingly enough ... HFEA consultant told "go abroad", and it was 
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before the removal of anonymity. He said only gonna worst after the 
law comes. He was the first one who got me thinking go abroad (Alice). 
Rosie states that due to the removal of donor anonymity waiting lists are long 
in the UK. Given her age, Rosie wanted to start her treatment immediately: 
I knew that in the UK it was very difficult the whole egg donation thing 
and the UK, lack of anonymity there were less donors you know ... just 
didn't seem ... and I didn't want to wait any longer I wanted to get on 
with it (Rosie). 
Regardless of their views for or against disclosure, both the users of Repromed 
and the interview participants considered that the disclosure policy had led to a 
collapse in donations. 
Donors with a physical resemblance to the would-be parents 
For couples who want to receIve donations from a donor with a physical 
resemblance to them, the donor shortage in the UK is an obstacle. Clinics 
situated in countries where abundant supplies of gametes are available often 
promise to match the physical characteristics of the donors with those of the 
would-be parents. A brief review of the postings on message boards on the 
Internet indicate that clinics avoid making such promises in the UK due to the 
donor shortage. As I showed in Chapter Five, Repromed users express the view 
that the reduction in donors has also compromised their chances of finding a 
donor with a reasonable match to their own physical characteristics, or those of 
their partner. Accordingly, would-be parents might consider travelling abroad 
in order to find a donor who resembles them. 
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Becker (2000) argues that the donor's physical similarities to the social parent 
are important because it gives the notion of biological continuity to the parents. 
She notes that having the child resemble oneself reduces the level of 
"cognitive dissonance" that social parents experience, as it is a cultural 
expectation that children resemble their parents. Becker claims "because use of 
donor gametes is less widely accepted than adoption, parents of donor children, 
regardless of their stance on donor confidentiality, want to maintain a degree of 
confidentiality about the child's origins" (2000: 162). For example, one of the 
reasons that motivated Rosie and her partner to get treatment in Spain was the 
likelihood of finding a donor who resembled their physical appearance. 
I am not actually English racially. I am actually Jewish, Polish Jewish 
and my partner is quite dark skinned. I thought Spain ... and we are not 
very tall ... so we thought actually Spain is pretty good for us anyway in 
tenns of matching. So I didn't look anywhere else (Rosie). 
Payment to egg donors 
This subsection deals with the payment to donors and helps us to understand 
how the participants present the commercial side of fertility travel. Although 
the question regarding payment to donors was not raised during the interviews, 
the issue was brought up particularly by the egg recipients. Donated embryos 
are usually 'surplus': couples who go through IVF may end up producing more 
embryos than they can use, and choose to donate some (for treatment or 
research), rather than destroying or storing them. In other words, embryo 
donors do not undergo treatment to donate their embryos. Spenn donation, on 
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the other hand, is not considered as an invasive procedure. Howeyer, unlike 
spenn, eggs are not a self-renewing, copious and accessible tissue and are 
never detached from the body in the nonnal course of events (Waldby. 2008). 
Donating eggs involves stimulating the ovaries, and the multiple follicles, 
shutting down the donor's reproductive cycle, several honnone injections, and 
a surgical procedure to retrieve the eggs. Being familiar with the complexity of 
IVF procedure (or having been involved in egg sharing), many participants 
expressed the view that egg donation was not an easy process and they would 
like egg donors to be paid for their efforts. The participants did not think that 
payment would cause abuse, because to them the amount paid would not be 
high enough to encourage people go through this procedure repeatedly. For 
example, in the following extract, Rosie says that the payment is not 'huge' 
enough to encourage people to donate repeatedly: 
I don't have a problem with it...1 think it is good that they pay people 
[in Spain]. I mean they don't get a huge amount of money. It is only 
like 7 or 800 Euros or something ... it is not. .. having been through IVF I 
mean, I don't think it is a lot of money because it is quite you know, 
quite heavy process to go through. I know that they are ok, they get 
paid but it is not a big amount, and they just do this thing they get paid 
money for doing it and that's it. So yes, I believe in donor anonymity. I 
think that what they are doing in Spain is good (Rosie). 
Rosie points out that she is comfortable with the idea of donors being paid, 
because then she can see the process as a business arrangement. She thinks that 
for a student for example, this is not a bad way of earning some money. 
I like to think that it is a business arrangement and they check people 
out and it is all above board and they are young people who are 
typically students and I think ok, well sounds ok, probably f o ~ ~ a student 
again it is a good, not a bad way of earning some money (RosIe). 
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Rosie's account also indicates that the donors deserve to be paid for 
undergoing IVF, which is a 'quite heavy process'. Similarly, Tina too, dra\\'s 
attention to the difficulties of donating eggs. She thinks that egg donors should 
be paid, because unlike sperm donation, egg donation is not easy: 
In Spain you pay woman 600 pounds. It is a cultural thing. It is not nice 
having been through it. You wouldn't keep doing it. For men it is easy 
(Tina). 
Another participant, Alison, shared her eggs and received sperm donation from 
an identifiable donor, in case the resultant child would like to meet the donor. 
In a way, she is an egg donor herself. Although she supports the open donation 
system, she expresses concern about the decreasing donor numbers, and the 
long waiting lists. She says that there are too many expectations from the 
donors: they are identifiable, and only get their travel expenses paid. Like the 
other participants, Alison states that she would like the donors to get paid. 
I had mixed feelings because I would choose an identifiable donor but 
obviously it means that the supplies greatly reduced so it is tricky. If it 
was up to me, I would I'd leave the identified part, but I'd like them 
get paid, you know .. .! think it is a double xxx that you have to be 
identified and you only got travel expenses for your travel (Alison). 
'Reciprocity', the expectation that if one does something for someone, at some 
point the favour will be returned, might be a useful term to understand the 
accounts of the participants. Putnam (2000) uses the term 'generalized 
reciprocity' which implies that there may be anonymous exchanges of objects 
or favours, in contrast to gift exchange in traditional societies, where the 
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identity of the giver and receiver are critical to understanding the functioning 
of the gift (Mauss, 1966). 
The participant accounts indicate that the egg recipients in this study did not 
consider payment to donors as an ethical problem, or as exploitation of poor 
women. On the contrary, they claim that it is unjust that donors are not getting 
any rewards for their efforts. The fact that the donor is getting paid might 
actually comfort the recipients as they can regard the transaction as a fair one. 
This transaction can even be perceived as a business arrangement, as one of the 
participants suggested. Presumably, making a payment turns the transaction 
into a commercial one where there are no expectations on either side beyond 
the immediate exchange of cash or goods, as opposed to exchange of gifts 
where the exchange of gifts is embedded in and constitutes evidence of a 
continuing relationship. This is not to say that the recipients do not feel 
gratitude for the donation, but their accounts indicate that they would be more 
comfortable in an exchange that both parties get something from. As they 
cannot return the favour in any other way, they want donors to be paid. 
High standards of clinics abroad 
All the participants had followed the postings on online support groups for 
infertility, or web sites hosted by fertility clinics such as Repromed to find out 
information about treatment abroad. Waldby (2008) notes, "multilingual 
websites and internet communication have made international partnerships and 
patient bookings much easier, facilitating the growth of such IVF tourism" 
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(2008: 20). For example, when Rosie needed egg donation, she started doing 
research about the procedure and found a website called IVF Connections. She 
read the postings on message boards and found out that the success rates were 
high in Spain, especially in one clinic in Barcelona (the po stings on message 
boards indicate that this clinic is particularly popular among the UK patients 
due to the high success rates). These postings praised the success rates in one 
particular clinic: 
I started looking into it and I found a website called IVF Connections, 
and through that I started doing research and reading message boards, 
hundreds and hundreds of postings. And you know, found out really 
what was going on in Spain and a lot of people from UK were going to 
Spain and this is working. Seems to be incredible success rates in that 
particular clinic ... later on, I was a bit more cynical about the success 
rates but that was ... and just reading the stuff from the board at that time 
everyone seemed to be successful, that was really incredible. It was just 
like very good feeling ... so many people were getting pregnant and so 
basically I thought about it. If all these women try that, what's so 
special about me that I couldn't consider it? Why don't we go, it is in 
Barcelona, we like Barcelona, it is a nice place you know, go and have 
a consultation and I heard that they were very quick and the indication 
of the cost that was a concern but I was lucky. I had enough money to 
do it. So we went to first consultation February last year and .. .I had a 
good feeling about it, maybe not so wonderful as some of the other 
women who think it was the most, really fantastic but I had a good 
feeling. I felt comfortable with them they just had test taken on an 
English doctor that was really kind of reassuring as well. So basically 
we decided to go ahead there and then (Rosie). 
Alice is content with the treatment she received in Spain and Poland. She says 
that the consultation process is more open and advanced in comparison to the 
consultation provided in the UK. Moreover, the cost of the treatment is lower 
abroad: 
What I experienced In Poland and Spain, compared to clinics here they 
have more experience. The doctors out there are willing to take time to 
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talk to you. Not wait 5 years. This is our recommendation, you can have 
2 or 3 .. .In Poland you decide how many embryos can be implanted 
they talk to you. In private clinic the consultation is so rush. They look 
at your notes. Even it is in different country you have their e-mails. I 
have the mobile number of the doctor. Also my personal situation ... in 
cost of 1 treatment in this country I can have 2 treatment (Alice). 
Tina had embryo donation in Spain. She stresses that donor anonymity was the 
main reason that drove her abroad, but she also comments on her other 
motives. She started her treatment in the UK in a private clinic. When they 
found out that they could not conceive due to male factor infertility, Tina and 
her husband decided to receive sperm donation. However, they were advised to 
get ICSI (the technique involves picking up a single live sperm and injecting it 
directly into the centre of an egg which significantly increases the chances of 
achieving pregnancy) instead, which could enable Tina to get pregnant using 
her husband's sperm. Given that ICSI is much more expensive than sperm 
donation, and more complicated, Tina did not take the clinicians' advice. When 
she heard from a friend that the success rate was only 5 per cent for her age 
group, she decided that the clinic was giving her false hope, and her treatment 
was a waste of time. The treatment was expensive, there were no donor eggs 
available (after failed attempts using her own eggs, Tina decided to use donor 
eggs), the waiting lists were too long, and the donors were identifiable: 
So we did 2 cycles in the UK. I, and when I had my second one in 
October I found that the success rate in my age group is 50/0. They just 
take your money! (Tina). 
She thinks that private clinicians have business minds, and when money comes 
in to equation, their advice is not reliable: 
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In the beginning when we found out that it was him we asked for DI. 
They said no, you must have ICS!. DI is for 500 pounds, ICSI is 5500. 
Lord Winston said when money comes to the equation ethics kind of 
xxx the door. With donor sperm you have a straight insemination, 100/0 
chance, it is not that great but it was ... and they said no ... your husband 
has some sperm and you must try to have your husband's child (Tina). 
Tina and her husband finally decided to get treatment in Spain usmg 
anonymous frozen embryos. The clinic staff in the UK warned Tina against 
getting treatment abroad. They thought the clinic in Spain was not ethical: 
My clinic here in England took an extremely poor view of me going 
Spain ... questioned the ethics and the professionalism of the clinic in 
Spain. They completely, you know, put a down view on the whole thing 
(Tina). 
Despite the concerns raised by the clinicians, for Tina the advantages of 
undergoing treatment in Spain were obvious: the clinics were more advanced, 
there were donors available, anonymity was preserved, and there were no 
waiting lists: 
In Spain, the bigger they are. Their equipment is the latest thing. In 
England it is all rubbish, you wait for hours and you spend the same 
money, the same cost. [ ... ]1 would have done here, which you can't. 
There is no donor egg available. This is just the problem. And if you 
have one, you have to tell the child. Waiting lists are five years. At my 
age you couldn't wait. In Spain there is no waiting list (Tina). 
Fertility travel and 'tourism' 
As I showed in the Chapter Five, in April 2006, the then chair of the HFEA, 
Suzi Leather issued a public statement warning British citizens against the 
poorly regulated treatment in overseas clinics: 
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We know that a relatively small number of people choose to travel 
abroad to undergo fertility treatment and that sometimes the 
treatment is packaged as a "holiday" where the patient can 
convalesce in the sun. However, we are concerned about people who 
choose to have their treatment abroad should know about the potential 
risks. We have heard of some clinics which offer treatment to patients 
that is so dangerous that it has been banned in the UK. For example 
implanting five embryos which significantly raises the chance of 
multiple pregnancy, the biggest risk of IVF for both mothers and 
babies. It is very sad when we receive complaints from patients about 
their treatment abroad and we are not able to help or reassure them. We 
would urge patients to think twice and consider the risks and 
implications before going abroad for treatment. (Suzi Leather, chair 
of the HFEA, in HFEA, 2006 [emphasis added]). 
The accounts quoted here and in Chapter Five indicate that many would-be 
parents express the view that the standards of infertility treatment are 
demonstrably as high, if not better, than those in the UK. In this statement 
Leather refers to those who travel abroad to get treatment as "a relatively small 
number of people" (HFEA, 2006). INUK's fertility survey, which I discussed 
in Chapter Five, shows that this argument is debatable: of 339 people who 
responded to the survey, 76 per cent would consider travelling abroad for 
treatment. Leather's statement annoyed the would-be parents. For example, 
according to Alice, the HFEA is "like an ostrich", burying its head in the 
ground. She is dubious that the Authority represents the patients' opinions in 
its decisions. Alice says that, in the absence of statistics revealing the number 
of people seeking treatment abroad, the HFEA will continue denying the facts. 
And I see a couple of programmes where they have interviewed Suzi 
Leather. She's just said "if people wants to go abroad that's their issue, 
we don't look at clinics abroad we look at clinics from UK", I am 
thinking yes, but it is actually your making that driving them abroad, 
you know and there is no recognition of that. No understanding. It is a 
bit like, the HFEA is like an ostrich, buried in the ground sometImes 
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that the way I feel about them sometimes so I think the more that you 
k n o ~ ~ we c ~ n n get our point across as users of fertility clinics and 
fertIhty servIces the better I think. . .. and it is one thing to do surveys, 
but who represents the patients in these big decisions that they make? Is 
there anyone? Not that I know of ... So I have mixed feelings about them 
(Alice). 
The would-be parents also reacted to Leather's remark that fertility treatment 
was marketed as a holiday. Like many other would-be parents sending their 
protests to online support groups (e.g. Repromed, INUK), Alice, for example, 
stresses that infertility treatment is not a holiday. 
You want a baby, the media made out this whole fertility tourism thing 
"yeah, you go on holiday and have your treatment" and it is like "yeah 
you get to go to a different place and some Spain or whatever". But it is 
not a holiday, there are so much going on in your body in your mind 
you know (Alice). 
Storrow (2006) notes that the meanings of tourism are various: despite the fact 
that, for most people, tourism evokes the ideas of travelling for pleasure, it can 
also mean the "occupation of providing services for tourists" (2006: 300). 
According to Storrow, to use the term 'fertility tourism' to refer to "the 
network service set up to provide infertility treatment to travellers from 
abroad" is consistent with the latter definition, which defines tourism as an 
industry. Storrow points out that this industry markets fertility travel so as to 
"create a fantasy of conceiving a child during a romantic holiday" (2006: 327). 
However, usage of the term 'tourism' gets a negative reaction from the would-
be parents and compounds stigma. Pennings (2004) argues that commentators 
frequently express disapproval when talking about fertility travel and that this 
attitude may be based on a number of convictions: "a belief in moral truth, a 
desire to ensure that others observe our standards, the belief that ethical rules 
-------------_.--- -----------------_._ .. _-----------
apply to everyone, everywhere" (2004: 2691). Referring to fertility trayel as 
'tourism' symbolises such jUdgements. Would-be parents might be 
uncomfortable with the way that the treatment is represented in the public 
domain, as any association of infertility treatment with a holiday package may 
seem to undermine the severity of the treatment they have received and the 
seriousness of their intentions. I can presume three main reasons for that. First. 
terms such as 'reproductive tourism' or 'fertility holiday' suggest that there is 
something pleasant about getting treatment abroad. It implies something 
'frivolous'. In contrast, many would-be parents describe infertility treatment as 
physically and emotionally 'painful'. Second, 'tourism' is usually a leisure 
activity which is 'voluntary'. The voluntary side of tourism might not fit into 
would-be parents' presentation of their infertility. As I have shown in Chapter 
Six, they describe their condition as an 'illness' which requires an emotionally 
and physically exhausting treatment. They claim that fertility treatment is a 
need, not a treat: they did not 'choose' to get treatment, rather their body failed 
them in a manner beyond their control. Third, would-be parents do not want to 
be associated with tourists of morally questionable markets. Similar terms -
like 'organ tourism', 'poverty tourism', and 'sex tourism' - have negative 
connotations. These terms imply the exploitation of the labour and resources of 
the poor. 
The choice of language to describe this travel is also evidence of the stigma 
that the would-be parents have to deal. Compliance with UK legislation is felt 
as stigmatising but the moral entrepreneurs behind the reforms have tried to 
characterise avoidance as equally stigmatising. This attitude may be based on 
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a belief in moral truth, the belief that ethical rules apply to everyone (Pennings, 
2004 ). Would-be parents face an inappropriate kind of moral absolutism while 
they are exercising their right to seek treatment abroad. 
Reactions to the disclosure policy 
Storrow (2006) notes that not all reproductive laws are generated by moral 
certainty on the part of their supporters: 
At times, proposal to regulate assisted reproduction arise in reaction to 
the perception that its use creates ethical or social problems that need to 
be addressed. Such regulation sometimes takes the fonn single-issue 
lawmaking aimed at putting a stop to certain practices that either create 
a moral outcry or generate ethical confusion (2006: 304). 
For example, he notes that the UK curtailed the practice of surrogacy not 
because of any strong consensus about its ethical questionability but because it 
was unnecessary to permit this in the UK given the availability of surrogates 
for hire in other parts of the world. He notes that "the view in Britain seems to 
have been that since surrogacy would occur no matter what policy the 
government adopted the practice might as well be banned and fertility tourism 
permitted to ensue" (2006: 305). Storrow further argues that, given the ready 
supply of anonymously donated gametes in Denmark and the US, the UK may 
well have had similar views when it removed anonymity. He notes: 
It is in precisely this way that fertility tourism acts as a moral safety 
valve permitting national parliaments to express local sentiments while 
simultaneously acknowledging the moral autonomy of those who do 
not agree with those sentiments (2006: 305). 
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Imposing a moral opinion on citizens who have not consented to these rules 
and principles threatens peace and cooperation in society (Pennings, 2002). 
Interestingly, in the UK, would-be parents did not press claims against these 
restrictions partly because it was relatively easy to travel from countries with 
restrictive policies to places where the desired services could be obtained and , 
partly because confidentiality mattered to them. Nevertheless, the reticence of 
the would-be parents does not mean that they do not consider the new law as a 
problem. The ethnographic studies I conducted voiced the concerns that 
escaped the public eye. Like many other participants, Fiona has been trying to 
be heard, yet anonymously: 
The HFEA the government did do a consultation at the end of the 
November last year, and they went over all current procedures and over 
all the things they were thinking about bringing in. [ ... ] And I did take 
part in that consultation and replied very strongly about my feelings .... 
So I did take part in that consultation and I replied to the government 
directly. And also INUK [Infertility Network UK] were asking for 
opinions, so I did send my opinions so that they could submit. They 
wanted to submit their opinion on behalf of their members so I did 
make sure that I was involved in that. But again it was all done 
anonymously so I dont think I could do anything other than that 
(Fiona). 
Alice took part in surveys, anonymously, because she wanted to get her voice 
heard: 
I take part in surveys with HFEA because I feel like, I want to get my 
point of view across to them. So whenever possible I do mention the 
fact that removal of anonymity causing waiting lists, it is driving people 
abroad, and I think there is the thing annoys me the most about HFEA 
is they are not prepared to recognise that (Alice). 
Alice notes that the HFEA is not prepared to recognise the fact that the open 
donation system is driving people abroad. In her view the HFEA does not take 
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patients' VIews into consideration in policy making. She claims that the 
Authority does not communicate with "the people they try to serve", neither 
consulting nor explaining to them why certain decisions were taken: 
Sometimes they do decisions without consulting the people who they 
try to serve. To be honest yeah ... again all going back to removal of 
donor anonymity and as someone who go through this treatment it 
wasn't, I do feel as someone going fertility treatment it wasn't ever 
explained to us why they took this decision. So yeah, I see them as 
being a little bit on high making these decisions but really not 
understanding the struggles that people going through when they go 
through fertility treatment. I mean a lot of European countries still have 
the donor anonymity and can't understand why, you know, in this age 
HFEA made a law to remove anonymity in this country. And there is a 
couple of other things as well, that I just I can't understand why they 
have done them. But you know, I sit for people who they meant to be 
looking out for. I am not sure (Alice). 
The would-be parents are caught in a VICIOUS circle: those who prefer 
anonymous donation are reluctant to press their claims because confidentiality 
matters to them and they are intimidated by the force of the rights-based 
discourse of openness. Given this reticence, their voice is unheard by public 
bodies, like the HFEA, which can only deal with issues through formal and 
transparent modes of communication. As a result, they can come to be 
colonised by the views of those who are less constrained, like the advocates of 
the child's right to know. 
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Conclusion 
According to Storrow (2006), the current phenomenon of European fertility 
travel is a symptom of globalisation and "owes its existence to the interplay 
between member states' individual (some would say idiosyncratic) policies on 
'responsible' procreation and the globalist policy of free movement of persons 
within Europe thought to be essential to the continued integration of European 
nations" (2006: 298). Storrow argues that policy making that appears to adopt 
local values rather than globalist trends depends upon tourism for its viability 
against organised resistance. 
The main causes of fertility travel can be summarised as follows: treatment is 
prohibited in the country of origin because the application is considered 
ethically unacceptable; the technique is considered medically unsafe; the 
treatment is not available; the would-be parents are considered to be unfit 
parents in their country; the waiting lists are too long; or the costs are too high 
(Pennings, 2000). Sometimes a combination of motives exists. The participant 
accounts and the posts on Repromed indicate that avoiding the UK law 
eliminating donor anonymity and the consequent lengthy waiting lists are the 
main reasons that drive would-be parents abroad to seek treatment. Shortage of 
donors with preferable characteristics and high standards of clinics are among 
the other reasons cited by the would-be parents. 
A majority of the Repromed users and the interview participants received or 
considered receiving treatment in Spain, which is one of the most popular 
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fertility travel destinations in Europe. This is in line with the findings of the 
INUK survey. It is argued that Spain is a particularly attractive destination 
because it combines high medical standards with a liberal approach to 
regulation (Waldby, 2008). In Spain there are no waiting lists, and donor 
anonymity is preserved. Donor anonymity policy is a significant consideration 
for would-be parents who strongly believe that the resultant child should have 
no access to identifying information about the donor who played a role in their 
conception. The accounts in this thesis demonstrate that would-be parents 
appear to start thinking about disclosure before they get treatment. Given that 
there is a supply of gametes/embryos from both identifiable and anonymous 
donors (including European countries such as Sweden and Norway), it is 
unlikely that anyone takes a haphazard decision about choosing a destination to 
get treatment without giving thought to the donor anonymity issue. The 
popularity of Spain shows that many would-be parents in the UK prefer 
anonymous donors to identifiable ones. 
Pennings (1997) notes that "those who argue for the legal imposition of either 
anonymity or identification presuppose that a single way of organizing the 
family will and should work for everybody. This is a short-sighted and false 
idea" (1997: 2839). The HFEA has no jurisdiction outside the UK. For those 
who do not want to receive gametes/embryos from identifiable donors, or those 
who cannot afford waiting in lengthy lists for treatment, fertility travel acts as a 
safety valve. The would-be parents' reluctance to mobilise around pressing 
claims to protest the removal of donor anonymity partly reflects the variety of 
ways in which they can avoid the impact of this legislation. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
This thesis has been guided by one over-arching question: how may donor 
conception families' reactions to the disclosure policy in the UK better be 
understood? After introducing the theoretical approach taken in the thesis, 
namely, social constructionist theories of social problems, I explored the 
natural history of the donor anonymity debate in the UK, and identified the 
claims-making activities that led to the 2004 Regulations which abolished 
donor anonymity. This examination revealed that the decision to abolish donor 
anonymity was strongly influenced by a discourse that asserted donor-
conceived children's 'right-to-know' their genetic origins. It is also clear that, 
despite the differences between the biological and social context of adoption 
and assisted conception, adoption has been regarded as a morally and 
psychologically relevant model for approaching the need to find out about their 
origins that has been claimed by some children born through donation. The 
2004 Regulations endorsed this reasoning by giving donor offspring and 
adoptees similar legal entitlements. But one important voice was not heard in 
this debate, namely that of would-be parents: in other words, those who would 
carry the burden of informing children of their origins, should they so choose. 
The ethnographic studies I presented in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight 
sought an explanation for this silence. 
In this final chapter, I will retrace the steps that I have taken in the thesis. I will 
then discuss the implications of the work as whole and I will focus in particular 
on the policy directions. 
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Social problems around donor anonymity 
Social constructionist theories of social problems explore how people come to 
define a certain condition as problematic, not the social condition itself. 
Schneider (1985) argues that many analysts, including himself, who describe 
their research as constructionist have trouble keeping the study of problem-
definition (claims-making) activities separate from that of social conditions. He 
notes that when analysts see conditions as 'real problems' which they want to 
help remedy through sociological investigation, it is a struggle for them to 
bracket their assumptions and focus on definitional activities. This was 
certainly a challenge for me. The silence of would-be parents in the donor 
anonymity debate might be taken to indicate that there is no problem for them. 
Yet there were indications of discontent among would-be parents which led me 
to challenge the basic assumptions of constructionism and to study the removal 
of donor anonymity as a social problem which cannot be expressed by would-
be parents in formal modes of communication. 
In terms of theoretical contribution, throughout this thesis I argued that the 
study of absent voices is a challenge to the conventional constructionist view of 
social problems, which sees them as the result of successful claims-making. In 
introducing data on voices that were not fully heard in the public debates over 
ending donor anonymity, one aim of this thesis is to suggest a more inclusive 
approach to 'claims-making' definition in social constructionist theories of 
social problems. 
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Secondly, linked to the problem above, I have argued that the social 
constructionist approach to social problems has practical difficulties if one is 
examining the claims-making activities of hidden or hard-to-reach popUlations. 
Individuals, particularly ones who have confidentiality concerns, can 
participate in claims-making activities through a variety of ways other than 
public gatherings or protests about the definitions of troublesome conditions. I 
have assumed that in some cases, claims-making may be repressed by an 
opposing group, or may not emerge due to a lack of public support or 
institutional power. It is also possible that the stakeholders of a problem cannot 
press their case due to the perceived illegitimacy of their claims. I suggested 
that analysis of such social problems may necessitate looking into alternative 
definitional activities where performing a collective activity is not possible or 
is not seen as desirable by the stakeholders of the problem. By investigating 
would-be parents' perspectives through interviews and a virtual ethnography 
study conducted on the Internet, this thesis aimed to address these two 
weaknesses. 
Early work on social problems followed a natural history model. Specifically, 
it was argued that every social problem had a history, and social problems 
developed through a series of stages. I argued that, like other social problems, 
the donor anonymity problem may have followed developmental stages. In 
outlining a natural history of the abolition of anonymity, I have attempted to 
identify these stages and illustrate the way in which certain interests, 
assumptions and claims caused a change in the law. 
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The natural history model revealed that there are two social problems 
surrounding donor anonymity: the donor-conceived child's right to know, and 
the would-be parents' right to seek treatment. By studying the natural history 
of the donor anonymity debate I identified a number of important claims that 
were made by advocates of the child's right-to-know. 
The child's right to know as a social problem 
Any social condition is a potential subject for claims-making, but it is claims-
makers who shape the public's sense of what the problem is. In Chapter Three, 
I examined the donor anonymity debate in the public eye through media 
representations. This examination helped me to identify a number of important 
claims that were made by proponents of the child's right-to-know, and to 
explain how donor-conceived children came to monopolise rights language. 
During the debate that led to the 2004 Regulations, without any significant 
objection from would-be parents, the donor anonymity problem came to be 
owned by advocates of the child's right-to-know. The view that donor-
conceived children have a right to have access to identifiable information was 
legitimised by two principal claims. First, such children have as much right to 
find out about their genetic origins as adopted people do. Studies on adopted 
children show that a child's knowledge of his or her background is crucial to 
the formation of positive self-identity. The position of donor-conceived people 
should be aligned more closely with that of adopted people, with access to 
identifying information about their donor. Genealogical knowledge is 
necessary for the development of identity: by denying access to their donor's 
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identity, the government infringes the human rights of donor-conceived 
children. Second, it was claimed that the secrecy and stigma surrounding 
assisted conception had faded and more parents were planning to tell their child 
about donor conception. The removal of donor anonymity had the potential to 
ease the remaining stigma. 
In the absence of an explicit reaction or opposition from would-be parents, 
counter-claims activities were performed by the medical community and the 
patient support group, INUK. These counter-claims making activities focused 
on the donor shortage. But the fact that would-be parents would suffer due to 
the donor shortage could find only little sympathy when weighed against the 
child welfare arguments raised by the child's right-to-know camp. The 
involvement of would-be parents in the debate might have changed the 
problem's trajectory if these parents had attempted to create a public or 
political issue by talking about their rights and experiences. But the interests of 
would-be parents were not represented and, in the absence of a counter-
discourse constructed by these parents or their representatives, claims 
concerning the child's right-to-know monopolised the human rights argument. 
As a result, would-be parents' right-to-seek treatment was compromised for the 
perceived needs of donor-conceived children. 
Instead of mobilising around the public donor anonymity debate, would-be 
parents used online discussion forums to express and exchange their views 
anonymously about the new law. There were also other indications of a social 
problem: fertility travel and purchase of sperm online increasingly featured in 
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the media after the new law came into effect. I concluded that this 'silent 
resistance' to the new law deserved to be the subject of empirical investigation. 
As detailed in Chapters Five to Eight, I used ethnographic studies to investigate 
would-be parents' reactions and claims that remained unrecognised in the 
public realm. Admittedly, the confidentiality concerns of would-be parents 
generated a methodological problem for the study by making recruitment quite 
difficult. It was hard to contact potential participants, and where contact was 
established, I ran into difficulties in convincing individuals to give interviews. I 
solved this problem by using the Internet as a recruitment channel and a data 
collection source. I used two different data collection methods: a virtual 
ethnography study on the po stings of would-be parents to online discussion 
forums, and semi-structured and open-ended interviews. In the following 
section I summarise the findings from these ethnographic studies. As I have 
mentioned in the outset of the thesis, the people whose views are presented 
here are a sub-group of would-be parents. This study does not claim to include 
a representative sample of people seeking donor conception in the UK. 
The donor anonymity problem as defined4 by would-be 
parents 
Both the posts and the interview accounts showed that understanding the nature 
of the stigma invoked by the failure to reproduce and the use of donor 
gametes/embryos was important if we wanted to understand would-be parents' 
silent resistance to the legal imposition of disclosure. The accounts showed that 
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there were two main reasons why would-be parents (the users of Repromed 
discussion forums and the interview participants) did not mobilise publicly 
around the donor anonymity problem. First, they had confidentiality concerns 
and they were therefore engaged in information control to conceal a condition 
which they saw as potentially stigmatising. Second, they could avoid the law 
by travelling to countries with donor anonymity for treatment purposes. 
Stigma and deviance 
When cultural norms and values encourage reproduction and celebrate 
parenthood, childlessness becomes an 'involuntary deviance' (Birenbaum and 
Sagarin, 1976: 35, quoted in Miall, 1986) and a potentially stigmatising status. 
Having a donor-conceived child affords individuals and couples a cloak for this 
deviance. However, donor conception still invokes abnormality as having a 
genetically-related child is perceived to be both a natural desire and the social 
norm. Having a donor-conceived child constitutes a permanent charge of 
deviance against the family. There are two such charges: first, the selfishness 
of would-be parents, who challenge nature and engage in 'manufacturing' a 
baby against the odds; and second, the donor-conceived child itself is deviant -
it might be perceived as not quite human. 
Having departed from the conventional route to parenthood, many participants 
reported uncertainty about using donor gamete/embryos to conceive. In other 
words, the would-be parents themselves categorised having a donor-conceived 
child as a negative attribute. As one interview participant pointed out, no one 
would choose give birth to a child with whom one did not have a genetic 
relationship. It was therefore important to have an information control strategy 
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that would give the resultant child and the parents the greatest comfort and ease 
so as to make the experience as 'natural' as possible. If donor conception is 
kept a secret, the family and the child may pass as normal. Hence, the legal 
imposition of disclosure may reinforce stigma rather than reducing it. 
Clearly, reproductive technologies offer a choice to those who cannot conceive 
using their own gametes; one might be able to give birth to 'a baby' and that 
baby may even be genetically connected to oneself or one's partner. This 
situation, however, does not parallel adoption given that here the recipient 
mother is also the gestational mother. Donor conception is an approximation to 
genetic parenthood which means that the adoption analogy is misleading. 
Adoption is a family-building activity that involves pre-existing individuals, 
whereas donor conception is directed towards creating a child in order to create 
a family (Haimes, 1998). In other words, adoption is a substitute for 
procreation whereas donor conception is a form of procreation: the act has its 
own integrity and completeness - it is the would-be parente s)' act and the child 
is unquestionably their child. "The act of procreation which takes place by 
artificial insemination is undoubtedly the act of the couple, and more 
particularly of the mother" (O'Donovan, 1988). In this act, social links are 
established between the procreator and the child, not with the donor. By basing 
its assumptions on an adoption analogy, the new law clearly disregards would-
be parents' biological claim to parenthood which differentiates them from 
adoptive parents. 
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Information control and disclosure 
Unlike the normal family, in the donor-conception family, parenthood is 
fragmented or separated. This separation is not desirable, and is potentially 
stigmatising for donor-conception families. As Haimes (1992) argues, in donor 
conception "the sheer fact of wanting to preserve elaborate devices for 
retaining anonymity is an indication that the genetic tie is actually regarded as 
very important indeed" (1992: 132). When anonymity is preserved, the 
donor's contribution to the conception remains invisible, hence gestational, 
biological and social parenthood can still be mediated and integrated (perhaps 
even more so than in a natural-conception family where the child is the result 
of an affair). In an open donation system, however, the donor cannot easily be 
dismissed. Despite having no legal obligations or responsibility, once the donor 
is known s/he has a potential to become an 'informal' parent to the resultant 
child, thereby separating the biological and social parentage that the would-be 
parents try to keep together. 
In considering the best interests of the child and the family unit as a whole, 
would-be parents have to consider the degree of privacy they wish to maintain, 
and the possible role of a genetic parent in their daily lives (Becker, 2000). The 
accounts in this study revealed the potential difficulties in the relationship 
between the non-genetic parent(s) and the child. The users and the participants 
reported that they had unresolved feelings about not being the genetic parents 
and uncertainty about whether to disclose donor conception to the resultant 
child and others. Another stated reason was that now that donors were 
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identifiable, the child might wish to contact the donors. The would-be parents 
did express gratitude for the donation. But their gratitude did not necessarily 
mean that they would like to have a complete stranger involved in their child's 
life. Some egg recipients also mentioned that contact might be frustrating for 
the donor, especially if the donor does not have children of her own. These 
findings contradict earlier reports. The reasoning given previously by non-
disclosing gamete donation parents (before the removal of the donor 
anonymity) was that disclosure would cause frustration if the child wished to 
trace donors (MacCallum and Golombok, 2007). In other words, when donors 
are anonymous some parents may keep donor conception secret in order to 
protect the child from the frustration of not being able to contact the donor. But 
the accounts in my study suggest that if donors are identifiable, some parents 
may opt for secrecy in order to protect the family as a unit from a donor 
intruding into their lives. The discrepancy in the findings seems to suggest that 
both donor-involvement and donor-absence might be perceived as problematic. 
All of the posts and interview accounts relating to disclosure suggested that 
whether to tell or not, what is to be disclosed, and when that disclosure should 
occur were perceived as private family matters: there was, in other words, a 
consensus that the disclosure decision should be left to the parents. The reasons 
given by the would-be parents who had already decided against disclosure to 
the child were similar to those given in earlier investigations: the view that 
disclosure could be more harmful than beneficial to the child; the view that 
there was no reason to tell; the wish to avoid any potential difficulties in the 
relationship between the non-genetic parent and the child: and the fear that the 
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grandparents might reject the child (Cook and Golombok, 1995a; Cook and 
Golombok, 1995b; Murray and Golombok, 2000; MacCallum and Golombok, 
2007). Although a relatively small number of participants and Repromed users 
thought that it was in the child's best interests to know, there was a consensus 
that a child would not be skilled enough to make sense of this information or 
skilled enough to judge with whom to share it. The participants took the view 
that protecting the best interests of the child meant managing this 'potentially 
stigmatising' information on behalf of the child, rather than giving the child 
autonomy at any cost. The accounts of Repromed users and interview 
participants revealed that these would-be parents were not only engaged in 
information control to protect the unborn child and but also to protect their 
family unit as a whole. Information control allowed them to perform a public 
display of normalcy which would protect their family privacy. 
The overpowenng discourse of the 'child's right-to-know' led interview 
participants and Repromed users to invoke a counter-morality to defeat the 
charges against them. Many pointed out that openness with the child was not 
always preferable or possible. They also noted that there were many children 
who were born as a result of affairs, or short term relationships, in natural-
conception families who did not know their genetic origins. The would-be 
parents did not present their deviance a 'moral failure' as such, but rather as 
akin to an illness over which they had no control. The disclosure policy, which 
as we have seen applies only to donor-conception families, was perceived as 
discriminatory both against donor-conception families and naturally-conceived 
children who may not have been told by their parents about their origins. Given 
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that natural-conception families had not been 'advised' or encouraged na 
legislation to be open with their children, the need for identifying information 
was seen as neither essential nor universal. Like 'normal' parents, the would-be 
parents also wanted to have autonomy to decide what is best for their child and 
what information should be openly communicated in their family. 
In the UK, as O'Donovan (1989) argues, the concept of identity being appealed 
to "is produced by legal and social structures which attach value to concepts of 
identity linked to genitors" (1989: 102). Shenfield (1994) also argues "the law 
has always been an important adjunct to the societal understanding of identity, 
symbolically reinforcing the notions of paternity and maternity, which can give 
rise to complex problems of filiation in assisted reproduction" (quoted in 
Shenfield and Steele, 1997) The new law ignores would-be parents' identity as 
biological parents and marginalises donor conception families. 
The intention to disclose depends on the perceived normative values (not being 
genetic parents to the resultant child) and the degree of privacy, confidentiality, 
or openness that would-be parents wish to maintain. The current law 
compounds stigma by obliging them to separate biological and social 
parenthood and to display their differences from natural-conception families. 
Goffman (1963) notes that "what will conceal a stigma from unknowing 
persons may also ease matters for those in the know" (1963: 126). My findings 
suggested that many would-be parents were reluctant to raise their voices 
during the donor anonymity debate because they did not want to be exposed to 
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publicity. Some would-be parents who tried to have their voices heard by using 
online discussion forums, giving anonymous interviews and/or participating in 
the HFEA's public consultations stated that the HFEA did not take patients' 
views into consideration in policy making. Presumably public bodies can only 
deal with issues through formal and transparent modes of communication; but 
as my study highlights, pressing claims against the policy change in formal 
ways would have 'exposed' would-be parents, perhaps permanently 
stigmatising the resultant children and their family units. 
Fertility travel 
The users of discussion forums on Repromed and the interview participants 
were united in the view that the removal of anonymity had identifiable 
detrimental effects: donors are reluctant to donate; UK clinics cannot meet the 
demand for gametes; there are long waiting lists for patients who wish to get 
treatment; and reduction in donors has also compromised would-be parents' 
chances of finding a donor with a reasonable match to their own physical 
characteristics or those of their partner. 
The would-be parents who want to use gametes from anonymous donors have 
no choice but to seek treatment abroad. Given the shortage of donors and long 
waiting lists, even those would-be parents who favour openness are left with no 
choice: if they wish to avoid the lengthy waiting lists, they have to consider 
travelling abroad. The accounts of the Repromed users and the interview 
participants showed that would-be parents saw the donor shortage as a direct 
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consequence of the removal of donor anonymity. The would-be parents 
blamed the HFEA for the circumstances that ' o b l i g e ~ ~ them to seek treatment 
abroad. The fact that obtaining treatment abroad has been condemned by the 
HFEA is a cause of further frustration for the would-be parents. These parents 
also expressed the view that their concerns were not taken into consideration 
by the HFEA. Further research examining the communication gap between the 
stakeholders and the HFEA would contribute to developing strategies that will 
infonn policymaking. 
Regardless of their views about the new law, many would-be parents express 
the view that they do not wish to be treated differently from 'nonnal ~ ~ families. 
Many would-be parents also express their discontent about being given 
parental advice and 'dictated' by the HFEA as to how to communicate with the 
donor conceived children about their origins. It would be fruitful for HFEA to 
address these concerns and find a more favourable language to address donor 
conception families, without marginalising or infantilising them. 
Ignoring the moral autonomy of the would-be parents inevitably drives some of 
them abroad to seek treatment to organise their family lives as they see fit. The 
movement of the would-be parents to other jurisdictions indicates that some 
people choose to cope with the problem by avoiding the law, rather than 
making official claims to challenge the policy-makers. Their reluctance to 
mobilise around pressing claims against the removal of donor anonymity partly 
reflects the variety of ways in which they can avoid the impact of this 
legislation: fertility travel acts as a safety valve. As I have mentioned in 
.... _ .. _-_ ..... _ .. ,_ .. _._-------_. 
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Chapter Eight, this is often described, pejoratively, as fertility or reproductive 
'tourism'. The label 'tourism', however, trivialises and obscures the serious 
issues that underlie cross-border travel in search of treatment. As the accounts 
in this study show, restrictive regulations, gamete shortages and waiting lists 
are clearly overlapping concerns, but the connection between them is not 
necessarily immutable. Exploring the extent to which regulatory regimes and 
consumerist reproductive culture playa role in UK patients' fertility travel 
would be fruitful. 
Policy directions 
Although there is no evidence that anyone policy is the best solution, 
legislators tend to impose one position on donor anonymity (Pennings, 1997). 
The UK government has made it clear that it does not intend to reverse the 
removal of donor anonymity (Department of Health, 2006). Yet the silent 
resistance of would-be parents to the new law should be addressed by policy 
makers: suppressed claims are likely to generate new problems. 
The donor anonymity problem can be solved by balancing the rights of 
recipients and donor offspring. The most obvious alternative policy would be 
to let the parties decide for themselves. Pennings (1997) suggests 'a double 
track policy', a system still in use in the United States. The model was initially 
introduced because of the difficulty of attracting egg donors and it is currently 
used in most donor gamete/embryo programmes. The advantage of a double 
track policy is that both donors and recipients are given a choice. The model 
304 
takes moral pluralism as its starting point: "it is built on the admission that no 
position is inherently better than the others and that consequently the parties 
should be able to decide under which conditions they want to participate" 
(Pennings, 2004). Potential donors have the choice to enter the programme as 
either anonymous donors or identifiable ones, and the recipients can choose 
between these two 'pools'. The advantage is obvious: the model is self-
regulating and choice is given to both donors and recipients: "[W]ithout any 
form of coercion or external force, the practice is directed in such a way that no 
person can say that his rights are infringed. The power balance is guaranteed by 
the simple fact that every party can veto any proposal of any other party" 
(Pennings, 2004: 2842). Obviously, a double track policy does not offer a 
solution to the problem of donor-conceived children who believe they have a 
right to know the identity of their donor(s): parents can still keep the 
information from the child and where a child does not suspect his or her 
circumstances of conception, no question of tracing one's genetic origins exists 
(Liu, 1991: 85). But in this respect the double track system would not be any 
worse than the current one and, as I go on to argue, there are other features of 
the system that suggest it deserves serious consideration. 
In the UK, a double track system might reduce the numbers of would-be 
parents travelling to other jurisdictions for treatment, thereby helping to allay 
the fears of the HFEA and, crucially, reducing the need for warnings that seem 
to block the opportunity for communication between the Authority and would-
be parents. Less prohibitive laws might also help to reduce the problem of 
exploitation of donors from poorer countries. Moreover, if the double track 
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system was introduced in the UK, the government could still make its moral 
position explicit by providing services with identifiable donors though the NHS 
(i.e., without charge). 
There are two equality-type arguments that might be raised against the double 
track system. It might be argued, first, that the system installs or facilitates 
improper discrimination given that it allows for different treatment of children 
(depending on the pool chosen) and, second, that it is also discriminatory if 
those who have sufficient private resources can 'buy' their way out of 
identifiable donation. These arguments are debatable, however. First, in the 
absence of measures that compel disclosure, the current system does not 
eliminate discrimination: it is parents decide whether or not to disclose, acting 
as gatekeepers to the right to know. Secondly, the current system is no better at 
avoiding 'buy-out' by those with sufficient wealth: although anonymous 
donation is prohibited under the law (Pennings, 2004), those who can afford it 
are able to seek treatment abroad using anonymous gametes/embryos, thereby 
avoiding waiting lists as well. 
The removal of donor anonymity is a failed policy, unsupported by evidence 
and based on a misconception of the relative weight to be given to the different 
rights involved. The policy undennines the sustainability of gamete donation 
while failing to promote communication within families and drives would-be 
parents abroad. The government did consult before introducing the policy 
change but as I have shown the odds were stacked against the inclusiyity of this 
consultation: the government was not likely to get a public reaction from 
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would-be parents because, as their accounts show those who are most directly , . 
affected by the disclosure policy are also those who prefer to keep the means of 
conception secret. And, because they have no reason to stop fearing publicity, 
it is unlikely that these would-be parents will feel able to take a public stand 
against the effects of the new law. For the would-be parents in this study 
complying with the new law creates is perceived as stigmatising; yet, as they 
point out, the moral entrepreneurs behind the reform have also characterised 
avoidance in such a way as to make it stigmatising. Rather than public 
condemnation of those who choose to maintain secrecy about donor conception 
and those who travel abroad to avoid the law and its effects, the UK needs to 
work towards an inclusive, fully informed debate on the relationship between 
the right to know one's genetic identity and family rights, including family 
privacy. Without such a debate, would-be parents might well take the view that 
'assisted conception' is a misleading and contradictory term. 
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Appendix 1 - Information about the interview participants 
Name Marital Sex Age Sexual Medical Considering Treatment Existing 
status orientation Condition treatment received children 
Darren Married M 36 Heterosexual Azoospermia No ICSI treatment Twins by ICSI 
Fiona Married F 31 Heterosexual Early Egg donation Donor eggs F oster parent 
menopause 
Tina Married F 41 Heterosexual Unexplained Another cycle Donor egg, Pregnant 
ICSI and 
embryo 
Rosie Cohabiting F 42 Heterosexual Unexplained Egg donation Traditional IVF None 
Hannah Married F 43 Heterosexual Unexplained No Donor eggs Twins by surrogacy 
Carol Married F 34 Heterosexual Premature Adoption N/A None 
Ovarian 
Failure 
Liz Married F 32 Heterosexual Premature Embryo Donor eggs 1 child adopted 
Ovarian donation 
Failure 
Mark Married M 34 Heterosexual Azoospermia No None 1 child adopted 
Alice Widowed F 33 Heterosexual Premature Egg donation Donor eggs and Pregnant 
Ovarian deceased 
Failure husband's 
frozen sperm 
Bette Cohabiting F 34 Homosexual None Maybe Sperm I shared Pregnant 
eggs 
~ ~ ~ ~
Lindsay Married F 46 Heterosexual Unexplained No Embryo One adopted, one by 
embryo donation 
Cindy Single F 18 Heterosexual Polycystic Donating eggs None None 
Ovary 
Syndrome 
-
Tom Single M 21 Heterosexual None No D o n a t i n ~ ~ sperm None 
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